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ABSTRACT:
The phrase “the fullness of time” touches upon one of M. M. Bakhtin’s most consistently
upheld tenets; for Bakhtin, philosophical and everyday utterances rely on their historical
embeddedness for the material and concrete reality from which they draw their meaning
and through which they are conditioned, inflected, and re-evaluated. In his very last work
Bakhtin stated that all meanings are in continuous evolution. In this thesis the attempt is
made to interpret Bakhtin’s corpus by concentrating particularly on the movement of
historical and philosophical becoming, the art of responding to philosophy and the events
of everyday life, and the particular mutual inter-relatedness of the disciplines of ethics,
aesthetics, biology, psychology, psychoanalysis, and linguistics as these discourses are
taken up in Bakhtin and the Bakhtin Circle’s writings.

Key words:
Answerability, Architectonics, Authorship, Bakhtin, Chronotopicity, Dialogue,
Discourse, Freud, History, Voloshinov.
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A work of literature... is revealed primarily in the
differentiated unity of culture of the epoch in which it is
created, but it cannot be closed off in this epoch: its fullness is
revealed only in great time.
—Bakhtin, Speech Genres, p. 5.

iv

For my parents...

v

Acknowledgements:
I would like to thank Dr. Michael Gardiner for his patience and profound kindness during
the composition of this work. Without his insight and expertise, I could not have made
this beginning into the headwaters of Bakhtinian literature. Dr. G., I look forward to a
continuing dialogue with you in the years to come.
Dr. Antonio Calcagno helped me to get settled both at CSTC and in Husserl’s
writings. Thank you, Tony ... Forza!
I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Joel Faflak and Dr. Carole
Farber who continue to give of their time and energy to CSTC and the larger community
at Western, and without whom nascent works like this would never be read or critiqued.
There are many proper names on the periphery of this text, whose voices I often
heard during its composition, and who continue to teach me from a distance. Among
these are Joseph Siddiqi, Dr. Susan Songsuk Hahn, Dr. Jakub Zdebik, Dr. David N.
Wright, Dr. Bina Toledo Freiwald, and Dr. Jonathan Sachs, each of whom was influential
in my undergraduate work and helped make viable my sojourn out of Montréal to CSTC.
I’d like to thank Dr. Veronica Schild for perceiving very early that Michael
Gardiner and Antonio Calcagno would lend the necessary direction to my studies at
CSTC.
To Dr. Tilottama Rajan, thank you for seeing in me the seed of something to
come. I look forward to our continuing conversation.
Dr. Peter Schwenger, thank you for your inexhaustible passion for the arts. Dr.
Damjana Bratuž, thank you for showing me how to actively listen in dialogue with
Bartók—maybe someday I’ll actually have an ear for it!
Melanie Cladwell Clark, thank you for being a gravitational centre at CSTC,
without you it all flies apart.
My colleagues Will Samson and Siobhan Waters I trust with my sanity, as they let
me know when I walk too close to the edge. Thanks.
This work could not have gotten off the ground at all without the help and untiring
support of Susannah Mulvale. She has remained a friend and colleague through years of
feast and famine. Thanks for everything, Sus, and not least of all for Katze.
My parents, Marilyn and Cyril Hall gave me life and then allowed me the freedom
to pursue a path of my own choosing. The two of you know better than anyone else what
this means to me. Thanks Mom and Dad.
Finally, a warm thank you to my unofficial mentor, Dr. Dennis O’Connor, who
found me a seedling in need of watering—who first sowed in this parched soil the idea
that there is a difference between being and having, and that this difference is not without
its own ambiguity. You will likely never know the extent to which your influence at a
distance teaches me daily... but I always try to remember to say thanks!

vi

Table of contents for
In the Fullness of Time: M. M. Bakhtin,
In Discourse and in Life
Certificate of Examination................................................................................................ii
Abstract..............................................................................................................................iii
Epigraph............................................................................................................................iv
Dedication...........................................................................................................................v
Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................vi
Table of Contents.............................................................................................................vii
Introduction........................................................................................................................1
A.
B.
§ 1.

The Vertigo of History...............................................................................1
Outline of the Whole................................................................................10

Biography: M. M. Bakhtin..................................................................................15
A Novel Education: Bakhtin’s Bildungsroman in Brief........................................15

§ 2.

Ethics: Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability..................21

2.1

Lost in Translation?: Bakhtin Meets the West.......................................................21

2.2

Christ or Marx?: How to Read Bakhtin’s Ethical Writings...................................24

2.3

Beyond Orthodoxy: Kenosis and an Ethics of the Event......................................26

2.4

I and I: A Genealogy of Ethics..............................................................................40

2.5

In the Flesh: Slovo, or the Word as Deed..............................................................43

§ 3.

Biology: Bakhtin, Kanaëv, and “Contemporary Vitalism”.............................49

3.1

A Brief History of “Contemporary Vitalism”:
Contextualizing the Kanaëv Paper.........................................................................49

3.2

Bakhtin and Kanaëv’s Critique of “Contemporary Vitalism”...............................54

3.3

Biology and Dialectical Materialism......................................................................59

3.4

Introducing the Soma, Instincts, and the Pleasure Principle into
Psychoanalysis........................................................................................................64

3.5

Freudian Appropriations of Biological Theory and Praxis:
Beyond the Pleasure Principle...............................................................................71
vii

§ 4.

Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Freudianism: A Marxist Critique.................80

4.1

Between Marxism and ‘Freudianism’:
Valentin Voloshinov & Psychoanalysis................................................................80

4.2

Freudianism: A Marxist Critique..........................................................................84

4.3

Extending the Bakhtin Circle’s Critique of Psychoanalysis.................................92

§ 5.

Discourse: A Critique of Saussurean Linguistics...........................................102

5.1

Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Saussurean Linguistics:
Child Psychology and Pedagogy: the Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952................102

5.2

Between Ergon and Energeia:
Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language...................................110

5.3

“Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”………………………………….......117

§ 6.

The Polyphonic Novel: Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics..............................128

6.1

Hearing Voices: Polyphony in the Novel............................................................128

6.2

Heroic Self-Consciousness..................................................................................130

6.3

The Idea in Dostoevsky......................................................................................136

§ 7.

Chronotopicity: Bakhtin’s Writings on Rabelais and Goethe.....................143

7.1

Seeing Auras:
Bakhtin’s Concept of Chronotopicity................................................................143

7.2

A Little History of the Novel:
Novelistic Genres and Forms of the Chronotope...............................................150

7.3

A Pregnant Death:
The Rabelaisian Chronotope..............................................................................157

7.4

In the Fullness of Time:
Goethe’s Chronotope and the Roman Carnival………………………………..168

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….177
Notes..............................................................................................................................179
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….232
Curriculum Vitae………………………………………………………………….....241
viii

1
Introduction

A.

The Vertigo of History
“Finally the Great Artisan ordained that man, to whom He could give nothing belonging only to himself,
should share in common whatever properties had been peculiar to each of the other creatures. He received
man, therefore, as a creature of undetermined nature, and placing him in the middle of the universe, said this
to him: ‘Neither an established place, nor a form belonging to you alone, nor any special function have We
given you, O Adam, and for this reason, that you may have and possess, according to your desire and
judgment, whatever place, whatever form, and whatever functions you shall desire.”
—Pico della Mirandola1

Pico della Mirandola called us the “nuptial bond of the world,” and the “interval between
enduring eternity and the flow of time,” but he failed to mention the vertigo caused by
this suspension between heaven and earth. 2 ‘Man’ is free! So says Pico. Free to crawl
as low as vermin, free to fly as high as the angels. But there is an ambivalence tied up in
this freedom. We are chameleons, as much shaped by as shaping our environment.3 My
intent in this thesis is to speak with many voices. Do men and women—and those for
whom these gendered categories prove insufficient—have the capacity for self-conscious
becoming, or contrariwise does becoming have human beings? Am I free to speak with
many voices? The institutions and ideas that make us what we are, as beings, sometimes
grip us very tightly indeed. Pico struck M. M. Bakhtin as a cautious man, somewhat still
held by the past, by the cultural inheritance of his forebearers and by the idea of a natural
order in which humans fit snugly in their place.4 The idea of hierarchy was archetypally
embedded in humanism during the Renaissance. Of this there is no doubt. But Pico
focused on movement rather than on a static one-time creation; in some sense he placed
the importance on the event rather than being. You are what you sow. According to
Pico, where we cultivate vegetative germs in human soil, we grow into carrots, and where
we plant the seeds of sensitivity, we grow into animals. But where ‘man’ is rational there
he will be a brother to the angels.5 His ideas about the mutability of ‘mankind’ bumped
up against similar notions in Giambattista Porta and Giordano Bruno, and “especially
Campanella.”6 This metaphor of the seed as it appears in Renaissance humanism evinces,
as the story goes, the first loosening of the great chain of being. The importance of this
epochal and perceptual shift away from the Medieval mind cannot be overestimated.
At first glance, the problem of speaking with many voices and of knowing when
and how to listen are not complex questions. It seems self-evident that I speak for myself
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and no one else and that no one else speaks for me. Yet no one seriously believes they
are objects among objects, or that they can communicate in private languages.7 In our
everyday lives, we usually use words as if they are transparently our own property. Yet
we do not invent the language in which we speak, play, think, pray, work, and love. If
pressed most of us will readily admit this. We are not wholly self-consistent. I will claim
my action to the extent that I do not trip over myself, and the rest... well ‘the devil made
me do it.’ Yet a wholly transparent selfhood is not supported by the evidence. There are
exceptions and endless qualifications of course, all the necessary reservations. We rest
assured: we have the power to speak with at least a tacit and tentative voice of our own—
from the very heart of our subjectivity? Somewhere at the centre of my existence, a voice
reassures me that I am a centre around which the world has arranged itself, even if what I
try to say comes out somewhat garbled and double-voiced. A little reflection on this felt
freedom to speak our minds, however, and we grow worried. We know that we are not
free where our institutions are concerned. And these institutions have a hand in making
us who we are. Are they not at least in part responsible for shaping what we believe? Do
they not mediate between the world and this little tacit voice that whispers ‘I am myself,
after all, of that there can be no doubt?’ Even where others are concerned, we are by
turns impugned and praised, assisted and resisted, taught how to love, how to pray, how
to speak, and how to live. And much of this teaching and assistance, criticism and
approbation, takes place before we learn to write our own name. So just like Pico, each
one of us is as much shaped by the past as we are active in shaping the future. The same
antecedents who provided Pico with the new humanist certainty that ‘man’ is born free
also haunted him with hierarchies; they told him that the nature in which he was
immersed was prepared in advance, fixed, ready-made.8 The belief in a God pantocrator
has no small part to play in many of the conflicts that arise between human beings, since
what we believe translates into how we act. In this sense, it makes all the difference in
the world whether one defers their motivation to an unseen hand or, contrariwise, whether
one believes human beings alone have the power of meaningful action.
Our institutions should also worry us. Without denying that this worry is itself
given shape within the milieu of institutions, the greater part of critique is nevertheless
born among and falls back upon institutions. One might speak in an almost child-like
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manner when grasping to understand the intuition: to riff on Deleuze and Guattari, in a
slightly different key, we might allow a little silliness here and say that everything is an
institution. Engels, for example, said the hand and the tool were mutualist institutions.9
Critique is only meaningful when it takes the form of a dialogue between human beings
and the institutions they create. The human being is itself an institution. Where they are
working at their highest capacity—i.e., crystallized in the institution of thought—the
efficacy of our institutions ought to be continually questioned. Do they provide us with
the maximum ‘freedom’ while at the same time offering the least resistance? After all, is
that not what an institution does? In terms of essences—and one should always retain a
healthy scepticism as regards essences—an institution facilitates and lubricates the world
while making sure to get out of the way of the human bodies it supports. In a world
where everything seems to live and die according to its status as institution, there arises
an emergent necessity to perpetually question the value of our institutions in all their
ubiquity. But if the human being is itself an institution—i.e., an inherited idea passed to
us by our antecedents, and if everything knowable about the human being is made known
by the human being, how do we measure the value of this knowing? The old humanist
problem of ‘man’ as measure of ‘himself’ rears its head here. How does a ruler measure
itself? Can a ruler tell you how big a centimetre is?
History should also worry us. We are likewise conditioned by as much as we
condition history. Tied up in history, between the earth and the sky, are many major and
minor narratives. There is a canon of our dearly departed and kindred philosophers’
proper names, which we must recite and learn as if by rote. But for how long? Is it not
sad if we go on forever thinking this way? Jules Laforgue said, “La vie est trop triste,
trop sale. L’histoire est un vieux cauchemar bariolé qui ne se doute pas que les
meilleures plaisanteries sont les plus courtes.”10 Insomuch as we are unconsciously
conditioned by history it bears us up tightly in its arms, and we suffer from the delusion
that the more we critique it the more we shall loosen its grip, never suspecting that we are
this history incarnate. But history is not only a nightmare, it is an adventure and a farce.
The same history that holds us from absolute possibility provides us with its legacy. Our
forebearers’ accomplishments in religion, ethics, natural history, psychology, linguistics,
literature, physics and all of our institutions restrain our freedom to become while
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providing the very possibility of historical becoming. We never move forward without
presupposing a firm footing on the cultural achievement of the past.
In my graduate work I have been twice blessed.
First I have discovered in the work of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin a crossroads
of sorts. Which comes first, being or responsibility? Ontology before ethics! This used
to be a personal maxim until Bakhtin convinced me otherwise. Language conditions
being, and—by extension—our ethically active human understanding. To proceed from a
strictly theoretical ontology without the living ingression into being, without answering
theory by architectonically conjoining it with practice, is to remain wholly on the side of
theoretical cognition—as Graham Roberts defines it, the word architectonic refers to “the
science of relations, of how parts relate together to form a (dynamic) whole.”11 In
proceeding from this strict theoretical point of view we amputate the real everyday
material aspect of our lives qua becoming. To proceed from the other direction, wholly
from the sensual aspect of our lives, consigns sense itself to the rubble of human history;
living this way, we lose our cultural and socioeconomic birthright to a wholly
aestheticized life.
As we will see, in Section Two, both of these approaches to ethics are necessary
but insufficient. Ontology and ethics are wed inseparably to each other in Bakhtin. The
world calls out to us and exhorts us to answer what he terms once-occurrent being-asevent—i.e., life in its creative and ever-rejuvenating present. For Bakhtin, we ought not
cease asking the question of the relationship between discourse and life. Life as it is lived
is a perpetual process that human beings are self-evidently held responsible to answer—
this is the price demanded us for the gift of self-consciousness. Bakhtin calls the ethically
active process of responding to the present moment the architectonics of answerability.
Since the sensual world is in constant flux, and since our answers are ineluctably
conditioned by the history we are attempting to answer, a constant re-phrasing is
necessary. In Section Two I will take up Bakhtin’s phenomenological and ethical
writings. These seek to establish the architectonically formed meaning of a life through
co-authorship. Never complete, co-authorship of a life is a perpetually renewed process
that takes place between self and other—i.e., between the author and hero. Authorship is
always conditional and pending upon the verification grounded in the body and life of the
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other. This verification is possible because, for Bakhtin, the other has an excess of
seeing—a sort of overflow of insight into the subject, which the other has and uses to help
temporarily complete—consummate—the subject. Since human beings are caught up in a
situation, they always have a view from somewhere, a position, and their selfunderstanding is necessarily limited as a result. The other’s excess of seeing provides
insight into those blind-spots, and the other therefore fills out the purview of the subject
through an intersubjective relation. It is only by being-with, only this exotopic
condition—i.e., by being located outside of the other rather than being co-extensive with
the other—that we can answer the call of being-as-event and consummate our lives.
Authorship and ethical answerability are always active. They take place through
unending dialogue between the subject and other and between the subject and the world.
Second, Bakhtin has been a profound teacher and touchstone for me in terms of
what I consider the question of 20th century philosophy—namely, ought humanism give
way completely to what Foucault has called the hermeneutics of the subject? Bakhtin
stands in the interstice between our fading faith in humanism and the rise of what Allon
White refers to as “semantic personalism.”12 M. M. Bakhtin provides us with a rich
account of world history from the point of view of the life’s ‘big questions.’ Post-1960’s
philosophical cynicism and the suspicion of all things relating to the subject do not tend
to humour these distinctly humanist concerns. But in a world that is once again all too
ready to throw its history in the dust-bin, to return to its repressed ground of existence, to
grant its corporations personhood while rolling back the welfare state, I have yet to hear
an argument that can dissuade me from the conviction that humanism is not wholly
beyond redemption or that post-structuralism can save us from ourselves. The first task
as human theorists, it seems to me, is to be theorists without ceasing to be human, and to
be human without ceasing to think critically.
There will never be a satisfactory grand narrative, and certainly humanism must
reject monological—i.e., univocal—teleology. But there is nevertheless an ongoing great
dialogue in which we need to actively seek a seat at the table, because we are all
implicated. This dialogue is neither wholly historical nor purely immanent to textuality,
but both the text and history require a “rejoinder” from us—we historical-semantic human
beings.13 What is the question asked in this great dialogue? That is part of the territory of
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this little survey. We need the right ears to hear this question, but we can say from the
very beginning that it is heard in a several modes and in a multiplicity of voices—it is
polyphonic. The question is not one but many. I have already begun to hint at the
intonation of this question as I hear it: what does it mean to be a human being? What is
the relationship between human beings and their institutions? How is the relationship
between human beings ethically and ontologically constituted? How are we historically
conditioned and how do we condition our history? And perhaps most tacit of all, I hear
these questions: What am I responsible for? How do I ethically answer these questions?
I do believe in redemption and its necessity. If this makes me a utopian thinker,
so be it. Yet perhaps we need to begin critically rethinking Utopia as a polyphonic,
double-voiced struggle, according to the logic of evolution and becoming. As Michael
Gardiner points out, both Merleau-Ponty and Bakhtin “uphold the Utopian possibility of
an ‘ideal community of embodied subjects.’”14 This ideal is bolstered not for the sake of
some monological vision of a singular collective telos realized at the end of history, but to
keep ever-present at the forefront of dialogue the reminder that our situatedness is not
solipsistic but intersubjective. Let us be clear here: I believe in redemption’s necessity,
but I do not believe in its absolute actualization. Like the problem of history, justice is
aporetic. It calls to us and requires us to answer, but this in no way means that we are
equal to the task. Life compels us to live without ready-made answers. Redemptive
embodiment and ideal communities are virtualities not eventualities, but they are
nevertheless embedded in the real socioeconomic milieu of everyday life and are selfreflexive, like the “critical Utopias” of Gardiner’s own theoretical position.15
There is no alibi we may give to the Reaper—he knows his chaff—and just so, it
is not permissible to scapegoat my personal situation. To live as if I am not myself is to
live in an illusion, and to live passively is to rebuke life itself. Where I hear a voice in the
event that calls me to act—be it to help a fellow traveller or to seek to leave the world a
more sustainable place for your grandchildren whom I will never meet—I must act.
The ethical project of answering life as once-occurring being-as-event is an
endless task. As human beings, we tend to seek ready-made solutions, easy answers, and
to lead finalized lives—i.e., as if we are wholly self-consistent and can live according to a
blueprint. The more we stutter toward uttering a true word, however, the more our words
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seem to catch in our throat. It bears repeating. In what follows I will attempt to speak
with many voices, presuming that this is both possible and permissible. How often we
treat others as if they were simply moments of our own life and as if they are not active
historical adventurers in their own right. I do not expect that my audience will always
agree with what is to follow, heaven forbid! Only dogmatism seeks to pre-empt
disagreement. This work is as much an invitation to the great dialogue regarding some of
the ideas of Bakhtin’s own time and our own as it is a monograph on the man himself.
It is essential to enter this great dialogue with a view to great time. That is to say,
we are mortal players on this planet, but we nevertheless participate in immortality. Yet
at the time I am writing this, we have turned the page of history to the 21st century having
almost entirely forgotten this long view of historical time—at least in our everyday and
non-theoretical lives. Even when we do look to the long view of history, there is a danger
of seeing only its negative aspect. Interpreted from the point of view of an individual life
and death, the image of great time is often only negatively inflected; in the wholly
negative polarization of the image of great time, we are reminded that our mortal lives are
insignificant in comparison with images of immortality.
The quasi-immortal Californian redwood, for example, can evince a feeling of
temporal impotence. In Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo there is a scene in which Jimmy
Stewart (a.k.a. ‘Scottie’) and Kim Novak (a.k.a. ‘Madeleine Elster/Judy Barton’) are
found walking among the California redwoods. Both characters ostensibly suffer from
personal limitations that obstruct their forward progression in life: Scottie from vertigo
and Barton cum ‘Madeleine Elster’ from the belief that she is the reincarnated spirit of
‘Carlotta’—a high society woman who drowned herself in the mid 19th century. In a
sense, both characters are immobilized by the vertigo of their personal history. The
audience overhears Stewart’s character read from a tourist placard: (referring to the
redwoods) “‘Their true name is sequoia sempervirens... always green, ever living.’”
When Scottie and Madeleine stop to view a cross-section of one of the fallen sequoias,
Hitchcock uses one of his famed slow-moving camera pans across the trees-rings to
intimate historical unfolding according to great time. We see “1066: The Battle of
Hastings,” “1215: Magna Carta Signed,” “1492: Discovery of America,” etc., with
arrows pointing to the chalked tree-rings. Pointing to the rings Novak speaks the iconic
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line: “Somewhere in here I was born ... and there I died. It was only a moment for you.
You ... you took no notice.” The great age of the trees upsets Novak’s character. They
remind her she will have to die—that her life is insignificant relative to the quasi-eternal
redwood. As we will see in the fourth and in the last sections of this work, for Bakhtin
there are both positive and negative polarities in images of life and death. Elster/Barton’s
verbal utterance expresses the wholly negative pole from which we understand great
time. Understood only negatively, our lives certainly appear insignificantly short when
compared with the sequoia, the age of the earth, of a star, or of the solar-system.
Nevertheless, there is also a positive polarity that can be coaxed out of images of life and
death in great time. When seen outside of the point of view of the individual, when
understood in terms of the collective cultural and historical life, great time takes on a
positive character in which the quasi-immortal human dialogue comes into sharp focus.
From this vista, even the image of individual life and death becomes re-infused with the
larger importance of the collective body of humankind to which it is connected. In taking
the problem of great time seriously, and by retaining in the image of individual life and
death its bi-polar negative and positive aspects, our lives may undergo a dramatic reintonation of what it means to live in the face of death; great time pushes to the
background some aspects of life with which we are often preoccupied and it brings into
sharp focus matters that we do not usually consider from day to day. If we have forgotten
how to view great time in terms of the great dialogue, we are in danger of hearing only its
negative inflections: ‘But why must I die?’ ‘I expected more out of life!’ ‘You only live
once, better take while the taking’s good!’ Such attitudes are the expression of a
vertiginous relationship between the individual and the larger whole with which he is
connected. Bakhtin provides us an alternative to the strictly negative and impotent image
of individual life and death, and we need now more than ever to hear what he has to say.
Bakhtin’s corpus and the writings of the Bakhtin Circle give us particular cause to
celebrate. By taking a long view of history and by returning to the big problems of
science, the humanities, and philosophy, he provides us a path back into the human
historical and cultural past with an eye to redeeming and rejuvenating what we cannot
leave behind without ceasing to be embodied self-reflective and semantic persons. As
such, he brings the self-autonomy promised in humanism back to life without promoting a
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manifest destiny or re-inscribing dogmatism, and at the same time he avoids the spirit of
absolute relativity that leaves philosophy and science without direction. In a sense,
Bakhtin is a funambulist. He walks a tightrope between the largely authoritarian human
past and the complete openness of the undisclosed future. The problem of history is the
problem of determining the proper weight we ought to ascribe to freedom and necessity,
and this problem is one belonging to the ontological category of becoming not being. In
other words, the problem of history is something set out for humans as a task and we
deceive ourselves when we propose ready-made solutions or attempt to finalize it. In
offering his particular perspective on history, Bakhtin shows a way forward that does not
dismiss the past as a mere nightmare. He never loses sight of the big picture—he always
has an eye to how the individual opens onto the greater narrative of species, of the bipolarity inherent in images of life and death. Only when understood with an eye to this
bi-polarity can the great weight of history be reborn as laughter. Only where we have an
ear for hearing the great dialogue and when we have taught ourselves to see the fullness
of time will we place the image of human beings back in the scale of great time.
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B.

Outline of the Whole

Rather than proceeding strictly analytically, I will attempt a more thematic and narrative
style throughout this work. This is not to say that analysis will not be an essential
component. No commentary can answer its subject without detailed and acute analysis,
but I wish to follow a style more akin to that of Bakhtin himself. Therefore, I hope that
what follows will be productive for the reader by gradually building up these themes in
additive rhythms rather than by providing a strict analytical reconstruction. This latter
approach is sometimes unavoidable, but I have usually found it leads to dry and spiritless
prose. There are now so many monographs on Bakhtin that I would be remiss if I did not
attempt to entertain as well as to inform.
Before we begin I will briefly outline some of the themes which I will take up
section by section. Those who wish to plunge right in without this spoiler can skip to
Section One.
Section One will outline some of the more salient details of Bakhtin’s early
biographical education leading up to his first book length publication Problems of
Dostoevsky’s Poetics in 1929.
Section Two provides a perspectival account of Bakhtin’s ethics. That is, it does
not attempt to exhaust his ethical writings, which are found, for the most part, in Toward
a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability. Since no neutrality is possible, no
attempt at neutrality can or will be made here. My reading of Bakhtin’s ethics attempts to
find a middle ground between Christian-doctrinal/liberal and Marxist-semiotic and
semantic appropriations. The former are found in the writings of Ann Shukman, Michael
Holquist and Katerina Clark, and others. I take Allon White as a proponent of the latter.
I tend to fall closer to White’s reading, by emphasizing the conceptual rather than
religious basis for Bakhtin’s own appropriation of both Christian and Marxist concepts.
The first part of this section will therefore focus on Bakhtin’s notion of ethical
consummation between subject and other. As we all know in experience, we appear
differently to others than we do to ourselves. Phenomenologically speaking, the subject
appears open to the world while the other appears as something whole unto itself, but
because of this fundamental difference neither subject nor other can achieve a synthetic
unity of this inside and outside appearance by their own power. Under only my own
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power, I cannot author my own life from both the point of view of the subject as well as
the point of view of my subjectivity as seen from the other’s perspective. The world
viewed from inside my own consciousness and my world as viewed from the perspective
of the other require a fundamentally phenomenological moment of analysis from inside
consciousness where the two perspectives of my life can be fused together in an ethically
active moment of answering what I have understood about myself through the other. The
self from inside and outside consciousness will never fuse without the help of the other’s
transgredient position—i.e., her state of being outside of my consciousness. As a result,
the subject needs the other in order to see itself from outside, and vice-versa. This surplus
of seeing, or transgredience, allows for co-consummation—or temporary ontological
completion—of self and other. As we will see, consummation has two essential
moments, an intuitive projection of the subject into the other and its return into its unique
perspective outside the other. It cannot do without either of these moments and still
achieve the ethical act of answering between self and other. In this section I focus on
projection of the self into the other as it might be inflected through the Orthodox virtue of
kenosis. In doing so, I hope I have shown that while Bakhtin is heavily influenced by
Russian Orthodox concepts, his concern is not with the spiritual supermundane aspects of
theology, but with their socioeconomic and materially contextualized implications for
ethics.
In the fourth subsection of the Section Two, I turn to the genealogy of Bakhtin’s
theory of intersubjective relation. Implicated in this is Bakhtin’s cornerstone idea
developed out of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, namely architectonics. Like Kant,
Bakhtin was concerned with how externally unrelated faculties—or what I have called
institutions in this introduction—might be brought into immanent relations and influence
one another within the same conscious existence. Today we might refer to this as
interdisciplinarity. By adding to this concern the distinctly Russian virtue of
responding/responsibility to one’s fellow human being, Bakhtin essentially maps the
concern with interdisciplinary relations onto a second ethically-inflected field regarding
self-other relations. Again, these relations are always read through the notion of
responsibility—of the necessity to answer the human sciences, the event, and the other as

12
they arise as a problem within conscious existence: hence the architectonics of
answerability.
The concern between both self-other relations and interdisciplinarity will set the
tone for the larger whole of this work and shall be revisited throughout the subsequent
sections. Bakhtin’s philosophical corpus is polyvalent, but he is everywhere preoccupied
with the dialogue between subjects, between disciplines and between ideas. We will
attempt to show how he seeks an answerable and additive response between the
disciplines of ethics, biology, psychology and psychoanalysis, linguistics, literature, and
history in the relevant sections that follow. In this work, ethics comes first in that it
grounds the possibility of answering the other disciplines while at the same time
establishing the dynamics of their ontological relation and exploring the possibility of
dialogue between the disciplines.
The third section of this thesis explores a paper published under the name of
Bakhtin’s friend I. I. Kanaëv entitled “Contemporary Vitalism”. The authorship of this
paper is highly debatable, but I proceed under the assumption that whoever penned it, the
essay is the product of collaboration. This section will begin by reviewing in brief the
history of vitalism. I will then review Bakhtin and Kanaëv’s critique of the vitalist Hans
Driesch’s work The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. As the paper ends with the
authors’ proclaimed commitment to dialectical materialism in the sciences, I attempt to
develop an account of how the sciences are fundamentally grounded in sociology and
cultural production—i.e., I try to show how the limited methods of biology are
themselves answered by their relation to sociological theory. In transitioning to the
following section I take up Freud’s borrowings from biological science to reinforce his
dualistic turn found in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. This new stage in psychoanalytic
theory evinces no small influence from the relation between body and mind and to the
spiritual agency that haunts vitalism.
The fourth section moves into psychoanalysis proper and its critique under the pen
of another member of the Bakhtin Circle, namely Valentin Voloshinov. Voloshinov’s
book Freudianism: A Marxist Critique attempts to replace Freud’s ontological distinction
between consciousness and the unconscious with the ideological distinction between
official and unofficial discourse—roughly categorical distinctions between sanctioned and
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unsanctioned utterance, not wholly unlike what Deleuze and Guattari call major and
minor literatures. Following Voloshinov, Freud is critiqued in this section for remaining
committed to a highly introspective approach to psychology—albeit an ingenious and
highly nuanced one. I will show that Voloshinov attempts to find a middle ground
between introspective and behavioural psychology by once again turning to dialectical
materialism and the architectonically answerable dynamic relation between discourse in
scientific theory/praxis and discourse in everyday socioeconomic life. As Voloshinov’s
book is largely a propaedeutic invitation to further research along these lines, the final
part of this section will then go on to show how Freudianism can ameliorate
contemporary visions of Freud. In doing so, I review the merits of Allon White’s attempt
to extend the Bakhtin Circle’s critique of psychoanalysis—as a bourgeois repression of
the carnivalesque and the grotesque body, and I also attempt to extend White’s productive
revisitation of psychoanalysis within the fields of sociological theory and modernist
literature.
The fifth section takes on Saussurean linguistics, first from the point of view of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s critique in his lectures on “Child Psychology and Pedagogy”
and then along the lines found in Voloshinov’s second book Marxism and the Philosophy
of Language. A pattern will begin to emerge here, as Voloshinov again seeks to establish
a middle ground based on everyday socioeconomic discourse. Here the third term falls
between two major trends in linguistic study, namely what Voloshinov calls individual
subjectivism and abstract objectivism. In order to show how the Bakhtin Circle makes
use of this third term, I will then go on to explicate Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s own theory
of discourse in art as it is related to and founded upon discourse in life. This analysis will
set the stage for the subsequent section on Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.
Section Six will attempt to explicate the first territory of Problems by showing
how the polyphonic novel marks a new and important development in the history of
novelistic discourse. At the same time, I will also show that by emphasising
Dostoevsky’s personalist approach to the characters in his novels, he is able to effect a
profound critique of German Ideology and enter into the great dialogue as it existed in his
own time and to show how the ground is prepared for its future life within his literary
corpus.
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Finally, Section Seven will take up a number of major themes in Bakhtin’s oeuvre
regarding novelistic genres, space-time, and history. Not least among the problems
within these spheres is the historical aporia between freedom and necessity. The
exploration of this historical aporia is explored through Bakhtin’s theory of
chronotopicity—loosely, the perceptually relative experience of space-time. Particular
emphasis will be placed upon the oppressive weight of neo-Platonic philosophy and the
part it has played in enframing occidental human self-understanding. In this section I will
also review the major chronotopes provided in Bakhtin’s essay “Forms of Time and of the
Chronotope in the Novel”; the Rabelaisian chronotope and Goethe’s talent for seeing the
fullness of time play the starring roles in this section.

15
§ 1.

Biography: M. M. Bakhtin

1.1

A Novel Education: Bakhtin’s Bildungsroman in Brief
“By biography and autobiography (the account of a person’s life), we understand the most
immediate transgredient form in which I can objectify myself and my own life artistically.”
—Bakhtin16

The narrative of Bakhtin’s early years is muddled and distorted by both a lack of evidence
and false testimony. The Gospel of M. M. Bakhtin according to Clark and Holquist’s
eponymous biography often strays into the apocryphal. By his own word, Bakhtin
graduated from St. Petersburg in 1918, but this has since been disproven.17 It seems that
Bakhtin’s ‘autobiography’ was part truth and part creation. Before arriving in St.
Petersburg in 1914 to study alongside his brother and mentor, Nikolai, Clark and Holquist
place Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin in the gymnasiums of Vilnius and Odessa. We may
go on faith that aspects of this are correct, since Bakhtin’s writings evince an intimidating
breadth of knowledge of the classics. He is said to have studied both Latin and Greek,
and it is apparent that he was saturated in theology and the philosophical thought of the
19th and early 20th centuries—especially Martin Buber and Kierkegaard.18 He was also
influenced by the Russian symbolist Vyacheslav Ivanov, and had already read Marx,
Engels, and Nietzsche.19 St. Petersburg was newly christened Petrograd at the time
Bakhtin came into contact with Russian Futurists and Formalists.20 These two strains of
the avant-garde he would co-opt and critique by turns throughout his career.21
Bakhtin seems to have been heavily influenced by his brother’s professor in
classical philology at Petersburg University, one Faddei F. Zelinsky. Zelinsky may quite
possibly be the source of one of Bakhtin’s most controversial claims—that distinctly
novelistic genres can be traced back to ancient times. Zelinsky believed that the ancient
writers had already formulated and begun actualizing all species of literary genres, from
the epic to the novel.22 It is Bakhtin’s commitment to this canonically eccentric definition
of what constitutes the novel as a literary form which in turn allowed him both to display
his exhaustive familiarity with the history of literature as well as to begin to develop a
theory of folk culture the scope of which would likewise span some “thousands of years”;
this founding idea of Bakhtin’s theory of the novel is perhaps defended most strongly in
his essay “Epic and Novel”.23 He believed that the remnants of ancient Grecian cultures
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that lay dormant in this millennial folk culture could be reborn “periodically” throughout
history.24 For some intellectuals the October Revolution marked the commencement of a
hoped for Renaissance of Hellenism.25
Mikhail’s brother Nikolai left St. Petersburg, joined the White Guards, and would
communicate with Mikhail little before his hasty departure from Russian soil soon
thereafter, and the two brothers would never again see each other in the flesh.26 By 1918,
at the tender age of twenty-three years, Bakhtin had already begun to evince a maturity
and philosophical insight that won him the friendship of some of those destined to
intellectual and cultural fame in Russia and abroad. Bakhtin’s friend Lev Vasilievich
Pumpiansky had coaxed Bakhtin into joining him in the unlikely cultural Mecca of
Nevel.27 Once in Nevel, Bakhtin had made the acquaintance and begun a philosophical
dialogue with, among others, Valentin Voloshinov, Pavel Medvedev, and Matvei Isaevich
Kagan; with these intellectual friendships Bakhtin began a lifelong commitment to
dialogue, co-authorship, and professional collusion. This so-called ‘Nevel School’ of
philosophy discussed subjects as diverse as theology, the theory of language,
philosophical discourse, art, and dialectical materialism. Their conversations were as
heady as the copious samovars of strong tea they sat drinking long into the night.28 The
group was also publically active and produced plays, lectured, and staged musical
performances.29
Pumpiansky was tempted away to Vitebsk in 1919 where he organized a seminar
in neo-Kantian philosophy.30 Bakhtin followed Pumpiansky to Vitebsk and the Nevel
Circle gradually began to disband. What remained of the group slowly re-orientated its
intellectual centre around Bakhtin himself.31 Since the revolution Vitebsk had grown
increasingly bohemian; the town was transformed overnight from a quaint outpost in what
is now Belarus, to a bustling base of experimental art and radical politics.
Parenthetically, Vitebsk was also the childhood home of Marc Chagall, who had returned
from Europe in 1918 to actively participate in the left-leaning cultural explosion now in
full swing.32 It is perhaps most surprising that this artistic upspring was taking place in
the midst of what was effectively a civil war, but the early days of the revolution were
every bit as much aesthetic as political. Theory and practice were in no way separate for
these artists and intellectuals, and the civil war did not begin and end in politics. For
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example, the Futurist Malevich and the “folkloristic” painter Chagall had themselves
fought an ideological war wherein Malevich achieved supremacy and eventuated
Chagall’s departure from his hometown.33 Clark and Holquist hint that Bakhtin had
ambivalent feelings about the seismological cultural inversion taking place in Vitebsk.
He had still not exorcised the influence of the second wave of Russian symbolists
represented in the figure of Ivanov—an influence against whom Formalists such as
Shklovsky were constitutionally opposed.34 The state of being outside of these artistic
movements no doubt had a profound effect on him.35
For a man who suffered from painful inflammations brought on by osteomyelitis
and who was struck with typhoid, losing his right leg in the process, Bakhtin managed to
keep surprisingly active. 36 His days in Vitebsk were spent in service to the community.
He earned his modest living by teaching, while at the same time organizing literary and
women’s liberation seminars, provided economic and bookkeeping services to the local
statistical bureau, and staged theatrical mock defence trials for infamous literary
personae; this last item is an extraordinary biographical detail considered from the
perspective of Bakhtin’s later theory of polyphony and the central idea in Problems of
Dostoevsky’s Poetics—i.e., that Dostoevsky hear the voices of his characters.37 By all
accounts Bakhtin became a skilled orator, though this talent was not always manifest in
his youth.38 In 1921 Bakhtin met and married Elena Aleksandrovna, who steadied and
cared for him during his frequent periods of convalescence.39
In the same year that Bakhtin arrived in Vitebsk, he wrote the earliest extant text
of his oeuvre. In English it is known as “Art and Answerability”. The brief essay
silhouettes the particular strain of thought which would occupy him for the next five years
in various guises. Like the artistic trajectory of the so-called Nevel Circle, the essay
opposes an immanent, life-orientated art to an accidental, mechanical form of art; as we
will see later, this latter type constitutes a clumsy synthesis of disparate elements that
Goethe would have rejected as “arbitrary constructions.”40 A truly immanent unity of the
artistic experience can only be achieved inside of consciousness and only through an
effort to bring back to life what is experienced in the work of art.41 Taking a page out of
Kant, Bakhtin asserts that there is an architectonic relationship that can be constructed
between art and life and that it is, moreover, our responsibility to consummate this
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relationship as authors of our own lives.42 Anything short of such an attempt is a
perversion of the properly conceived relationship between art and life: “inspiration that
ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not inspiration but a state of possession.”43 It
was precisely this effort to place art back into the realm of life as it is lived that inspired
Kagan’s exhortation that art ought to “involve itself more closely with life and not to
serve the interests of any one faction or ethnic group.”44 This turn toward everyday life
was in the air and was equally expressed by the Circle’s communist counterparts in those
early days of revolutionary optimism.45
As is well known, the two texts re-discovered during the 1970’s shortly before
Bakhtin’s death, one set of writings anthologized as Art and Answerability and the other
an unfinished treatise on ethics, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, belong to this period;
however, the transition from these notebooks to translated and published texts is
convoluted and not without controversy.46 The central themes that hold this body of
writings together are their consistent dedication to questions of authorship—the so-called
“master trope” of his worldview. 47 Existential responsibility does most of the heavy
lifting in these texts, as Bakhtin attempts to position himself in the history of philosophy.
His early approach to authorship, disciplinarity, and the responsibility inherent between
subjects and the world is overwhelmingly phenomenological and neo-Kantian.
Bakhtin’s earliest surviving notebooks evince a multifaceted philosophic avenue
into various theoretical concerns that at times contract together in agreement and at times
expand into different points of view—for example, the different approaches to ethics and
authorship evoked in his phenomenological and textual studies. Bakhtin’s oeuvre is, in
short, dialogical from its very beginning. This kind of contradictory co-existence in the
same body of work is part and parcel of Bakhtin’s style of writing, which consistently
privileges theme over analysis; moreover, Bakhtin is not the most economic writer, and
his works tend to be prone to long digressions that do not always fit back into the whole
of his stated task.48 What it lacks in Germanic economy, however, it manages to
compensate for in fairness and insight, polyvocality and virtuosic journalistic
performance. Indeed, the voice of the poet journalist Walt Whitman often enters into
conversation with me when I read Bakhtin’s works, for example:
You shall no longer take things at second or third hand, nor
look through the eyes of the dead, nor feed
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on the spectres in books,
You shall not look through my eyes either, nor take things
from me,
You shall listen to all sides and filter them from yourself.49
Throughout his corpus Bakhtin remains committed to seeing the other side of an
argument, to hearing the voice of the internal ‘thou’ and the external other. It is precisely
this commitment that allows us to speak of his work as being informed by both
centripetal and centrifugal forces, by both contraction and expansion, both ergon and
energeia, both being and becoming, and to approach these works from a polyvocal rather
than dogmatic perspective. These themes will stay with us throughout the present text,
just as they tarried with our Russian thinker throughout his own life and work.
Bakhtin’s philosophical apprenticeship, in those revolutionary days of tumult,
sickness, economic depression, and profound productivity, was perhaps most consciously
and directly shaped by the proponents of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. Most
notable among these was the so-called “sage of Marburg”, Hermann Cohen.50 Cohen
attempted to expunge the gap in the Kantian dualism between mind (phenomenon) and
world (noumenon), and his philosophy won him many devotees in both Russia and
Germany. For Cohen, Kant’s Ding an sich (thing as such) was not to be approached as an
absolutely unknowable substance, but as “merely the limit of conceptualization.”51 Our
concepts of the thing as such, according to Cohen, proceed to greater and greater clarity.
If this is the case, then it follows that the conceptualization of the thing as it is in itself is
not wholly beyond conceptualization, but quite to the contrary, there is no end to its
conceptualization. Cohen wanted to make Kant over into a monist, to permanently bridge
the gap between subjectivity and the world: there is no world wholly unto itself; there is
only the world of conception and concept formation.
According to Clark and Holquist, this placed Bakhtin on the far side of the neoKantian divide diametrically opposed to Cohen.52 While he was greatly influenced by
Cohen’s assertion that conceptualization could never come to a full stop—that at its limit
concept formation was wholly unfinalizable, Bakhtin rejected the idea that matter could
be nothing other than a conception.53 ‘The other’ and ‘alterity’ are important categories
which Bakhtin respects in the formation of his concepts. Moreover, the gap between
mind and world is not a division that Bakhtin would want to permanently conjoin in a
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unity without difference. In other words, for Bakhtin, “all that is living is alive precisely
because of a noncorrespondence with others."54 Unlike Cohen, Bakhtin sees this gap
between mind and world as an ontological divide that can be crossed but never
completely closed, and he therefore remains a dualistic thinker. In fact, it is precisely
because this dualism is hardwired into what he calls the once-occurrent being-as-event
that we cannot foreclose on the sense of existence. That is to say, everyday conscious life
as it arises phenomenologically maintains a gap between subject and world and between
subject and object. Today we would describe Bakhtin’s philosophy as a body of
utterances that expresses an ideological preference for discourses of becoming.
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§ 2.

Ethics: Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability

2.1

Lost in Translation?: Bakhtin Meets the West
“In the beginning was the deed.”
–Goethe55

No commentary can wholly resist predication. Ideological intonation is inevitable. In Art
and Answerability, Bakhtin says, “no one can assume a position toward the I and the
other that is neutral.”56 In this section I intend to accomplish two essential tasks that I
hope will outline how the present work ties in with the very large and growing body of
Bakhtinian scholarship. First, I want to show that Bakhtin’s early notebooks translated as
Toward a Philosophy of the Act and Art and Answerability are informed by Christian
doctrine, and specifically the Orthodox kenotic tradition. This influence is not
transparent, but it can be elucidated by a careful exposition of the intersection between
the distinctly Russian virtue of kenosis and Bakhtin’s conception of projection as an
essential, but not exclusive, moment in his ethics of answering what he calls onceoccurrent being-as-event. Kenosis is essentially the word used to describe Christ’s
sloughing off his Spiritual substance and taking on a wholly material body when he
became incarnated as ‘man.’ In Russian Orthodoxy the virtue of kenosis is essentially the
doctrine that one should attempt to empathize with the other and treat them as a worldly
brother to whom they must respond ethically. It is my belief that Bakhtin’s projection
self-consciously allies itself with the virtue of kenosis. As projection is used in Bakhtin’s
writings, the notion is not without dispute, and it is crucial to state at the outset that
projection is an intuitive moment of union between subject and other and not
ontologically actualizable. There is a very real connection here with Kant’s concept of
Einfuhlung, or empathy, which was adopted by a number of Germanic thinkers including
Wilhelm Dilthey and Hermann Cohen. This is not to say that Bakhtin accepts the
possibility of unmediated co-empathizing between subject and other. In a very real sense
there is no overcoming the alterity of the other and no reduction of difference to a
monological unity. For Bakhtin, in the words of Michael Gardiner, empathy is “only the
initial moment of alterity; after this, we must ‘return’ to ourselves.”57
Second, this section will seek to establish the so-called ‘master trope’ of both
Bakhtin’s corpus and the present work: namely the architectonics of answerability as an
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authorship of self through a deeper understanding of self-other relatedness. Since this is
the section of my thesis devoted to ethics, I will attempt to show how this architectonic
method of answering works within Bakhtin’s ethical thought—with a particular focus on
the relations between subject and other. In doing so, however, it is my intention to lay the
ground-work for the remainder of this thesis, vis-à-vis how answerability also informs the
manifold of relations between disciplines as Bakhtin understands them. Bakhtin’s
interdisciplinarity—or peregrinations between disciplines—will then be further explored
in the subsequent sections of this thesis.
Julia Kristeva’s “Une poétique ruinée” launched Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics on the French reading public in 1970. Kristeva asks “how will this text be
understood” at the remove of some forty years since its publication.58 Her work is tightly
associated with other key figures in the semiotics movement in Europe in the late sixties
and early seventies, and most especially Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, and Tzvetan
Todorov, the last of whom composed a monograph on Bakhtin entitled Mikhaïl Bakhtin:
le principe dialogique (1981). Kristeva praises the Circle, including Medvedev and
Voloshinov, for effectively correcting Russian Formalism’s failure to capture the truly
objective “‘scientific object’” of study they sought: “Bakhtin and his group show that one
could cover fresh ground, within the Formalist and poetic range of problems, if one were
to question the workings of literary meaning from the point of view of their place in the
history of meaning-systems and of their relationship to the speaker.”59 Kristeva follows
Medvedev and Voloshinov’s charge that the Formalists collapsed the object of their study
into mere “categories of language”—which is to say, they fallaciously reduce literary
utterances to linguistic and formal categories.60 The Circle primarily adds two important
facets to literary study that were missing from the Formalist method of scholarship. First,
the material value-laden “meaning-systems” were not reducible to a “unified field,”
regardless of whether this field was conceived of as composed entirely of mind or
meaning.61 Second, one could not treat the social-context, or milieu, as an empty husk—
material and socioeconomic context could not be stripped away from the utterance.62 The
practice of language production therefore jumps out into the forefront as a problem of the
construction of a theoretical apparatus which can account for the “language-user.”63
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According to Kristeva, the tangible language-user nevertheless remains deficient in
Bakhtin’s first publication—i.e., Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Kristeva accuses
Bakhtin of psychologism, a common philosophical fallacy in fin-de-siècle European
philosophy, which attempts to ground logic and semantics wholly in the space-time of
psychological discourse.64 Finally, Kristeva accuses Bakhtin of apparently glossing over
his own covert Christian commitments and humanist remainders.65 By her own
admission, Kristeva therefore reveals these supposedly latent religious undertones in
order to redeem the remainder of the text; she wants “to salvage,” however unknown to
its author, the “kernel” of what he “really meant” to say; her critical intervention would
then bring this authorial intention into contemporary semiotics as one of its “hitherto
unknown precursor[s].”66 It was thus that Bakhtin was introduced to the West.
I have no interest in taking up Kristeva’s accusation of psychologism here, as it
will not foreground in any way my anticipated discussion of Bakhtin’s philosophy, nor
will it add to or interfere with my account of his critiques of ethics, vitalism,
psychoanalysis, linguistics, or humanism. Bakhtin does provide an account of the
language-user that takes a phenomenological tack, however, and it will figure importantly
here. The texts in which he does this were still unknown, even inside of Russia, at the
time of Kristeva’s writing of this essay, so it would be unfair to criticize her for this
omission. We are on firmer ground if we state, along with Charles Lock, that while
Kristeva’s attempted semiotic appropriation of Bakhtin says much about “her perception
and scruples that she was able to recognize and admit traces of Christianity; less happily,
it says more about the need to stereotype Bakhtin.”67
In addition to Kristeva’s introduction of Bakhtin to the West, Sergey Bocharov’s
“Conversations with Bakhtin” and Clark and Holquist’s biography have become standard
sources for the study of the theological inflections in Bakhtin’s work. In an important
passage from Bocharov’s “Conversations”, Bakhtin stresses the fact that he was vitally
aware of Soviet censors and intimates that he repressed his religious and philosophical
views in his publications; this supposed repression had left them “morally flawed” as a
result.68 Aesopian prevarications or not, the titles of the 1920’s penned under the names
of Voloshinov, Kanaëv, and Medvedev show a precocious and unique extension of the
philosophical thought of Marx, Freud, the Russian Formalist school, behavioural
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psychology, and biological science. We will have opportunity to explore a great deal of
this critical work in the sections to follow. Suffice it to say, there is no absolute authority,
no last word, on the authorial intent of these works.

2.2

Christ or Marx?: How to Read Bakhtin’s Ethical Writings

Bakhtin’s interest in theology is essential in understanding the narrow contractions of his
philosophical thought and how he perceives alterity. This account is also central to his
theory of the materiality of the word, and therefore also implicates his translinguistics—
i.e., a linguistics that is founded in the surrounding extraverbal socioeconomic milieu.
This is a fine line to walk, since it seems that the motivation for this exploration is usually
one of misappropriation according to an extra-Bakhtinian agenda. I have no intention of
repeating liberal selective readings of Bakhtin for the purposes of furthering personal
religious commitments, since I have none. For my part, I will also leave to one side
Bakhtin’s personal faith in matters of religious devotion. What is more interesting and
productive is Bakhtin’s nuanced exploration of Christian themes, or what we might call—
somewhat paradoxically—Bakhtin’s radical orthodoxy.
In his ethical writings, Bakhtin attempted to erect a bridge between his theological
interests and his theoretical activity and writings. The deeply philosophic traditions of
Orthodoxy as a cultural storehouse from which Bakhtin fortified many of his most
important concepts tends to be dismissed out of hand. The reasons for this, I suspect,
often have more to do with the personal experience and unfounded worries of those who
want to appropriate his work along Marxist avenues, however selectively. This is not to
say that there are not more academically sound concerns underlying the shying away
from these Christian themes. It is often held—and usually without question—that if one
accepts Christian conceptions of the world one must also reject strong materialist
accounts. But I believe this supposition has more to do with the history of the early
Christian church, especially after Augustine’s conversion from Manichaeism as well as
with the official censure of various heresies during the fourth and fifth centuries.69
In letter and not spirit, I follow Clark and Holquist’s argument that there are
“connections between Bakhtin’s Christology and the major, apparently non religious
concerns of his thought.” 70 Clark and Holquist make themselves easy targets, since their
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claims regarding Bakhtin’s ‘religious’ views seldom turn on direct textual evidence from
Bakhtin’s own oeuvre. Instead, the biographers conjecture that as Westerners, it is
unlikely that readers outside of Russia are truly qualified to judge such connections. This
claim is dubious, first since as Westerners—at least those of us outside of Slavic and
Religious Studies discourse—it is at least equally likely that we would paint all religious
Russians with the same orthodox brush and assume that they have all read The Way of the
Pilgrim thoroughly. This Franny and Zooey-ization of the Russian religious-other must
inevitably yield proskynesis to those specialists in the know, as it were. We would
therefore take Clark and Holquist’s Christianisation of Bakhtin at face value.
Alternately, one could say that those of us who are in the West could not only
understand Eastern Orthodox tradition but could help to consummate it from the
outside—i.e., we could help it to better understand itself through dialogue. The claim that
non-specialized Westerners are simply not knowledgeable enough to understand the
nuances of the Russian Church is made according to precisely the same logic as the
claims made by Bakhtinian Russian scholars who explain—with feigned professional
concern—that non-Russians simply cannot comprehend the nuances of M. M. Bakhtin’s
work and therefore are doomed to misappropriate it. But to state with a straight face that
well-intentioned and otherwise acutely knowledgeable academics are incapable of
moving beyond a cultural-linguistic barrier is highly unsatisfactory. Not only are these
positions based on a dubious faith in the assumed authorial intention of the author, they
are neither constructive of anything resembling theoretical substance, nor are they
productive in making Bakhtin relevant to contemporary theoretical pursuits. What is
more, they overlook the value of Bakhtin’s theory of transgredience, the ability of the
other to stand outside and help consummate a life, and therefore have no purchase on
reanimating Bakhtin’s theoretical corpus. In my reading of Bakhtin, it can be shown that
the idea of kenosis not only founds the theological underpinnings of the Russian religious
mind, it is also an essential moment in transgredience itself.
Clark and Holquist are on much safer ground if we read them factually and leave
to one side their speculative remarks on Bakhtin’s personal faith—especially where it is
supposed to come into his work. The way I would like to approach this problem, as I will
try to demonstrate—and the only way forward as I can see it, is to place ‘Bakhtin’ back
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into scare-quotes as Allon White does in his article “The Struggle Over Bakhtin” and to
read him strictly intertextually against the religious traditions that are supposed to have
held sway over these texts known as ‘Bakhtin.’71 Anything less than this approach runs
the very real risk of epistemological anarchism. We simply don’t know what Bakhtin, the
man himself, believed. We have only the author ‘Bakhtin,’ and he requires a reader to
breathe new life into his lungs.
Clark and Holquist often run into trouble with the intentional fallacy and provide
little textual evidence to support their claims. As a result, we are left to take it on
authority that Bakhtin’s association with the likes of A. A. Meier, his love of Cohen and
Buber—both Jewish—and his frequent references to Manichaean-like oppositions, make
Bakhtin into a believer whose work is everywhere (covertly) infused with dogma.72 We
are told that Bakhtin was referred to as a Cerkovnik, or churchman—i.e., someone who
took his faith seriously.73 Yet Bakhtin was not strictly Orthodox, and he also openly
discussed the value of other religions. This openness is only in keeping with his
commitment to what he will later formulate as dialogism.74

2.3

Beyond Orthodoxy: Kenosis and an Ethics of the Event

It is no great secret that Christianity in the West has been profoundly marked by neoPlatonism and through it by the Platonic polarizing elevation of spirit and corresponding
“degradation” of matter.75 More often than not Platonic dualism between mind and body
has been carried over wholly intact, at least effectively, into the Christian ethos. This is
the meaning of the so-called musiktreibender Sokrates, an inversion of the figure of
Socrates embossed out of historical obscurity by Plato. 76 As Nietzsche reminds us, this is
the Socrates who knows how to dance, who has remembered his lyre and now obeys the
god’s bidding that he should compose poetry rather than philosophy. A Socrates who
plays music and who does not fear such imperfect, embodied, degraded copies, throws off
his overly rational adherence to the ideal and the world-denying bad-conscience that
causes every good Western Christian after the Council of Trent to put fear and hatred into
his song.77 The “negative-theology” of Plotinus, after Plato’s Republic, situates the good
beyond the reach of mortal man in his earthly digs—effectively reinforcing this world
denial.78 What Ricoeur calls “empirical individuality,” and what Derrida calls the “tode ti
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of brute existence”—i.e., embodied sensual experience—has largely been put to one side
in Western Christianity.79 The reaction against this bad conscience and world denial,
rigorously critiqued by Marx and Engels’ dialectical materialism, and then psychologized
by Nietzsche, has been amplified into a practically universal suspicion of all things
Christian in the 20th century—and not least by the disciples of Marxism and Nietzschean
philosophy. At the slightest whiff of the familiar logic of the topos ouranios and
supermundane, or the world-denying search for guidance from on high, well-meaning
commentators take flight.80
In the Republic, Plato placed “the good” outside of the world of appearances; his
method is worked out into the two-fold process of hypothesis making and testing
according to dialectical reasoning. This was supposed to be the proper method to
approach true knowledge of the good. This method still works well enough to put it to
use as a crucial part of scientific method—i.e., where science must presuppose the unified
sense of a particular scientific discourse. But in constructing this method, Plato also
erected a hierarchy moving from conjecture to true knowledge. There are four rungs on
this ladder which ascend into the supernal realm of knowing; they are: conjecture, belief,
understanding, and knowledge. ‘Knowledge’ for Plato was exclusive to the world of
ideal knowing. Thus one moves from mere opinions or doxa, which arise from the
senses, to understanding, which can be verified by apodictic verification—algebraic truths
and geometric forms belong to this category. Finally through the formation of
hypothesis—literally ‘to put under’ qua the support for an idea—one arrives at the
invisible transcendental category of knowledge, vis-à-vis ideas. The “Idea of Ideas” in
Plato is the good, but the good is not directly accessible by human cognition.81 It is what
has become known in philosophy as the invisible, and is the supposed by Plato to be the
perpetuum mobile of thought—that is, the unconditioned Idea of Ideas is the generator of
all conditioned ideas. By analogy, Plato provides the example of Helios. The sun
provides the means of seeing, but is not itself light or the condition of seeing. The good
would here correspond to light, the transcendental condition of seeing. In this way, Plato
places beyond sense-certainty the condition of possibility for the senses; he does not place
the good in any object but posits the good in-itself.82 Later Kant’s idea regarding the
intuitions of space and time will follow the same logic.83 By taking up this logic of the
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visible and the invisible, by making the good essentially supermundane, Western
Christianity after Proclus has tended to emphasize the next life and the otherworldly
character of holiness and right living, and he effectively creates in humanity the need for
redemption—an absolute redemption that we inevitably are powerless to bring about
ourselves, as mundane creatures.84
We are right to be suspect of this kind of world-denial that has by and large
gripped the West for two millennia. The atheistic declaration of the death of God and the
humanist flattening of the hierarchical order in scala naturae, did not catch up with all
ideological discourse immediately. No doubt there is still ideological and psychological
residue in the Western soul from the great chain of being—just as there is a long delay
between Darwin and Scopes. Kristeva’s auto-immunity to Bakhtin’s theological
influences is, however, misplaced. I believe she has unfairly quarantined Bakhtin with
patients who are indeed infected with the virus of bad conscience and ressentiment.
Bakhtin’s work is not uncritically influenced by Christian dogma, and where this
influence is at all overt, the emphasis is on bringing the theological and the properly
philosophical into a conceptual mutualism. Nowhere do any of his appropriations of
Christian concepts betray these Platonic and neo-Platonic commitments to the
supermundane. Rabelais and His World is more than a thinly veiled Aesopian polemic
against Marxism in favour of Bakhtin’s hidden commitments to another, more Christian,
world. Regardless of Soviet suppression of the Orthodox Church in the USSR, Bakhtin
had absolutely no need to transcribe his supposed Orthodoxy into disguised concepts,
since unlike its Western counterpart, the kenotic tradition understands the incarnation to
imbue all matter with divinity and all divinity with matter—“all matter is potentially
divine.”85 It is difficult to see, therefore, how the distinctly Russian inflection of Kenosis
could contradict a Marxist and materialist worldview—at least on the surface and putting
to one side the overt antipathy between Marxism and religion in general.
Bakhtin seems to have been sympathetic to the kenotic tradition, and yet from
what evidence we have of his religious activity during the early twenties, we may still
infer that he was not a devotee to any particular sect.86 Where he was outspoken, and
where recognizably Christian ideas do enter into dialogue with his works, he privileges
Christology not eschatology, embodiment not spiritual ascension, and he ascribes to a
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collectively active spirituality not a solemn, solipsistic, individual austerity. David
Lodge’s attempted Catholic appropriation cannot stand the test of this simple contextual
framing. In kenotic virtue, the image of Christ as an attendant to the poor as well as
charitable human sympathy are stressed. Naturally there is an emphasis on pouring
oneself out into the other human being, on living for the other, and on “selfhumiliation.”87
Kenosis is an essential aspect of what G. P. Fedotov calls “ethical dualism.”88 For
Fedotov, kenosis exists as one pole of the Russian religious mind. There is another side
of the polarity of spirituality motivated by fearful submission to Christ-Pantocrator; this
aspect is named the Byzantine ethical component by Fedotov. While it would be wrong
to say that the social hierarchical structure of Russian society was wholly flattened in
kenosis, hierarchy is only “presupposed,” while ethical responsibility exhorts devotees to
self-degradation through the imitation of the “humility of Christ.”89 Kenotic monasteries,
as a matter of fact, practiced submission and communal service, equality among “high
and low,” and the “loosening of discipline.”90 Therefore fearful submission is practiced,
but so is humility and life lived for the other. Byzantine subservience and kenotic love
for the other are both observed side by side; they exist as a bi-polar movement of spiritual
and earthly devotion. The mundane and the supermundane exist together. This is ethical
dualism. The tenet that “all men are brothers” is meant to encourage an active
engagement with the lower orders of society, while judgement is often most strongly felt
for class positions of higher rank.91 Here we already see traces of the inversion of social
hierarchies that will play such a prominent role in Rabelais.92 Social hierarchies are not
actually inverted, however. They are only suppressed and again only in the kenotic
polarity. Nevertheless, the pyramidal structure of power in Catholicism and the role of
priest as intercessor would have an apocryphal ring in Bakhtin’s ear. He appears to have
been concerned instead with the teachings of ‘Christ’ and the role of the earthly
community not a heavenly hereafter.
Allon White’s complex discussion of Bakhtin’s position between poststructuralism and humanism will further help us to position the kenotic elements of
Bakhtin’s philosophy. In his paper “The Struggle over Bakhtin”, White rejects outright
the notion that Bakhtin can in any way be appropriated by Christian apologists such as
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Lodge, Ann Shukman, and “more seriously,” Clark and Holquist.93 Although White
gives no credence to theological influences—indeed they do not seem to be on his radar
at all, he deems that Clark and Holquist’s attempts to discard Bakhtin’s Marxism in
favour of a less critical and indeed “conventional biography,” is nothing less than a
misprision of the office of theoretical commentator.94 As I am arguing in favour of
Bakhtin’s Christological influences, it may seem paradoxical that I also agree with
White’s assessment of Clark and Holquist’s biography. This apparent contradiction,
however, is just that, merely apparent. In fact, it is from Clark and Holquist that much of
White’s own knowledge of Bakhtin’s life and the life of the Circle have for the most part
all come through the filter of Clark and Holquist.95 However, the fact that Clark and
Holquist attempt to downplay Bakhtin’s commitment to Marxism is not overruled merely
by their proximity to the original texts. Clark and Holquist suggest that “the second part
[of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language], while not free of Marxist declarations,
seems more purely Bakhtinian in its stress on context and intonation in meaning and its
analysis of different speech levels.”96 For both White and for myself, this supposition
seems to ignore Bakhtin’s own commitments to authorship as a collaboration.97 It also
seems highly unfair to indict Bakhtin for the “familiar casuistic” use of Marxism, since
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language engages with Marx precisely to the extent that
is necessary to compose a propaedeutic theory of language from the Marxist point of
view.98 It and Freudianism are meant as entry points into a Marxist theory of linguistics
and psychoanalysis; they are self-consciously prolegomenal rather than exhaustive. As
such, they should be read as an exhortation to a larger effort by a community of theorists.
What Clark and Holquist cannot possibly argue convincingly is that the
Voloshinov texts attempt to undercut Marxist theory, since everywhere they are informed
by its theory of ideology and by dialectical materialism. They may claim that these texts
are cursory efforts, superficial analyses, even opportunistic, but they cannot claim that
they are not authentically Marxist. Moreover, the form of these texts is saturated with
collaborative thought as is the content. The problem of indirect and quasi-direct
discourse, for example, and of reported speech, as well as speaking throughout in the first
person plural “we,” all of these factors point to the stress on an open-ended and
cooperative creation which liken literary and theoretical products to the solidarity of
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workers called for by Marx and Engels. 99 These texts are academic and extra-academic
social experiments in Bakhtin’s tripartite theory of authorship. I will not go so far as to
assert that Bakhtin is most definitely the author, hero, or apostrophe in these works, but
they are most definitely produced within the framework of a division of labour. Thus
‘Voloshinov’ and ‘Bakhtin’s’ voices, if they are indeed both present, are no doubt
intertwined. We may bow to Bakhtin’s conviction that these voices do not merge, but I
am not convinced that these voices can be distinguished within the Voloshinov texts.
‘We’ simply cannot agree with Clark and Holquist’s supposition that they have some
special privileged ear with which to do so. As a brief aside, we do have every reason to
not only believe that Bakhtin could hear distinct conflicting voices in Dostoevsky since
we can hear these voices ourselves. The conversations between Alyosha and Ivan in
“The Grand Inquisitor” chapter of The Brothers Karamazov, for example, is a tour de
force of multi-voicedness; Alyosha, Ivan, the author ‘Dostoevsky,’ the Grand Inquisitor,
and the Prisoner (‘Christ’), all speak with separate and distinct voices even while they are
overlapping and embedded—without fully merging—within the single consciousness of
the reader.
White wishes to read Bakhtin between post-structuralism and humanism without
simply resolving this contradiction into a unity, but instead he wants to place the author
‘Bakhtin’ on the frontier between these two discourses. Just as dialogue takes place
between interlocutors, so Bakhtin’s thought fluctuates between this “contemporary
disagreement” between humanism and post-structuralism without ever coming to a rest or
being reduced to a homogeneous unity.100 White makes use of Kate Soper’s division of
humanism into territories of human agency and teleology, and he accepts agency in
Bakhtin’s humanism while denying that dialogism can in anyway be reconciled to a
humanist teleology.101 In order to embed this humanism in its apparent opposite—i.e.,
post-structualist thought, White relies on Bakhtin’s account of what he calls semantic
personalism and what White refers to as vocalic intonational ghosting.102 By these
enigmatic phrases we simply mean to invoke Bakhtin’s notion that the “who” of an
utterance is irreducible to the “what” or wholly verbal or textual meaning of that
utterance; yet if this who remains intact, it is nevertheless inseparable from both the
semantic content and the context in which the utterance emerges.103 Here the struggle
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between the discourses of humanism and post-structuralism, the latter of which has given
to us the discourse now known as post-humanism, “appears to be [a] contradictio in
adjecto, an impossibility”104; in other words, White puts their very inter-communicability
into question. Nevertheless, this contradiction is merely an appearance, since it is clear
that “the putative poverty [of humanism] only serves as a semantic device to underpin
post-structuralism,” which is to say that we are to understand the semantic person—the
subject of the utterance, as itself conditioned by the social milieu in which it speaks.105
The humanist agency here is a semantically conditioning agency. Humanism is itself read
through the human condition—which is, for Bakhtin, steeped in historical materialism
and textuality. The semantic personalism, for example, that Bakhtin endorses in the
penultimate paragraph of his late essay “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences”
points toward studying the subject as per se a subject of meaning who is always-already
engaged in a dialogue with another semantic subject—insomuch as an address
presupposes the “anticipation of a response.”106
As we have already seen, Cohen sought to ‘expunge the gap in the Kantian
dualism’ with which Bakhtin continued to struggle. Here Bakhtin was unable to follow
Cohen. He could not posit a permanent closing of the gap between the polarities of
matter and the conceptual, ideological being—or again, between the tode ti of brute
existence—what Kant would have called the noumenal—and phenomena. It is not the
case that the subject is entirely devoid of a personal agency. The subject of Saussurean
parole is inept. Husserl’s idealism does not convince me that the intentional act can
account for an autonomously acting subject. What White calls Bakhtin’s semantic
personalism ostensibly leaves room for this autonomy by (un)grounding it in everyday
lived experience. Not unrelated is the capitulation by that greatest of all sceptics, Hume,
to the force of sensation: ‘I play backgammon therefore I am.’107 Bakhtin does not
reinscribe the Cartesian knowing subject, or the gnoseological subject as it is found in
Kant, or the liberal personalism that flows from the humanist tradition—a tradition that
cannot escape the solipsism inherent in a reduction of language to rationalism and
subjectivity to idealism.
Nevertheless, White’s apparent fear of Bakhtin’s theological forays is as
misguided as was Kristeva’s before him, even if he does not fall into the transparent
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liberal agenda for which he critiques Lodge, and Clark and Holquist. This is because
Bakhtin’s kenotic commitments do not represent a retention of the subject as such, but an
emptying of it.108
As we have already suggested the notion of kenosis refers to the self-emptying of
the divine Christological spirit out of the flesh and blood Christ as ‘man.’ By implication,
we do not understand Bakhtin’s commitment to kenosis to be a betrayal of his faith in
materialism; quite to the contrary, it is a fulfilment of this commitment. To be fair,
kenosis is divisive even within the Orthodox tradition, and notably divisive along class
lines in Russian history. The degree to which a devotee is meant to imitate Christ as a
flesh and blood being is contentious within the tradition.109 It seems that there is a
gradation in the praxis side of kenosis which is meted out along class lines. Nevertheless,
Bakhtin seems to interpret the virtue as active and universally applicable to all ethical
subjects. For Bakhtin, kenosis is the moment in his theory of transgredience or
outsideness that requires a projection of self into the other through what he calls
"empathetic co-experiencing.”110 It bears repeating: kenosis is one moment of
transgredience and the return into self is a second—non-successive—moment required in
the act of consummation.
In Art and Answerability Bakhtin’s phenomenology of the experience of empathy
as actively understood from the point of view of the author. Here the author can complete
the hero—i.e., provide his consummation—only from “outside [the hero’s] bounds.”111
By dint of my ability to project myself into another, and empathetically co-experience life
from within its internal rhythm, I can then complete her. But we must be careful here.
For projection in itself is not sufficient. Kant’s notion of Einfuhlung, or standing in
someone else’s shoes, is only a moment—and is not even the chronological primary
moment.112 Ann Shukman clarifies the matter as follows: “Bakhtin disputed the neoKantian expressive aesthetics based on the concept of Einfuhlung (empathy), and Cohen’s
version of it, ‘aesthetic love,’ for its failure to take account of form and of the separate
identity of perceiver and perceived, author and his created hero.”113 A complete fusion of
consciousness is not only undesirable, it is impossible.114 It does not follow from this that
kenosis is likewise impossible. Bakhtin does endorse “self-renunciation” for the sake of
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the other, only this refutation cannot be understood as a renunciation of my unique
position in once-occurrent being-as-event.115
There is no wholly identical moment between the subject and other, author and
hero. If this were the case the author would be powerless to create a truly dialogical life
outside itself—i.e., the hero and author would merge—and the ethical subject would be
powerless to complete and find his completion in the other. Projection is essentially the
first movement in the intentionally understood condition of becoming self. The second
movement is, as we have said, a return into the self to re-establish the necessary distance
from the other in order to answer for the other. This answering is to be understood as an
ethically responsible act of supplementation, redemption, and temporary (in)completion
of the other. The return is not only absolutely necessary to this consummation, but it
cannot be ontologically avoided:
Even if we succeed in encompassing the whole of our consciousness as
consummated in the other, this whole would not be able to take possession of us
and really consummate us for ourselves: our consciousness would take that whole
into account and would surmount it as just one of the moments in its own unity
(which is not a unity that is given but a unity that is set as a task).116
Even the unity of consciousness in Bakhtin is therefore something yet to come. We can
understand the semantic personhood of the subject in the sense of a present participle
form—the -ing—of becoming. Semantic personhood remains in motion. In this way, it is
not a matter of deciding the either/or—either there is a subject or there is not, but in
understanding the subject as aporetic, open, and undecidable.
The subject of language in Bakhtin, the so-called semantic personalism, is a
disappearing/appearing subject and not merely the copular subject of propositions and
deduction; by this we mean that the Bakhtinian subject is disappearing from the pages of
the history of philosophy as it has been written and appearing momentarily in the ethical
act of answering for the other. The subject is a subject of becoming not of being—
Bakhtin’s subiectum is a dialogic subject.
The fact that Democritus and Epicurus, on whom Marx wrote his dissertation,
were ancient theorists of kenos—i.e., were theorists of the vacuum or nothingness—
presents circumstantial evidence that a marriage between Marx and the concept of kenosis
on which the tradition has been founded is not entirely indefensible.117 Hegel speaks of
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kenosis as Spirit’s “externalization of itself,”118 but through the mutual kenotic
externalization of self-consciousness and substance he posits a spiritual unity between the
two.119 For Bakhtin this proposed unity found in Spirit would be too much to posit either
intuitively or to justify ethically. One could not live in this unity and have anything more
than an aesthetic existence.120 If kenosis suggests a pouring out, therefore, there must
nevertheless be a return into self. Again, Bakhtin is working specifically with a kenotic
notion of degree rather than a complete negation of self.

The logic of peregrination

and return is repeated in the phenomenology of love provided in Toward a Philosophy of
the Act. The pouring out of oneself into the other, i.e., kenosis, may even be said to be
one of the fundamental virtues of phenomenal existence. In fact, the projection of self in
kenosis is a fundamental condition of living ethically in the world; without it we could
neither justify the existence of another nor find this justification for ourselves. Nor, as we
shall see, could we answer once-occurrent being-as-event.
More recent Bakhtin scholarship has allowed for a rejuvenation of the interface
between kenotic theology and intersubjective ethical understanding in Bakhtin’s early
notebooks. For example, in “Bakhtin and the Hermeneutics of Love” Alan Jacobs argues,
along the same lines that I have been trying to trace here, that there is indeed a kenotic
thread woven throughout these texts:
the early Bakhtin understood at least theism and perhaps even Christian belief to
be necessary for anyone who hopes to love the other in the ethical or aesthetic
(hermeneutical) spheres. The kenosis of ‘Christ’ establishes the pattern for our
own answerable deeds: it is his ‘I-for-myself’ and ‘I-for-another’ that reveal to us
the proper form of self-activity and empower us to pursue it persistently and
faithfully. This may be a point at which the Bakhtinian ethics-aestheticshermeneutics cease to be merely consistent with Christian theology and becomes
an elaboration of that theology.121
In other words, Bakhtin argues not that we must all become Christians, or even that we
ought to adhere to kenotic belief, but instead appropriates the gospels symbolically and
emphasizes the Christological sacrifice of divinity. The weight of his appropriation of
kenosis falls entirely on a vision of emptying out of the ideal self in order to take on flesh.
In Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtin attempts to move ethics away from
abstraction and show the fundamental difference which exists between once-occurrent
being-as-event and its abstracted conceptual representation. There is in some sense an
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impossibility of representation in Bakhtin. To follow Kant and found ethics on merely
“theoretically valid judgement[s]” is only to “assign to it a certain theoretical unity” and
to abdicate my active participation in the world. We see this in what Fedotov calls
“Anglo Saxon ethics” where law hovers above the entire order of nature.122 Fedotov calls
this species of ethics the “cult of purity,” which appeals to the law in the form of custom.
But here custom—the nomos—is nothing more than a pure abdication of the ethical
responsibility to answer the event as it arises in its unique once-occurrent being-as-event.
Anglo Saxon ethics assumes an alibi in being—that is, it abdicates personal ethical
responsibility by deferring to the law.123 Fedotov writes “never in Russian history was
either purity or law dominant morally.”124 The law does not adjudicate itself; ethics
cannot provide its own evaluative grounds on which to answer being in the act of
becoming. The law can only answer being through the architectonic unity accomplished
within a real living consciousness. In the manifold of a theoretical unity, on the other
hand, every proposition is valid, no matter how atrocious the conclusions which follow.
They may have apodictic certainty and still be unjust. Ethics requires a life to
consummate it and deem that it is just through the ethical act of answering—and this can
only be done with an “emotional-volitional referral” to oneself from the position of a
unique chronotopic and perspectival embodied existence. It cannot be accomplished in
theoretical or intuited aesthetic consciousness alone.
Bakhtin’s semantic personalism consists of a constantly self-emptying subject of
meaning; it is a humanist subject whose very humanism is grounded in a constantly
shifting verbal and extraverbal milieu. This semantic subject cannot be entirely alienated
from its material existence into a purely theoretical form. An analogous example can be
taken from technological research and development; when technology is alienated from
human life and is developed only according to its immanent manifold existence—i.e.,
only according to what is possible, allowing proposition after proposition to become
actualized sheerly by the force of its permissibility and according to its own internal
structure, the result is then not founded for human existence but for itself. Ethics can only
find its justification by bridging the gap between theoretical and practical being through
the actively answering act of practical consciousness; again, this answering cannot be
performed by cognition alone:
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The theoretically cognized world cannot be unclosed from within cognition itself
to the point of becoming open to the actual once-occurrent world. But from the
performed act (and not from the theoretical transcription of it) there is a way out
into its content/sense, which is received and included from within that actually
performed act; for the act is actually performed in being.125
A wholly lawful cognitive-theoretical approach to ethics fails, but what if we approach
from the other direction—i.e., from sensuous existence and specifically through aesthetic
intuition?
Aesthetic intuition achieves a greater synthesis than theoretical cognition, since in
it consciousness has passively synthesized the content and form of the external world.126
But while aesthetic being can achieve what theoretical cognition could not, vis-à-vis
“pure empathizing,” the aesthetic world from which this empathy is achieved is not the
world of once-occurrent being.127 Whereas the unity achieved within theoretical
cognition is an abstract theoretical unity and cannot provide ethical norms from within
itself, aesthetic consciousness’ achievement of pure empathizing is likewise an abdication
of the ethical subject’s responsibility to its own unique place in being.128 It is literally a
senseless abstraction of oneself—i.e., the very opposite of a theoretical abstraction.
Kenotic projection is therefore a necessary moment but not yet sufficient for a truly
answerable act by participative consciousness. Unlike theoretical cognition, one can live
within the aesthetic being of empathetic co-experiencing, but then life amounts to a mere
performance; a wholly aesthetic life merely “play[s] a role,” and does not live life for
itself and for the other as a responsibly ethical subject.129
Thus theoretical cognition and aesthetic intuition go astray when they attempt to
live entirely from within theoretical unity, on the one side, and pure empathy on the other.
I would liken the ready-made ethical activity of the law in theoretical cognition to
“Christ-Pantocrator” whose lawful word is outside of time and space—i.e., is valid now
and for all time.130 Theoretical cognition is therefore to be likened to the Byzantine virtue
which appeals to hierarchical class structures to regulate the enforcement of the law.131
For its part, kenosis can be likened to aesthetic intuition, since it is only in intuition that
we have the power to co-experience life from the point of view of the other. As human
beings, we must effectively and ethically empty ourselves of content in order to take up
the other’s perspective. Both movements are necessary but neither is sufficient for the
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truly ethical act. Even kenosis thus proves insufficient, if necessary, for the
consummation of the other by the ethical subject.
Bakhtin repeats this line of argumentation again in the two extremes of content
ethics and formal ethics. Content ethics takes as its law either the veridical propositions
in the theoretical unity that we have already seen, or else it founds its laws on
“primordially relative” fiat.132 Either way it goes wrong by attempting to fabricate a
ready-made universal imperative out of that which is actually contingent upon onceoccurrent being. This moment would likewise align with Christ-Pantocrator, or what
Bakhtin calls the “lawgiver.”133 These laws cannot be justified from within themselves
either. They require a transgredient outside consciousness capable of bringing the
theoretical (law) and the practical (the event) into a synthesis. This synthesis is shortlived, inchoate, and requires the continual practice of a lifetime. This synthesis is what
Bakhtin means by ethical answering. An event is made answerable when it is not
understood as merely beholden to one of the forms of abstraction we have been
discussing. The event therefore cannot be ethically justified either by the merely
theoretical cognitive unity, the aesthetic (quasi-practical) intuited unity of subject and
other—i.e., empathy—or by attempting to formulate the theoretical on pre-established,
ready-made, content.
Finally, what Bakhtin calls “formal ethics” attempts to decline the event by way of
a pre-established, ready-made form.134 In this way ethical thought proceeds from the
opposite direction of content ethics. Theory is no longer made to follow life but life
theory. However, the presumption that ethical comportment can follow pre-established
rules of engagement leaves the propositions of formal ethics entirely one-sided.135
Formal ethics thus determines the “law as such, in itself, or the idea of pure legality,” as
its ground from which all its propositions follow.136 But this ground is only assumed and
is nowhere proved scientifically. Formal ethics thus loses the object of its inquiry, the
ethical deed itself, and replaces it with an abstract conception of law for law’s sake.
Colloquially, we typically call this species of ethics legalism, and Kant’s categorical
imperative can be said to be one of its avatars. Legalism does not broach life itself: “The
actual deed is cast out into the theoretical world with an empty demand for legality.”137
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Formal ethics is founded not in the answerable act, but wholly within theoretical
cognition.
The ethically answerable deed (postupok) is not directed toward this sort of
theoretical legalism, but it is instead concerned with answering actual existence. For
example, if I am a proprietor of some business and am asked by someone for a job, how
can do I go about ethically answering for myself in this situation. Let us make the
problem easy, let us say that I have need of one additional worker. Let us also say that
there are no special skills required for the position. I can only become ethically
answerable by responding to this request according to the real living person here in front
of me. Whether I hire this applicant, my decision cannot be based upon some ready-made
company policy that would leap over the present situation and find my pending approval
or rejection of her application already decided in the past. For an answer to be ethical it
must find its justification in the supra-rational and unique, singular, character of the
present situation.138
I will provide an example from another concrete situation—a disagreement
between husband and wife. The two truly love each other in our example, but they have
had a disagreement about whether they can continue to support their political party. They
have always voted for this party, since they found a matter of ideological agreement that
trumped other conflicting political concerns. Let us say that this concern was an
environmental policy. The party has recently gained numerous new seats in government
and has gone from supporting a carbon-tax on business to supporting a tax on middleincome families. The couple is divided, since the husband will continue to support the
party. He has reasoned that the change in policy is merely to make the party more
palatable for a wider swath of voters. The wife no longer wants to support the party, not
as a matter of principle, but because she believes a carbon-tax is practically efficacious
and will not cripple middle-income families. Nevertheless their discussion becomes
argumentation and then full-blown anger. They begin to argue more and more from
polarized positions, both of which become more and more hypothetical and abstracted
from their current situation. They forget for a moment the common ground that is
always-already established beneath their feet: this tangible kitchen where they prepare
their meals together, the social and economic alliance they have erected, and most of all
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the real life, perhaps even banal, fact that they love one another. They lay all of this aside
in order to argue from their new abstracted positions, and as such they have ceased to
participate in the real life socioeconomic conditions of their lives and have therefore
abdicated the immediate meaningful context in which all ethical concerns must be rooted.
What I am attempting to state here in writing, in all truth, cannot even be stated on paper.
It is an irony, and one we should not fail to observe, that the language which conditions
semantic personhood also fails us. Merleau-Ponty had something like this in mind when
he proposed his “tacit cogito.”139
In Bakhtin, one’s word (slovo) demands embodiment. Everything follows from
this, whether we are speaking of the ethical comportment between subjects or the ongoing
architectonic answer that the subject gives in response to the event. There are no alibis
for existence.

2.4

I and I: A Genealogy of Ethics

In Art and Answerability Bakhtin provides a genealogy of the I-for-myself and the I-foranother in the section translated as “The Value of the Human Body in History”, which is
framed as the “‘idea of man’”—i.e., as a humanism.140 This “value” changes throughout
history. Indeed, the genealogy that Bakhtin offers us is one of different polarizations of
the ‘I’ and the other. These are axiological categories which are not absolute but are
moments of experience. The dominant mode of perception of the I and other in the world
of antiquity are interlocking, and the I is wholly determined according to the aesthetic
external body of the other—as opposed to a psychological inner mode of selfunderstanding. This explains why the ancient’s self-identification was wholly on the side
of the physiological group; the Spartan was born to go to war, for example, and Achilles
becomes a sacrificial lamb for the Greek people—a fate from which even his demigod
status cannot redeem him. And they say double-dipping is uncouth!
At the time of the Bacchanalian mystery cults, the I-for-myself begins to emerge,
is present, but is not yet distinct from the category of the I-for-another and remains
wholly determined by it.141 Individuation sets in here and the wholly aesthetic existence
of ‘man’ begins to give way to an ethical mode of being. This being is presented to
Hellenistic ‘man’ and to us “as a task to be accomplished,” and this process of
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individuation is experienced as something inwardly painful.142 Ethics does not exist
before this historical moment. The emergence of Epicureanism marks the historical
moment of the cordoning off of the body as a separate organism while not fully alienating
itself from the other; furthermore, the notion that I-for-myself is a spiritual problem begins
to emerge with the Stoics; the corresponding notion of ‘man’ modelled off of spirit owes
itself to this paradigmatic shift.143 The “plastic” outward physical body as the ground of
the I-for-another completely disappears with neo-Platonism and is replaced with an I-formyself that wholly encompasses the category of otherness. Henceforth, otherness is only
understood as a negation of the I-for-myself, and not by dint of its own existence for itself.
The other is then wholly conditioned as a moment within the I-for-myself polarization: “I
give birth to the other inside myself, without going beyond my own bounds and without
ceasing to be alone.”144
Fission occurs at this point in the category of the ‘I,’ “the emanationist theory
prevails,” and the I becomes at once that which thinks and that which is thought.145 Here
we may posit the genealogical beginning of semantic personalism. I now have not an Ifor-another, experienced as objective reality, but an I-as-I-appear-for-the-other—a
wholly phantasmal spectral I.146 This spectral I in turn ossifies the notion that ‘man’ is a
project of religious self-justification; this is the emergence a completely ethical mode of
being. For Bakhtin, it is at this point that the supermundane—i.e., the merely theoretical
or formal ethical consideration—first becomes a motivating principle for human action,
and the body as it is given in time and space is understood as degraded being while at the
same time it is the condition of possibility for all truly answerable ethical action:
Hence, neo-Platonism also includes the most consistent denial of the body: for me
myself, my body cannot be a value. Purely elemental self-preservation is
incapable of engendering any value out of itself. In preserving myself, I do not
evaluate myself, for self-preservation is accomplished outside any valuation and
justification. An organism simply lives, without any justification from within
itself, for the grace of justification can descend upon it only from outside. I cannot
be the author of my own value, just as I cannot lift myself by my own hair. The
biological life of the organism becomes a value only in another’s sympathy and
compassion with that life (motherhood). It is the other’s sympathy and
compassion that introduce biological life into a new value-context.147
From this vantage point we now begin to see the phenomena of Christianity forming, but
in a highly aggregated unfolding. Here the movement has traversed the initial stage of
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formation of the collectivity—“the people”—as one undivided organic entity we bear
witness to a complete interiority of the subject requiring justification from outside
itself.148 What comes into existence here is the realization that self-justification is
impossible—the Baron von Münchhausen moment.149 Bakhtin repeats the image
between this self-lifting by one’s own hair and self-justification in Toward a Philosophy
of the Act.150 Here the metaphor is invoked in order to emphasize the inability of
theoretical cognitive unity to find immanent self-justification. We can already see,
therefore, that Bakhtin’s account of answerability according to ethics and his account
according to the subject-other co-relation can be mapped onto each other. Just as
theoretical cognition must find a transgredient justification outside itself in onceoccurrent being so to must the phenomenological subject—the I-for-myself.
In the genealogy of transgredient justification, the figure of ‘Christ’ comes to
represent the model of a perfect “ethical solipsism,” whereby ‘Christ’ is recognized as an
infinite I-for-myself in all its depth—and is therefore alone capable of redeeming the
other.151 ‘Christ’ becomes flesh, the internal spiritual I externalizes itself (kenosis), and
pours itself into the other, since it has depth and can redeem while the other is all surface,
an empty husk in need of redeeming. While therefore it is true that there is an aspect of
this account that seems to retain the neo-Platonic world denial of the I-for-myself in need
of redemption, the I has already understood ‘Christ’ as the I-for-myself that has infinite
depth which can complete the other, vis-à-vis myself. Conversely, since “I-for-myself can
also be the other for God,” I take up the attitude of the I-for-myself of infinite depth—
modelled on ‘Christ’—that I may likewise sacrifice myself, or pour myself out for the
sake of the other. ‘Christ’ therefore becomes the model of the I-for-myself whereby I
assume the sacrificial mode of being; I empty myself out into the other (projection).
Then I return into myself that I might consummate the other; the other performs the
mirror image of this redemption for me. Both formal ethics and content ethics miss this
moment.
Lastly, we observe that the necessity of redemption appears to be at least as
historical as ontological in Bakhtin; it has grown out of the genealogy of perception of
autonomy and the becoming-isolated of the subject. It is unimaginable that the Spartan
would have conceived of the need for redemption in the other, since he lived a wholly
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physiological existence—since even his cultural self was wholly defined according to his
preparedness for battle. The lack of historical evidence of this genealogical account of
the emergence of the solipsistic subject does not negate the present necessity of
redemption in human perception. Another way to say this is that we must take a detour
through the other in order to come back to ourselves as consummated subjects and
especially as subjects of meaning-making. The idea that we can have and create a world
without the other is absurd, and yet how often to we catch ourselves lost in moral
solipsism and uninterested in trying to listen to the other’s voice on its own terms.

2.5

In the Flesh: Slovo, or the Word as Deed

The kenotic ‘Christ’ of Philippians 2:5-8 is therefore not a hidden theological motivation
of Bakhtin’s work, but the theological equivalent of ontological projection. Theorists who
would excoriate this moment of grace do nothing more than mortify the flesh of Bakhtin’s
theory of self-other relationality. Moreover, they overlook the fact that Bakhtin is
attempting to provide a genealogy of how our present ontological understanding of selfother relations has been passed down to us from the Greeks. In this way he is following
the methodology that can be traced through his teacher Zelinsky and inevitably through
Nietzsche. But where the latter theorizes the genealogy of ressentiment and bad
conscience, Bakhtin provides the conceptual line of descent for the necessity of external
justification, or grace. Bakhtin scholars who bypass the role of grace, which comes from
outside and is equally for me to give as it is for me to receive, do his early philosophy a
great injustice. What’s more, they risk losing the line of sight between these theologically
motivated concepts and his notion of outsideness on which all ethical justification is
grounded.152 This is, after all, the meaning of transgredience—that only I can
consummate the other, and only the other can provide me with the gift of justification. It
is also an essential moment in all economic exchange, metabolic existence, and, in the
final analysis, it is at the heart of the experience of love.153
The movement that Bakhtin describes in this section ultimately founds itself on a
gradual move inwards to self-conscious awakening to the need of redemption by the
consummating activity of the other. The crisis of neo-Platonic world-denial not only
hampers Christian ethics, but to my mind it is also echoed in all instrumental reasoning.
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It is a movement away from ethical existence into a merely theoretical cognitive and
ready-made virtue. On the other side, a wholly aesthetic intuitive form of absolute
empathizing does no better at providing an account of the other as a subjective I. This
form equally reduces the other to an object, finalizes her, although this time it does so by
assuming it can speak from inside the other’s consciousness. As we have seen, there is no
merging of consciousnesses, and the other cannot be reduced to an objectivised other—
which would amount to nothing more than an object among objects.154
I would like to make it clear that it is not the case that Bakhtin is following the
road of the middle-term or seeking a compromise between the two. Theoretical-cognitive
and aesthetical-intuitive approaches to ethics, while they are comprised of active
ingredients necessary to a truly ethical answering, are completely deficient in themselves.
They are also completely deficient if they are merely combined together. There is no
middle road between them that will lead to ethical answering, and to take this view-tocompromise would merely make a monstrous assemblage out of their ethically active
ingredients. It is true that cognition and projection are essential moments in ethics, but an
a priori-aesthetic assemblage composed of ready-made categorical imperatives and
aesthetic merging with the other will not bring me a step closer to answering for the other
from my unique place in once-occurrent being. In themselves or combined, these
approaches are deficient—one wholly gnoseological and the other wholly aesthetic; as
such, they each express only compartments of life as lived and do not approach the type
of synthesis that we experience within participative consciousness. This type of synthesis
is a unity-in-difference, or the subject who understands the other as another I who cannot
be reduced to a monological mergence with subjectivity. For this reason perhaps
Bakhtin’s early notebooks would more aptly have been anthologized as From Theoretical
and Aesthetic to Ethical Answerability.
Bakhtin emphasized the kenotic strain of Orthodoxy; as such, we can understand
his commitments not as some world-denying longing for a supermundane spiritual life,
but as bolstering his conception of embodiment of the word as flesh. Thus it might also
be interpreted as a renunciation of the ressentiment toward life that Nietzsche condemns
in the Western tradition. Messianism and the utopian eschatological refutations of the
present are themselves subject to excommunication in Bakhtin’s thought155; this rejection
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of eschatology again shows up in the theme of unfinalizability and great time, which we
will have opportunity to say more about below. Arguably, unlike the Western or
Byzantine Christian tradition, the community trumps the individual in Bakhtin’s stance
towards theology.156 He genuinely seems to believe in an “ideal community”—perhaps
not so unlike the occasional utopian movements in the West such as the Hussite rebels of
Bohemia. Clark and Holquist call this communal ethical basis “something like the
Bakhtinian polyphony or heteroglossia translated into social terms.”157 What they seem
to miss, is that the essential thread running through these themes is in no way akin to the
liberal and heavily individualist shades of thought that would pervert the corporeal and
material focus of Bakhtin’s writings. It is this focus which manifestly saves Bakhtin from
the accusation of an “‘unrecognized influence of Christianity in a humanist
terminology.’”158 As we have shown and will continue to show, neither Bakhtin’s
Christological or humanist tendencies are strictly orthodox.
The ideal community is not a separate community, however. Bakhtin was
repelled by the isolationist spirit of certain factions that began to form within Voskresenie
and whose utopian spirit impelled its adepts to withdraw to separate communities.159
Like humanism, Bakhtin’s relationship with utopian thought is again not strictly
transparent. We will return to this in the section on dialogue and dialectics below.
We ought to take up the question of Bakhtin’s Christological influences from the
outside. He invites us to do so, even as he skirted various forms of faith while
nevertheless abhorring the pyramidal and hierarchical structures of organized religious
affiliation. Bakhtin practiced what he preached, namely transgredience, exotopy,
outsideness. There is a double movement between the virtue of the law, personified by
Christ-Pantocrator, and the virtue of kenotic/empathetic projection of the subject into the
life of another, but neither of these movements is sufficient. The architectonic
consummation between external elements—here between system ethics and ethical acts,
between subject and object—is an art. The art of answerability assures my non-alibi, my
non-abdication, of becoming an ethical being from my unique place within it. In
answering the other and life from the outside I may bring to each the excess of being that
can neither be understood or witnessed from within itself.
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Finally, there is a real sense here in which Bakhtinian ethics and the Circle’s
translinguistics overlap—here one should think of the figure of the Venn diagram, and
this too is not a wholly satisfactory image. Bakhtin’s philosophy is self-reflexive in that
his individual studies complement and complete each other from the outside.
Nevertheless, it takes some reading before one begins to perceive the inner dialogue along
disciplinary lines between socioeconomics, linguistics, ontology, phenomenology,
biology, psychology, ethics, and cultural history, which is being perpetuated in Bakhtin’s
corpus. None of these faculties are reducible to the other, but they are taken up
throughout his oeuvre as mutual-aids. The whole remains inchoate and is set as a task.
Ethics brings to translinguistics the idea of the word made flesh. As we will see below,
Voloshinov emphasizes the materiality of the word and the primacy of this materiality in
shaping consciousness—hence the concept of a translinguistics. There is no question for
either Voloshinov or Bakhtin that in the beginning was the deed, or more precisely, the
word as deed. When the witness and judge first appeared on earth—i.e., when the
phenomenon of reflection first came into earthly being, it emerged in the form and
content that the word actively constituted.160
Saint Cuthbert’s is the oldest surviving codex on earth, housed in the British
Library, and it happens to be the Gospel of Saint John. The earliest extant book on earth,
therefore, begins ‘In Principio erat Verbum’ (In the beginning was the word).161 The
Latin verbum connotes both word and verb. In the Greek original, the ὁ λόγος of the
opening verse of St. John’s Gospel (Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος), was understood as half god and
half man, both spirit and material in nature. Verbum, like slovo, like logos, carries the
connotation of both meaning and action, or perhaps meaning-in-action. The English word
was once understood as everywhere active rather than passive. Etymologically word can
be traced from its Indo-European roots not only to a familial connection with verbum, but
to the Latvian vārds—to give one’s word and to promise to take action.162 It is to change
the event itself through evaluative inflection. When I give my word I change the material
nature of the social situation in which this word is embodied, just as the spiritual nature
becomes incarnate in the kenotic moment. The merely symbolic and abstract character of
the wholly theoretical and cognitive side of life again catches up with embodied life in
motion—if only temporarily. When one’s word ceases to be connected with the material
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conditions of life, when it is wholly spiritual, his words become ready-made and passive.
The passive word, impossible before the advent of writing, no longer seeks to materialize
and change the situation in which it is enmeshed. When I treat my word as a detachable
abstraction of myself, rather than a material bridge from the world to myself, I begin to
lose my ideological orientation in the world; that is, I pretend that my utterances can be
axiologically neutral. Ironically, Marxist political-economy is haunted by the materiality
of the word. The political-economic focus of Marxism, as Gardiner points out, in which a
“determining base” determines the superstructure, was simply inadequate to the task of
explaining the utterance. It was entirely too abstract.163
Now that we have begun to see how an ethically active subject answers onceoccurrent being-as-event, we will widen our inquiry into the answerability that ought to
take place between the faculties. We must everywhere keep in mind the materiality of the
word—the word is an ethically active deed or it is nothing but an empty-husk. Although
we typically talk as though our thoughts are wholly produced internally, somewhere deep
in the somatic, before they magically appear as material for the phonological apparatus
and finally become meaning for another, this is not the case. We will see in what is to
come, for Bakhtin—and notably for infants—words are not born inside of people but
between them. Both verbal and extra verbal words are actions before they are things and
they are things before they are abstract notions. It also seems to be the case that the
virtual or written word has this same existence or potential existence for Bakhtin, since he
suggests that one can live on through one’s rewritings—or more precisely that one’s
words can be reborn.164 The written word is action in potentia.
Words are materialistic from top to bottom, and exist much as things in the world
exist; they are matter in motion, subject to inflection and intonation. We may state that
naïve consciousness implicitly understands words as intentional entities—we think of
them as an outward embodiment, the clothing of our thought. Words everywhere seem to
be directed outward. Bakhtin reverses the ontogenetic order here, so that the word is
delivered of the subject rather than the subject delivered of the word. Just as the baby
first learns to say ‘mama’ when her mother is present and only then internalizes the word
as inner speech, thought itself begins with words that help to shape our concepts. So it is
that Bakhtin’s translinguists, as we will see below, runs deeply into the movement of
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being and the sensual world around us. Insomuch as the architectonics of answerability
constructs bridges between our institutions, therefore, this bridge-building is to be
accomplished only alongside of a socioeconomic and materialist account of the word.
This material existence requires a response outside itself, from within the life of
consciousness. The life of consciousness itself begins with matter in motion—with
becoming—just as the word begins with the deed. The verbally and extraverbally active
word—i.e. intonation—is the medium with which we witness, answer, and judge
existence. In what is to follow we will look closely at the line of critique embraced by the
Bakhtin’s Circle’s writings on biology, psychology, psychoanalysis, linguistics and
discourse, and theories of space-time. Each of these disciplines are brought together
through the construction of architectonic bridges between them and by attempts to ground
them in the material and socioeconomic origins of conscious life.
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§ 3.

Biology: Bakhtin, Kanaëv, and “Contemporary Vitalism”

3.1

A Brief History of “Contemporary Vitalism”:
Contextualizing the Kanaëv Paper
Life can be consciously comprehended only in concrete answerability. A philosophy of life can
only be a moral philosophy. Life can be consciously comprehended only as an ongoing event, and
not as being qua a given. A life that has fallen away from answerability cannot have a philosophy:
it is, in its very principle, fortuitous and incapable of being rooted.
—M. M. Bakhtin165
“Life... is [nature’s] best invention; death means greater life to it.... It is whole and eternally
unfinished. As it creates, so can one create eternally.”
—Goethe, “Nature”166

In this section I will review Bakhtin and I. I. Kanaëv’s paper “Contemporary Vitalism,”
still largely ignored in Bakhtinian scholarship. After providing a brief account of the
history of vitalism, I will then show how their paper critiques neo-vitalism as a subjective
and uncritical approach to biology. I also intend to provide an account as to how
dialectical materialism fits into the Bakhtinian critique of vitalism specifically and also
the architectonics of answerability more generally. Then I will proceed to an analysis of
Freud’s borrowings from the biological sciences and the vitalist theory that seems to
influence his “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. The present section will primarily take up
the question of forming an architectonic between biology and sociology—or more
properly, dialectical materialism. I will transition from bio-scientific-sociological
answerability to psychological-sociological answerability in the next section. In order to
accomplish this transition, I want to take up the question of Freud’s peregrination into
biology in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. This will achieve three ends. First, we will
see where the strictly subjective account of biology that Freud provides goes wrong.
Secondly, and almost cursorily (almost, but not entirely), this analysis will establish
Freud’s relation to vitalist-like principles and their detrimental influence on
psychoanalysis. Finally, this analysis will set the stage for Voloshinov’s critique of
psychoanalysis proper; Voloshinov’s critique shall be the subject of our next section.
Between 1924 and 1927, Bakhtin and Elena Aleksandrovna were living in an apartment
building owned by Kanaëv in Leningrad on Preobrazhenskaya Street.167 Under the
auspice of intellectual curiosity, the biologist Kanaëv took Bakhtin to a lecture that was to
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be given on the concept of chronotopicity by the Russian physiologist A. A. Ukhtomsky.
The lecture was held in Peterhof; the year was 1925.168 This seems to have been the
occasion which would inspire the composition of “Contemporary Vitalism,” an article
critiquing the vitalist theory of Hans Driesch which Kanaëv and Bakhtin co-wrote.169
George Rousseau locates the heart of Bakhtin’s scientific disposition in the short two part
paper which appeared under Kanaëv’s name; there were to be more papers to follow in
subsequent issues of the journal Man and Nature, but these never materialized.170 The
paper concludes with a short defence of dialectical materialism as the proper road for
science to follow.171 It is dialectical materialism as a scientific method that Bakhtin
wants to endorse, according to Rousseau, because he understood the efficacious approach
to scientific inquiry to move along “the axis of empirical subjects from physiology to
biology.”172 Bakhtin was in no way a follower. We have seen already this in his critical
appropriation of Russian Orthodoxy and, even more narrowly, of the kenotic tradition.
His neo-Kantian commitments were no less critical, and he did not blindly react to vitalist
doctrine and reject Driesch’s neo-vitalism only to fall back into a “merely logical and
epistemological” set of relations; that approach could at best only revivify the spectre of
Cartesian rationalism.173 This supposition is in agreement with Michael Gardiner’s work
on Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty, “‘The Incomparable Monster of Solipsism’”:
From his earliest writings[, and “Contemporary Vitalism” is his first co-authored
work,] Bakhtin likewise argues that the impoverishing dualism of Cartesian
rationalism can only be combated by a repudiation of the abstractions of idealist
philosophy, so as to grasp the nature of the concrete deed or ‘act’ as it constitutes
the essential ‘value-centre’ for human existence.174
The question that opens the paper on vitalism, “what is life,” therefore takes on added
significance in light of Bakhtin’s commitment to moving beyond Cartesian-rational and
Kantian-categorical paradigms. Marx’s famous paradigmatic inversion of Hegel,
expressed in the dictum that consciousness is determined by life, everywhere informs
Bakhtin’s work, from the earliest notebooks—Art and Answerability—to the very last
word in “Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences.”175 If we are to understand why
Bakhtin and Kanaëv put so much emphasis on dialectical materialism as the proper
methodology of the biological sciences, then, we must follow his post-Cartesian critique
of Driesch and Bergson. For simplicity sake I shall again invoke the proper name
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‘Bakhtin’ as the author of “Contemporary Vitalism”, although this in no way supposes
that I am deliberately excluding the possibility that Kanaëv was actually penned the
article.176
There are three approaches to the question “what is life,” which are taken up in
“Contemporary Vitalism”: namely the mechanist, the vitalist, and the positivist. The first
declares that there are no essential boundaries between the organic and the inorganic, and
they can each therefore be reduced to self-consistent planes of physical and chemical
properties from which all experiments and explanations are to be conducted.
Contrariwise, vitalism grants that life itself follows distinctive non-physico-chemical
laws, and the whole is therefore greater than the parts. Finally, positivism lives and dies
by what is in essence Newton’s maxim: Hypotheses non fingo, and works merely with
what is given. Positivism hesitates to provide hypotheses until such a time as when
Science is “on firm, reliable, footing.”177 This last position is necessary for the
“descriptive stage” of biological science, but this stage had long passed by the early 20th
century, and Bakhtin therefore rejects positivism outright, since looking for nothing, it
was sure to find it.178 What Bakhtin was looking for was a philosophically active science;
science is supposed to respond to life, after all. Between biology and life, therefore, he
placed the method of actively and architectonically answering life by bio-scientific
means. In biology as in life, we are responsible not merely to say what is but also to
establish what ought to be—in other words, what should properly be set as a task for
biology. In this supposition, Bakhtin shows where he remains indebted to the Kantian
philosophy even while trying to supersede it by placing it back in life as what he calls a
participative consciousness.179 Positivism attempts to establish “‘a well-founded’
neutrality between the mechanists and the vitalists,” but this position ignores both the fact
that biology has already established a methodology and that a full answer to the question
“what is life” is not only unnecessary, but is not wholly answerable.180 Positivism
therefore ought rightly to be discarded, both because the descriptive stage of biology is
already behind it and because no neutrality is possible.181
Vitalism has passed through a series of stages throughout history; it has travelled
through what Hegel would have described as a succession of forms.182 Although
Rousseau latches onto two main important categories of vitalism in Bakhtin’s paper, the
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old and the new strain, there are three essentially different historical stages through which
vitalism has had to move and which are described in “Contemporary Vitalism”. These
are the ancient, the modern, and the contemporary forms. Recognizably vitalist and
mechanist strains of philosophy were both debated by the Greeks. According to Bakhtin,
the Greeks understood the distinctive characteristics of life to be purposiveness, freedom
and answerability.183 Vitalism has survived more or less throughout the Western
philosophical tradition since Aristotle, and was roughly patterned after Aristotelian
thinking. There are in fact only two moments in the history of Western philosophy in
which vitalism could not be considered alive and well, for a relatively short period during
the seventeenth century—directed as it was toward rationalism and the mathematization
of nature, vitalism was in its death throes.184 More recently, vitalism has suffered a
second excommunication from the biological sciences roughly since Crick and Watson’s
discovery of DNA. It could be argued, though I will not do so here, that a vitalist style of
thinking has fled the world of sciences altogether and found a new life in the
humanities—that the false imposition of agency as a necessary fiction is equally applied
to political thinking, and that the idea of organic unity has since been equally applied to
the concept of the autotelic text.
By all accounts the 17th century was overwhelmingly mechanist and tended to
push vitalism to the margins of philosophy. However, vitalism was not altogether
expunged—and even the mechanists often admitted the necessity of teleological
principles.185 In the 18th century, William Paley’s universe may have been a clockwork,
but it still required a watchmaker to set it in motion. Newton himself could not shake the
idea that celestial mechanics required something akin to Aristotle’s first mover, and, as
Hans Eichner points out, “the arch-materialist... Baron d’Holbauch, as late as 1770,
ascribes to dead matter an innate ‘nisus,’ or striving, which, rather than gravitation,
accounts for the fall of bodies.”186 Finally, what Bakhtin refers to as contemporary
vitalism is a self-described critical vitalism, since by and large it owes its epistemic
grounding to the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment” in Kant’s third
critique. Bakhtin denies, however, that there is anything objective or critical about
Driesch’s contemporary vitalism.187
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The vitalism of the 18th and early 19th centuries was dogmatic, and its proponents
largely presumed some form of nisus or agency was necessary to explain life and the
motility of matter. As far back as William Harvey’s opifex or “artificer,” proponents of
the modern dogmatic line of descent, who posit some form of vital agent, stretches
through Caspar Friedrich Wolff (vis essentialis corporis), Albrecht von Haller (vital
spirit), Georg Ernst Stahl (vital fluid), the Brunonians (Lebenskraft), Blumenbach (nisus
formativus), Robinet (élan vital), and many others, culminating with Kant’s critical
positing of a teleological principle in the power of reflective judgement.188 In the second
part of the third critique, Kant injects the tension between mechanical and teleological
principles directly into to his critical philosophy, relying on his concept of reflective
judgement and final cause as merely regulative principles, so as to leave the
epistemological door open and retain his critical—i.e., non-dogmatic—position.
According to Kant, living organisms, unlike inorganic matter, cannot be thought
merely according to “nexus effectivus,” or efficient cause, but require the subordination of
mechanical causal explanations to the “nexus finalis,” or final cause.189 In the “antinomy
of the power of judgement,” Kant begins from the thesis that “all generation of material
things is possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws,” while his antithesis states
that “some generation of such things is not possible in accordance with merely
mechanical laws.”190 All of nature ought to be thought according to mechanical or
efficient cause, or there can be no science of nature at all. Without these laws science has
nothing to quantify. However, experience teaches us that we cannot help but to
understand organisms according to a second, higher cause, which works according to the
logic of ends. Organic things therefore present us with an apparent contradiction; they
are at once self-caused and determined. As with the antinomy of causation in the first
Critique, the antinomy of judgement will turn out to be illusory.191 The antinomy
collapses when we posit a special reflecting power of judgement as a merely regulative
judgement which can account for natural ends where a priori determining judgement
cannot do so. The central practical importance of this principle, as Helmut MüllerSievers rightly points out, was to enable “scientists to determine the range of their
problems and to avoid the trap of answering questions outside their fields, precisely the
temptation that had led to the inconsistencies in Haller’s, Buffon’s, and Wolff’s
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systems”192; that is, each of these philosophers of the organic had dogmatically assumed
life required a non-mechanical causal agency. Bakhtin follows Kant half-way; he also
wants to provide a propaedeutic to the biological sciences. Unlike the efficient cause
supplied by determining judgement, however, reflective judgement’s nexus finalis “is a
mere idea, to which one by no means undertakes to concede reality.”193 It is merely
reflective, and in principle does not contradict or subvert mechanical causal accounts.194
Thus Immanuel Kant erects the framework on which the “critical vitalism” of Driesch
shall be presented, but of course Driesch actually posits an hypostasized forming agency.
Bakhtin therefore deems neo-vitalism every bit as dogmatic as ancient vitalism:
We in no way want to say that vitalism has actually succeeded in making itself
critical. We do not think it has; we hope to convince the reader that vitalism, by
its very nature, can never transcend dogmatism; in other words, that in the final
analysis, it may only be a matter of personal faith, in no way a basis for scientific
knowledge. We term contemporary vitalism critical in the subjective sense, that
is, we mark only the fact that its representatives strive to be critically-minded,
whether they succeed or not. They give their constructions a principled,
methodological shape; they endeavour to consider the strengths of the mechanistic
position in biology, and this side of neo-vitalism must be noted.195
As we will see, it is not Driesch’s empirical practices that err but the conclusions he
draws from them. In forming his hypotheses he leans too far toward the hypostatization
of an autonomous formational agency.

3.2

Bakhtin and Kanaëv’s Critique of “Contemporary Vitalism”

Bakhtin focuses his critique on Driesch’s work, and specifically the three—nontechnical—of his four proofs of vitalism. The first of these is known as “organic
regulation” and is supposed to ground the theory of Driesch’s neo-vitalism. Organic
regulation is further subdivided into regulation of process, or “morphological regulation
or restitution.”196 Regulation includes any attempt by the organism to restore damaged
parts or interrupted functions, and the example is given of the self-regeneration observed
in earthworms. Organic regulation is held up by Driesch as the first and most important
evidence for an extra physico-chemical force necessary to and inherent in all life.197
Driesch’s first proof for the autonomy of life is most fully expounded in his
reported experiments with sea-urchin “fission,” through which he gives a fuller account
of organic regulation by artificially interrupting normal cell division of the blastomeres.198
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In sea-urchins, blastomeres are cells under normal conditions, which divide from their
initial state of the embryo as a single cell. Fission occurs from this first blastomere until
about 800 cells have accumulated. An internal “cavity” is formed. This is the stage of
the “blastule.”199 The blastule simply marks a “new period of embryonic development”
in which the endoderm and the ectoderm begin to form and the embryo begins the
gastrule stage of development.200
Driesch preformed three experiments on interruption of ‘normal’ cell duplication
and was satisfied that there was sufficient proof that each cell has at any point in this
process an “equipotential” to perform the task required for one stage of growth or
another.201 First, at the two cell stage Driesch artificially separated the blastomeres and
thus interrupts the progression to the third stage. The individual cells then repeat the
normal growth from stage one to stage two without any abnormal result from their having
been divided—except for a slight diminution of size. In the second experiment a single
blastomere is artificially separated off from the group during the four cell stage. The cells
will again achieve normal growth, and again there is a slight diminution in the size
observed in the organism. In the third experiment artificial fission is performed on a fully
grown blastule, and each half then forms a slightly smaller but otherwise complete seaurchin.202
The enormous flexibility of the blastomeres seems to point to a freedom of
potential development which Driesch calls “‘prospective potentials.’”203 This is to say
that each blastomere potentially has the capability of contributing any functionality
required for the realization of normal growth. Which part each blastomere actually plays
he calls “‘prospective significance.’”204 A second type of experiment seems to play out
the idea that every blastomere possesses “equipotentiality”—meaning that “all the
elements of our system have identical prospective potentials.”205 In this experiment the
developing embryo’s ‘vertical’ axis of growth is restricted by placing it between glass
plates from the four cell stage to the eight cell stage. The group of blastomeres are then
released and they proceed uninhibited, developing both vertically and horizontally.
What is at stake here? An explanation of the sea-urchin’s growth does not seem
to be exhausted by the “spatial location” and “size of the system.” 206 In addition to the
mechanical constituents guiding the sea-urchin’s development, Driesch’s conception of
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equipotential requires a third, actively participative influence. This agency has the power
to freely direct growth toward the consistent organization of the whole. Driesch calls this
entelechy after Aristotle, but his meaning is closer to the Aristotelian eidos—or the
“blueprint of the whole.”207 The notion here is that while this agency cannot interfere
mechanically with the physico-chemical properties of the organism, it nevertheless has
the power to govern form.
No matter how many ways you slice it, says Driesch, the machine theory of
organicity cannot account for the consistent unfolding organization of the blastomeres,
and we must look beyond mechanistic causation. Unlike inorganic matter, organisms
cannot be thought merely according to nexus effectivus, but require the subordination of
mechanical causal explanations to the nexus finalis.208 For Driesch, therefore,
morphogenesis is autonomous of physical and chemical causality:
It seems to me that there is only one conclusion possible. If we are going to
explain what happens in our harmonious-equipotential systems by the aid of
causality based upon the constellation of single physical or chemical factors and
events, there must be some such thing as a machine. Now the assumption of the
existence of a machine proves to be absolutely absurd in the light of the
experimental facts. Therefore there can be neither any sort of machine nor any
sort of causality based upon [a] constellation underlying the differentiation of
harmonious-equipotential systems.
For a machine, typical with regard to the three chief dimensions of space,
cannot remain itself if you remove parts of it or if you rearrange its parts at will.
Here we see that our long and careful study of morphogenesis has been
worthwhile: it has afforded us a result of the very first importance.209
The essential error in Driesch’s theory occurs entirely on the side of his theoretical
hypothesis. It is the logic of the concept that errs, however, and not the observations he
has made or the state of biological knowledge at the time these experiments were
conducted. Driesch’s equipotentiality is an example, and we will see more below, of the
subjective theoretical projection onto what ought to be an objective theoretical practice.
We remember that Driesch claimed there were many prospective potentials for each
blastomere. This was universally true and true at each stage of development, but there
was also only one prospective significance actualized in each stage. Driesch thesis
posited equipotentiality for each blastomere at all stages of development until the
formulation of the blastule was achieved. Yet the experiments with the sea-urchin
embryo were conducted at each stage of development and even under conditions that
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restricted growth along the vertical axis altogether. At no time during these experiments
were any alternate possibilities expressed or signified by the organism itself.210 There is,
therefore, a gap between what has been observed and what Driesch’s theory of
equipotentiality posits.
Driesch’s mistake is to overstep the bounds of the role of subjective interpretation
in the hard sciences. By attributing to the organism a hypostatized teleological form of
causation—i.e., final cause, he has snuck in subjectively perceived ends by the back door.
Without wit of it, he has secretly changed nexus effectivus into nexus finalis—hey, presto!
For Kant, however, final cause can only play a regulative function for scientific theory as
it progresses forward. Institutionalized science is self-motivating, and refines and discards
its concepts by turn and according to the degree of adequation they obtain for the
progression of scientific knowledge. In the sciences we are not free to hypostasize
purposiveness or to anthropomorphize nature; where we attempt to exchange mechanical
laws with subjective agency, we commit a paralogistic ingression of perceptual
phenomenon into the things themselves. This is the part of Kant which Bakhtin accepts,
but not as an epistemological limit. The limit is rather to be understood as a limit
between being and becoming. Kant’s limit remains gnoseological. Bakhtin’s limit is
built into the limit of the historical framework which has conceived, birthed, and nurtured
biological science to its current state. Note, there is nothing in Bakhtin’s paper that
would contradict Crick and Watson’s discovery of DNA and RNA or protein guided
growth of organic bodies, since in the latters’ work proteins do the work of the
autonomous agent presupposed by vitalism, and Crick and Watson do not, therefore,
require an extra-materialist account of the organism and do not have to appeal to forces
beyond the physical and chemical to account for self-unfolding and self-individuation.
Neither Kant nor Bakhtin deem life to actually have a teleological agency. This
becomes especially tricky since we tend to look at the world in terms of its use and
according to our own ideologically directed ends. This is also true of the way we look at
biology, but we must be careful not to attribute actual ends to life. As a regulative
principle, nexus finalis provides biology with light enough to go forward but not enough
to claim this type of cause is real.
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We see this everywhere in biological study. Take the eye, for example. We used
to say the eye is for seeing. It is efficacious to say so, since the eye is principally thought
of in terms of sight and since sight plays such a large role in our culture and biology. Yet
we cannot strictly say that the eye developed exclusively for sight in reaction to light.
There is nothing about light that should require an organism to develop the eye as an
organ of sight. There is nothing in light that is exclusively devoted to vision or to making
visible. It is only the visual function of the eye that tempts us, retroactively, to say the
telos of light is to make visible. Lacan, for one, takes skin pigmentation as evidence
against this teleological account of the ocular.211 Of course, the eye is still studied
according to its ends as a receptor of light, but this oracular course is tied up in the
concept eye, as well as the fact our world is overwhelmingly visually orientated, and not
the organ itself, and which may even possess non-ocular or even anti-ocular capacities.
Likewise, the purported harmony that is supposed to emerge from Driesch’s
distribution of functions along the blastomeres via equipotentiality is nothing more than
the spectre imposed upon living matter by “subjective, valuative consciousness.”212
Bakhtin does allow for a certain mode of objectivity which would understand the
organism as a harmonious self-regulating whole, but only on the side of perception.
Therefore it is no contradiction to suggest that the dance of the male bird of paradise
arouses its mate through the power of sensual attraction, and we can justifiably substitute
this for a physico-chemical explanation. Nevertheless, Bakhtin rejects the “uncritical
transference” of perceptual appearances onto mechanical and lawfully bound
processes.213 The teleological conception of nature is therefore to be understood not only
as final cause, but also and only from the end that has already been achieved. Again,
according to Bakhtin it is only in retrospect that we can contemplate the phenomenon
from the point of view of nexus finalis.214 Below, “Freudianism”—so-called—will
likewise be critiqued in part for its fallacious retrogressive method.215
At the end of their essay, Bakhtin and Kanaëv also draw attention to the machinelike character of the organism. Against Driesch, they affirm that the organism is a strange
machine. From the top to the bottom, the organism is a self-assembling, regenerating,
regulating, and living machine. Taking this statement at face value, one might be tempted
to recall in advance Deleuze and Guattari’s axiom: “Everything is a machine.”216 But
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Deleuze and Guattari’s machines subsist on a plane of immanence, of “nondifference or
dispersion.”217 Their machinic philosophy moves in both directions at once: there
vitalism moves away from organic unity and toward mechanism and mechanism away
from “structural unity” and toward living machines which can only be considered an open
unity.218 But Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic philosophy is not mechanistic, or is not
exclusively mechanical. Meanwhile Bakhtin’s account remains committed to an
explanation by mechanical cause.

3.3

Biology and Dialectical Materialism

The principle importance of Bakhtin and Kanaëv’s paper is kept in the background and
only surfaces briefly and is underemphasised. This is true to the extent that Clark and
Holquist have become convinced that Bakhtin’s endorsement of dialectical materialism is
only lip-service to the Soviet censors, but the homage to dialectical materialism is not
simply a walk along the party line. It is instead an acknowledgement that scientific
method itself is evolving and relies on social institutions for its momentum, and that what
one learns in science in turn changes these institutions. The institutions that guide
biological scientific practice are themselves changed by this practice and this symbiotic
relation exceeds the sphere of the biological sciences and its epistemes; they also
encompass adjacent territories—territories of governmental funding, of chemistry play
sets, of the first science fiction novel, of the ability to imagine little machines, of nanobots
and their technologies, of linguistic practice, of having a proper breakfast. In some sense,
everything is an institution. All of these parts, Bakhtin was crucially aware, are not
merely adjacent to the “complex phenomena [of] organic relations,” but are themselves
part of the productive work of science. Yet if Bakhtin was committed to dialectical
materialism as a method, and if he remained a dualistic thinker, he likewise accepted a
gap between consciousness and the world. How could he endorse Butler’s bee-pollenflower assemblage, or Deleuze and Guattari’s molar-molecular dispersion? Deleuze and
Guattari’s machines go all the way to the bottom; they find a way to unify the vitalistmechanist assemblage by placing the subject, the consciousness that does science, to one
side, and by looking instead at the movement of desire, collectivities—the molecular, or
microscopic machines, and on the other side at mass phenomenon, societies, institutions,
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planets, individuals—i.e., the molar, on the other, in a real sense their solution both erases
and multiplies the gap between the molar and molecularity: “at this point of dispersions of
the two arguments [vitalism and mechanism], it becomes immaterial whether one says
that machines are organs, or organs, machines.”219 Is this really as messy—and schizo—a
solution as Deleuze and Guattari believe, or does it repeat the search for an elegant
unified universe? Bakhtin does not search for a plain of immanence, and this is the
difference.
Perception has the effect of slowing the advance of science. Perception is as
much cultural as it is biological. If the landscape of scientific consciousness is as much
shaped by scientific practice as by advances in theory, then this too goes all the way to the
bottom of perception. The historian of science, Steven Shapin relates the story of the
Paduan professor who “refused to look through Galileo’s telescope to see with his own
eyes the newly discovered moons around Jupiter,” while observers of telescoped
terrestrial objects not only believed what they saw but were amazed.220 Seeing is
believing, certainly, but the question is what do we see? What we see is always-already
telescoped by an instituted socioeconomic condition.
Insomuch as it is a science of life, biology is Bakhtin’s ideological dominant. As
such, he and Kanaëv are focused not on answering the question “what is life,”
definitively, but in establishing a theoretical framework for biology that takes into
consideration life as it is lived and the sciences as they are practiced. Biology therefore
presupposes sociology. In the background of their text, therefore, Bakhtin and Kanaëv
never lose sight of the methodological prerequisite that science must be self-reflexive.
Scientific hypotheses are formed though conscious striving, but this consciousness is
itself first formed by the material practices that give to it its distinctive style and territory
and which, in turn, shape scientific consciousness. The scientific genre is borne along by
the rhythm of everyday speech. Here it finds its bedrock and the sedimented ideological
material with which to form linguistic communities and discourses. It is for this reason
that we can say for certain that Bakhtin and Kanaëv are also in dialogue with one another
in the essay, since while Kanaëv has helped to tutor Bakhtin in conversation and helped
him establish the scientific veracity of his theoretical position, Bakhtin has invested
biological practice with the art of sociologically answering, so to speak.
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To make this clear, we must again look for a moment at the paper “Art and
Answerability.” There, Bakhtin shows that the “three domains of human culture—
science, art, and life” bear merely external—i.e., mechanical—relations to one another
and can only achieve an internal unity in the fertile soil of a consciousness capable of
consummating each by answering one with the other. Thus science is answered by life,
life by art, art by science, and so forth. This is done by bringing to science what one has
“understood in art.”221
Furthermore, the concept of the understanding has a technical meaning in
Bakhtin, as Allon White clarifies:
Thus understanding, for ‘Bakhtin,’ always carries more than its purely cognitive
meaning. It always includes that further sense of active and sympathetic solidarity
with the other; it is an emotive-evaluative act as well as an act of pure knowledge.
It is an act of elective inclusion, of unification, though never in the sense of
denying social and cultural differences and distinction. For ‘Bakhtin’
acknowledgement and knowledge flow together.222
Understanding does not begin and end by fitting sense-perception into neat cognitive
categories, and in this way Bakhtin is not only attempting to move beyond the rationalism
of Descartes, but is also post-Kantian. It is therefore not simply a matter of doing science
on paper or remaining within abstract theoretical formulation and deduction, but one must
answer the once-occurrent being-as-event.
If we have said that biology, in its orientation toward life, is Bakhtin’s
ideologically dominant approach to the sciences, it is only dominant where it can
architectonically unify the other faculties—notably the sociological—within the unity and
uniqueness of consciousness by the witness and the judge. The particular cultural domain
of biological science as a theoretical practice is not to be understood as loosely—i.e.,
mechanically—connected to his larger philosophical project. It is not a matter of there
being a disjuncture between the two, nor is it a matter of Bakhtin changing his mind
between his early notebooks and the publication with Kanaëv. Quite on the contrary, the
critique of vitalism that he offers us fits into the larger edifice on which he began to work
during this period, during the early to mid-1920’s. Again, Toward a Philosophy of the
Act makes a concerted effort to show how one cultural region of life, science and art—
and here ethics—fits into his ontology:
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Our time deserves to be given full credit for bringing philosophy closer to the
ideal of a scientific philosophy. But this scientific philosophy can only be a
specialized philosophy, i.e., a philosophy of the various domains of culture and
their unity in the form of a theoretical transcription from within the objects of
cultural creation and the immanent law of their development. And that is why this
theoretical philosophy cannot pretend to being a first philosophy, that is, a
teaching not about unitary cultural creation, but about unitary and once-occurrent
being-as-event. Such a first philosophy does not exist, and even the paths leading
to its creation seem to be forgotten. Hence the profound dissatisfaction with
modern philosophy on the part of those who think participatively, a dissatisfaction
that compels some of them to have recourse to such a conception as historical
materialism which, in spite of all its defects and defaults, is attractive to
participative consciousness because of its effort to build its world in such a way as
to provide a place in it for the performance of determinate, concretely historical,
actual deeds; a striving and action-performing consciousness can actually orient
itself in the world of historical materialism.223
Of course, Bakhtin’s commitment to continued dialogue and to interpreting being as an
event rather than as a thing restrict him from accepting wholesale the Marxist account of
historical materialism and its eventual resolution in a classless society.224 Historical
materialism, along with anthroposophy and theosophy “commit the same methodological
sin,” none of these approaches attempt to be answerable to the event and cannot
distinguish methodologically “between what is given and what is set as a task, of what is
and what ought to be.”225 Positivism is only the most extreme form of this fallacy, which
as we have said, adheres merely to what is given and makes no attempt to erect a
philosophic foundation, or here an architectonic, to answer being.
It is essential for us to remember, again with Allon White, that the character of the
unity Bakhtin supposes between art, science, and life is a unity-in-difference. For creative
thought, which has had the historical (ad)vantage of post-structuralist hindsight, already
more or less rejects grand-narratives and monological unities of the Hegelian sort, so this
perspective may seem pedestrian. However, at the time of Bakhtin’s writing, we recall,
other neo-Kantian practitioners—Hermann Cohen for example—continued their efforts to
subdue this difference, to reconcile all historical becoming to the copular, propositional,
unity of being as concept.
We still do not take the species—or “trends”—of biology and science seriously
enough.226 Science must always have a frontier. Sometimes sciences share a frontier
along “boarder zones”; today we would call these zones of interdisciplinarity.227 Bakhtin
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says that trends originate in these interstices, and we see this most notably in the wholly
new discourses as they are instantiated in Darwin, Freud, and Marx. Darwin worked on
the edge of the biological sciences, Freud in the interstices of psychology, and Marx in
the margins of political economy and social theory. When science reflects on its own
activity, this “supra existence,” or radical reflection, of science will change the practices it
is looking at. In effect the entire structure of a scientific discipline changes when it
becomes actively self-aware. Self-conscious reflection and the bare consciousness of an
object are clearly different things. Bakhtin says that there is a discernable moment in
great time in which being in and for-itself first came into existence.228
This moment is not reducible to essentially human characteristics and neither,
therefore, can this ontological difference be solely shouldered by humanism. The
“supraperson” effectively leads its own life, in the grand cosmic scale of great time. We
can infer that to be conscious is to be a personal and singular consciousness, to have a
perspective, to be a unique situation seen from a particular vista: to take part in the
“supra-I.”229 In the supraperson I see myself in my entirety. I am not simply one
existence among others and am definitely not an object among objects, but I am also a
sense of that existence. My life takes on a second sediment of meaning from the point of
view of the in-itself and for-itself. But the supraperson depends upon the external social
milieu for its origin and development and it only approaches its great complexity long
after birth:
Everything that pertains to me enters my consciousness, beginning with my name,
from the external world through the mouths of others (my mothers, and so forth),
with their intonation, in their emotional and value-assigning tonality. I realize
myself initially through others: from them I receive words, forms, and tonalities
for the formation of my initial idea of myself. The elements of infantilism in selfawareness (‘Could mama really love such a...’) sometimes remain until the end of
life (perception and the idea of one’s self, one’s body, face, and past in tender
tones). Just as the body is formed initially in the mother’s womb (body), a
person’s consciousness awakens wrapped in another’s consciousness. Only later
does one begin to be subsumed by neutral words and categories, that is, one is
defined as a person irrespective of I and other.230
The discipline of biology is like this. We have constructed it in our own image. Biology
only emerged as a science after thousands of years spent as a descriptive practice—and
for a long time was limited to Medieval bestiaries and was driven by a profoundly
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sympathetic (microcosm and macrocosm) and anthropomorphised style of thought. The
answers given in chemistry and physiology have in turn reflexively calibrated natural
history, and we have been able to re-organise genetic taxonomical families around
genetically veridical natural species. Historical hermeneutical interpretation tends to take
up the study of history through its own ideological lens.231
3.4

Introducing the Soma, Instincts, and the Pleasure Principle into
Psychoanalysis

We are now ready to transition from Bakhtin’s critique of vitalism to Voloshinov’s
critique of psychoanalysis. We will do so by first providing a brief analysis of Freud’s
borrowings from vitalism and biology. Before moving to the next section I want to show
that Freud’s account fails along the same lines as Driesch’s—vis-à-vis the purely
subjective mode of analysis he provides and his omission of history from both his science
and biological/psychological development. As a trained medical doctor, biology heavily
bookends Freudian psychoanalysis, but we will limit our comments to the case of the
hysterical biological influence that returns in his later work, in “Instincts and their
Vicissitudes” and “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.”
I picture Freud M.D. and academic caught between his search for an etiologic
psychoanalysis and his bio-scientific curiosity regarding the somatic origins of purposeful
behaviour. It is hard to explain his speculations on “germ-plasm” and ontogeny without
first promoting a distinction between how Freud seems to understand his metapsychology
and what he would like it to do. 232 Freud indeed set out to provide a theory for both the
history and the destiny of the psyche, its functioning and its repair. There seems to be a
double Freud here, however—a split consciousness. How do Freud’s biological
speculations in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” jive with the Freud who wants to make a
science of the psyche?233 There seems to be an inside and an outside to psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis seems to evince an unfulfilled longing to establish the essence of the
somatic.
In Freud’s 1915 paper, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, he recognizes that all
sciences must begin in description, just as we have seen in Bakhtin.234 He further admits
that concepts must be “imposed” upon science so long as it remains in this natal stage; the
ideas begin with “some degree of indefiniteness.”235 Ideas in science begin as
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conventions, and Freud’s notion of the instincts is no different.236

He then makes the

distinction between physiological stimulus, coming from without, and to which the
organism can respond by taking flight, and instinct, which originates within the organism,
remains constant, and to which “no actions of flight avail against them.”237 Freud then
does something strange. He assumes, and it is nothing more than an assumption, that the
interior life of the psyche is allergic to stimulus, so to speak. That it wants to return to a
state or rest, or a wholly non-stimulated state.238 It is only by this will to return to a state
of rest that can account for the development of the nervous system. Since instincts are a
constant “afflux” of stimulus from inside the organism, the nervous system has been
developed as a sort of internal flight mechanism, whose purpose is to nullify this internal
disruption of organic quiescence.239 Freud then supposes that the “unpleasure” of these
disruptive instincts is therefore subject to the pleasure principle.240 The organism wishes
to fly from the unpleasureable sensation that his disturbed its dormancy. Finally, Freud
posits that these instincts are not only internal to the organism, but, speaking biologically,
they arise in the écart or interstice of the psychic and the somatic:
If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from the biological point of
view, an “instinct” appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental
and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from
within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made
upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body.241
We are therefore assured that “instinct” is a frontier conceptualization, and the concept
itself therefore must be more clearly, if tentatively, defined in terms of this body to mind
dualistic relation.
For psychoanalysis interprets biological and psychical development as a
negotiation of the interior-exterior relation as it pertains not only the organism as a unity,
but between its psyche and the somatic. For Freud, the subject must come to identify
with those desired objects exterior to it and only thereby does it interiorize them and
make them its own.242 This renegotiation of identity-alterity as interiority-exteriority,
then, seems be in flux and has a vector moving from high to low irritation, with the aim of
releasing building pressure, or “Drang.”243 Under the constant afflux of pressure the
individual develops an economy and valuation of interior-exterior relations. This is
Freud’s principle of constancy: he says, “the pleasure principle follows from the principle
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of constancy: actually the latter principle was inferred from the facts which forced us to
adopt the pleasure principle.” 244 The instincts coax the organism to let down its defence
in order to interiorize those objects deemed necessary for survival. Ultimately, this
interiorization is accomplished by thwarting or rerouting the defence mechanisms of the
nervous system through self-identification with those exterior objects; again, for Freud, it
is only through such identification that the psychic and somatic defences against
exogenous stimuli can be compromised.245
The drive which motivates the gaze—the scopophilic “aim”—is defined generally
as “looking as an activity directed toward an extraneous object,”246 and the scopophilic
vicissitudes of reversal of the active to passive form—i.e., scopophilia becoming
exhibitionism and “turning round upon the subject’s own self” can,247 and should, be seen
as vicissitudes through which the scopophilic instinct will have to pass. In first turning
his scopophilic instinct to his own body, the subject makes himself the object of his own
inspection. This is the primary scopophilic stage and it would correspond to the stage of
primary narcissism in Freud’s theory. In the next stage of scopophilic drive
development, the subject solicits the gaze of the other.248 The important take away here is
that for Freud, scopophilia is born in the subject as an instinct whose source is somatic
but ultimately unknown. The instinct must achieve its aim by cathecting, i.e., investing
desire in, an object. Again, in primary narcissism, the object selected is the subject’s own
body. Freud posits this as the beginning of the scopophilic instinct, when the subject
contemplates his own genitals, and they are cathected as the desired object through which
the instinct may achieve its aim.249 Through repression and the castration complex,
however, the child must learn to displace his object of choice and find a proxy—though
Freud does not here specifically elucidate the vicissitudes of “repression” or
“sublimation”250; as the subject first passes from the auto-erotic stage, the “active
scopophilic instinct” takes hold of an external object, cathects it, and thereby “leave[s]
narcissism behind.”251 Again, note that the movement is unidirectional in terms of origin,
that the movement is one of exteriorization, even if “instinct” is a truly frontier concept
between mind and body.
Freud complicates the categories of interior and exterior through the further
positing of the “three polarities of mental life,” 252 each of which complicate in divergent
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manners according to their subject matter. All three polarities can be understood as a
(re)negotiation of the relation between interiority-exteriority. The three polarities are
categorized in terms of the biological, the real, and the economic; but more importantly,
Freud categorizes the three polarities according to the instinctual aims themselves, which
tend to hold sway.253 The biological polarity is defined in terms of individual organisms,
the real polarity is demarcated by the ego-to-externality relation, and as the borders of the
ego are redefined through identification and projection, so too is the interior-exterior
relation renegotiated. Finally, in the development of the pleasure principle in primary
narcissism, the economic polarity of the interior-exterior relation emerges. In this
polarity interiority and exteriority of the subject are (re)negotiated strictly in terms the
pleasure and unpleasure. Subjective identification is bound by pleasure, whereas
unpleasure is to be expulsed and disavowed254: “[t]hus the original ‘reality-ego,’ which
distinguishes internal and external by means of a sound objective criterion, changes into a
purified ‘pleasure ego’, which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others.”255
Henceforth this economy of pleasure-unpleasure helps condition identity and
alterity and ultimately what is considered endogenous or exogenous to the organism. The
split-ego then abandons the portion of itself it finds unpleasureable by projecting the
abhorred part of itself out into the world. The external world is no longer seen as
indifferent, but now is considered strictly “hostile” by default.256 According to Freud, we
may here begin to discern a second opposition in the normal development of object
love.257 In this second opposition he terms “love-hate”; indifference is now considered
secondary to, or merely derivative of love or hate. This is because in Freud there are no
passive instincts.258 The example of scopophilia should express a resistance to the
external world by the secondary opposition that is characterized by indifference that now
stems out of the primary love-hate opposition. The indifference to the world is
manifested in the subject’s auto-erotic play during narcissism, the exploration of his
limbs,259 or quite literally in the obsessive self-appraisal of the scope of the subject’s
body.260
We are now ready to formulate a preliminary thesis on the movement of the
Freudian vicissitudes: the logic of interior-exterior is grafted onto and runs parallel to the
logic of the subject position in general. For all practical purposes, development always
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pushes toward a resolution of any contradictory evidence that ‘I am in here’ and ‘the
world is out there.’ In short, in the change from the “reality-ego” of the earliest
developmental stages of the I,261 to the “pleasure-ego” born in primary narcissism,262 the
ego comes to identify with those things it finds pleasurable and therefore attempts to
reconcile those exteriorities it finds pleasant by interiorizing them into itself.
Toward the end of “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, Freud writes that “the third
antithesis of loving, the transformation of loving into being-loved, corresponds to the
operation of the polarity of activity and passivity, and is to be judged the same way as the
cases of scopophilia and sadism.”263 This third psychoanalytic declension of love, qua
instinct, also will require a little unpacking. The first listed vicissitude, an instinct’s
reversal into its opposite form, from active to passive, Freud explains in terms of the
sadistic instinct. Moreover, for Freud, masochism is never a primary aim of the drive.264
This will make sense if we also recall that in love it was only through identification that
the object could be internalized. Meanwhile, masochism maintains the otherness of its
object. The possibility of being-loved implies that we have long since passed from the
primacy of the biological polarity through the real-external vicissitude of the real polarity
and into the pleasure-unpleasure dynamic of the economic polarity. Therefore, the love
of the other always requires a highly complex interworking of all three polarities. This
intertwining of the pleasure principle, the reality principle and the somatic functioning of
biology are the instinctual Gordian knot that Freud is trying to untie. The biological
polarity of activity and passivity remains operant, as does the real-external, even with the
emergence of the third polarity during narcissism; in other words, what was a temporary
and preliminary state has become a psychically adjunct state—which is to say that they
psychically “co-exist alongside one another.”265
In the third antithesis of love, we are concerned with the transformation of activity
into passivity. In wanting to be loved by the external object, the subject must pass
through the vicissitude in which the instinct turns into its “opposite,” and then finally
enters the vicissitude in which the instinct falls “back on itself.”266 All of this is to say
that in seeking to be loved by another, the subject displaces himself. He takes his
pleasure vicariously through the eyes—the gaze—of the other. Only the object has
changed, however, and not the aim, since the subject has successfully displaced himself
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while the subject’s Eros instinct remains intact and falls back upon himself vicariously
through the other. In the case of scopophilia, the vicissitudes follow the same trajectory
and find their satisfaction in the release of somatic instinctual pressure from an unknown
source. In gaining their satisfaction, instincts will either direct the ego toward narcissistic
self-absorption, fall directly upon the other as projected gaze, or thirdly, fall back on the
subject through his vicarious enjoyment of the other’s gaze. But the other is always
treated as an external object during the vicissitudinous movements of the instincts.
Although “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” is only a preliminary attempt toward
the description of the frontier concept “instinct,” Freud’s analysis intertwines the three
polarities and the two vicissitudes that it explores with astounding perspicuity. Still, it is
often difficult to know for certain at which points he crosses the gap and helps himself to
the biological and anthropological theories of origins that border on the mythic,
Romantic, vitalistic, and wholly subjective mode of analysis; in the next section we will
have opportunity to review Voloshinov’s charge that Freud remains too subjective in his
analysis. We will provide a specific example of how this plays out in the “Instincts and
their Vicissitudes”. Beyond the primary stage or narcissism, it is hard to be certain from
this essay when Freud means the vicissitudes as stages of ego development, and when he
means them as descriptions of adult psychical activity. Assuming that Freud implies both
as possible descriptions of the function of the vicissitudes—i.e., that any one of these
vicissitudes might repeat themselves in adult life, we can then say that the primary stage
will merely cease to dominate universally through the necessity of “self-preservation”
alone.267 Hence the development of the ego-interior and the real-external division. As a
result, in the stage of primary narcissism, the reality-ego becomes the pleasure-ego and is
regulated according to the economy of pleasure-unpleasure. Again, we find a deemphasis on what is purely interior in terms of biology—i.e., the somatic. External
objects can be identified with and internal objects projected alienated from the ego
according to the new parameters of the pleasure principle. We see then that the word
“polarity” emphasises the frontier, or the relation, between interior-exterior, and it does so
especially in terms of the dynamic dialectical movement of the ego through the various
psychical and developmental stages in psychoanalysis. In Freudian psychoanalysis, these
themselves turn states-evidence, so to speak, in the form of the underlying ideological
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utterances. Tellingly, at no point does Freud offer us a wholly objective method of
analysis of the conventional notion of “instincts.” Whereas copious behavioural
phenomena has become subject to a quantitative set of analytical practices within
psychology and biology, the term “instincts” has yielded to no such objectivity. As such,
it has not moved beyond the scientifically natal stage of development; the term instincts
remains a wholly subjective notion, and as such it will always belong to the domain of the
descriptive science known as psychoanalysis.
Before turning to “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” I will briefly sum up what we
have witnessed in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”. In our example, Freud understands
the psychical instinct scopophilia as born out of the individual alone in the primary stage
of psychical development; it results from an afflux of tension originating in an unknown
somatic source that remains constant.268 Qua instinct, scopophilia has four important
vicissitudes; they are: first, the reversal of the instinct into its opposite; secondly, the
instinct falls back upon the subject (Deleuze and Guattari’s “il se rabat sur”)269; thirdly,
the instinct is repressed; finally, an external object is sublimated and the instinct thus
acquires its satisfaction. I have briefly dealt with the first two vicissitudes here, as does
Freud. The first vicissitude has to do with the active-passive dichotomy, and in keeping
with Freud’s principle of instinctual constancy, it is hard to see how an instinctual
pressure could be other than active. Therefore, the first vicissitude sets the stage for the
explanation of the second—whereby the subject displaces the object of his desire; the ego
displaces itself and thus scopophilia becomes exhibitionism, while the pressure (i.e.,
activity) remains positive and constant even while appearing to be externally displaced.
In this way the ego is able to identify with the gaze of the other and exploit it for his own
pleasure. In this displacement, the ego remains the object of its own pleasure. Through
the three polarities, Freud has given an account of the dialectical development of the
interior-exterior relationality of subject to world. Nevertheless, this relation remains in
flux.

The primary state of the biological polarity Freud calls activity-passivity, and it is

presumed to psychically co-exist alongside the real polarity of ego-external world and the
economic polarity of pleasure-unpleasure. Only after these relations have been
themselves economized—summed, or “synthesized”—can the “word ‘love’” be
employed. 270 In other words, the source, or proper name of the instinct lies behind this
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tangled weave of active negotiations of ego-instinctual motivations for self-preservation.
Everywhere the ego remains the object of its own affection, so to speak. The primary
operative logic of interiority remains the subject’s ideal psychical position at any one
time, and it never ceases to re-align itself to this ideal; we must never lose sight of the fact
that for Freud the interior is always associated with pleasure from the narcissistic stage
onward. This is not the real interior of the individual organism; it is the psychical interior
which remains in flux and is defined according to the economy of pleasure-unpleasure
and ego self-identification. This is to say that regardless of Freud’s compounding of
polarities, in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, pleasure remains his ideological
dominant. This is not what Freud says, but this is what is revealed in the logic of the ürpolarity of interior-exterior relations between ego and world. Moreover, this ür-polarity
is everywhere guided by an ür-motivation—that of seeking pleasure or, what amounts to
the same thing, taking flight from unpleasure. Pulsion always moves toward expulsion,
from interiority to exteriority. If all of this seems rather like the fortuitous dialectic of a
mental contortionist, this is not accidental; by following Freud in the black letter of his
theory we are attempting to make manifest the univocal directionality of the
psychoanalytic subject.

3.5

Freudian Appropriations of Biological Theory and Praxis:
Beyond the Pleasure Principle

In the 1920 paper, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud resumes the development of
his economic model of psychic experience by again borrowing from biology. He
presumes stimulation to be the primary origin of distinction between the interiorpsychic—“perceptual consciousness”—and the exterior world. 271 Psychoanalysis takes
up into its theory of psychic origins a recapitulation of a natural-historic and
embryological development. This is not to say that Freud actually historicises
psychoanalysis; he does not. He merely appropriates the theory of recapitulation for his
own programmatic ends. Moreover, recapitulation is itself not fully historical but is
merely mimetic of the historical evolution of species at the plateau of the individual.
Instead of a blastule or a central nervous system being formed, Freud posits an outer layer
of the psyche whose primary function is to protect against stimuli, like a crust, “some
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degree inorganic.”272 After this psychical aegis has formed the outer layer begins to die,
essentially taking on inorganic properties as “a special envelope or membrane resistant to
stimuli.”273 We briefly note the messianic phrasing “by its death, the outer layer has
saved all the deeper ones from a similar fate.”274 The sensory organs sit physiologically
and topographically beneath the outer nervous crust and make only “tentative advances”
into the world due to their acute sensitivity.275 The outer layer then differentiates itself as
the stimulus receptor at the psycho-somatic threshold of the external world.
The “perceptual Consciousness,” however, does not have a mechanism to shield it
from “internal excitations.”276 We have already seen this logic in Freud’s distinction
between instinct and stimulus, between what is internal and external to the organism. As
a result, what we might call the internal nervous condition of the subject will be
overwhelmingly more influential than external stimuli. Particularly stressful internal
excitations will be treated as external stimuli. As such, the external psychic shield can be
deployed against internal excitations. “This is the origin of projection,” in
psychoanalysis, but we note that this portrayal of projection does not take into
consideration the world as an event but as a screen—an object—on which the psyche
alienates itself; unlike in the account Bakhtin has provided us, Freud is not interested in
the phenomenal limitation of consciousness at the intersubjective hinge between self and
other as herself an autonomous subject.277 Moreover, Freud’s vision of the cell here is
entirely militaristic; it is seen from the point of view the bourgeois pathologist implicitly
fortified against the outer world of society. Therefore, Freud’s vision of the cell is
likewise a projection of the psychopathology of everyday bourgeois life. As we will see
in greater detail in the next section, the problems of trauma originate here for
psychoanalysis, as do the problems of mastering and binding loose energy, the polarity of
pleasure and unpleasure, and of the dualism between Eros and the death instinct. Each of
these problems emerges and is analysed wholly in accordance with a subjective
conjecture made to appear objective—by objective we simply mean that which is
methodologically repeatable in principle. While Freud’s observations may be repeatable
his conclusions and analyses are not; we have already seen this subjectivism in Driesch’s
leap from observations to conclusions.
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“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” begins with the attempt to define pleasure and
unpleasure. He suggests that unpleasure results from unbound energy, but is more likely
directly related to the interval of time in which this energy remains unbound rather than to
its quantity.278 But unlike his earlier work in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, Freud
now admits of the possibility of an interruption of the pleasure principle. Here, he finally
falls back upon the notion that an individual organism—as a unity—must sometimes
reject the pleasure principle as disruptive of its own ends and even as dangerous to its
survival. The status quo qua inactivity cannot be maintained without damage or even the
death of the organism:
Under the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure
principle is replaced by the reality principle. This latter principle does not
abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless
demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction [delay], the
abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the
temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure.
The pleasure principle long persists, however, as the method of working employed
by the sexual instincts, which are so hard to ‘educate,’ and, starting from those
instincts, or in the ego itself, it often succeeds in overcoming the reality principle,
to the detriment of the organism as a whole.279
It becomes painfully obvious here that Freud is working without a conception of the
mutualism or symbiosis of organism and environment, and that his conception of the
organism therefore remains without the complexity witnessed in real life within the milieu
of organism and environment. Everything is determined according to the isolated
individual, and the wider sphere in which it finds its means of life is entirely abstract in
psychoanalysis.
Freud says that the drive to self-preservation conflicts with the pleasure principle,
and often instincts are repressed which, if fulfilled, would destroy the viability of life.
Thus it happens that instincts which seek pleasure are made manifest as unpleasure when
their energy escapes cathexis and is not properly bound. Freud attributes “all neurotic
unpleasure” to the anti-cathected repression of detrimental instincts.280
Beyond the pleasure principle, as it were, the compulsion to repeat plays an
essential role. In support of his theory, Freud presents the circumstantial explanation for
dreaming as the retrospective attempt to master the influx of stimuli during waking life.281
Here one is compelled to return to an earlier, and often unpleasant, state of affairs. It is
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not enough to recollect this prior state, but one must play it out. Ostensibly this
dissatisfaction with the mere memory of the traumatic event, mother leaving you behind
for example, causes Freud some concern282; one seeks to relive the event in order to
master the unpleasant stimulus. It is not only neurotics who practice this mastery; this
repetition is also a part of the psychopathology of everyday life. For example, children
also try to master “unpleasureable experiences” through repetition.283 Upon observing
the child’s game of Fort-Da or ‘gone’ and ‘there’ (return),284 Freud hypothesises that
there must be a dominant instinct more primeval than the pleasure principle. Officially,
Freud supposes the compulsions to return to former psychical states implicates the
biographical moments in the individual’s life that were anything but pleasurable. On the
face of it, the pleasure principle is simply not equipped to explain the active repetition of
unpleasure. He therefore concludes that there must indeed be a second more primitive
drive which may commune and even be brought into the service of the pleasure principle,
but which cannot be reduced to the same origin:
on mature reflection we shall be forced to admit that even in the other instances
the whole ground is not covered by the operation of the familiar motive forces.
Enough is left unexplained to justify the hypothesis of a compulsion to repeat—
something that seems more primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the
pleasure principle which it over-rides.285
Indeed, but Freud has explained very little. His genius is to open up problems rather than
to solve them, as I hope to show in what follows.
Freud may be primarily concerned with the psychoanalytical source of repetition
in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, but he is not content to restrain himself to
speculations within his field. The somatic returns in this essay; psychoanalytic thought
again takes a peregrination into the field of evolutionary biology. Freud muses that
compulsion to repeat may also explain the migratory habits of birds and what appears to
be the embryological recapitulation of species descent, as well as what Driesch has called
the regulatory and regenerative functions of the organism.286 The salamander, one might
say, regenerates its tail, not simply to replace what has been lost, but for the sake of
returning to the former state. These are clearly different explanations in that one proceeds
from the image a normalized whole, understood from an exterior point of view, and the
other purports to give an explanation immanent from within the organic system itself.
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Freud then toys with the theory that we are physically and instinctually marked by
the history of our antecedents. He is convinced that the compulsion to repeat is not only
the stamp of a biological interest in our figure within the grounding environment, but is a
cosmic echo of the very first moment of the universe in what Bakhtin has analogously
referred to as great time: “In the last resort, what has left its mark on the development of
organisms must be the history of the earth we live in and of its relation to the sun.”287
Again, in all of its speculative accounts, psychoanalysis proceeds according to a logic of
the original state. Whatever phenomena are to be explained must contain seeds that were
present from the very beginning of our universe—in principle, at least. If we posit the
dualistic principles of Eros and the death instinct, for example, they must be shown to
have been present in great time, from the start. In this way psychoanalytic recapitulation
is actually more akin to preformationist theory in which there is nothing new under the
sun. We do not mean that Freud believes there can be wholly new phenomena, only that
he hesitates to postulate a truly spontaneous and emergent phenomena. In this way also,
psychoanalysis is entirely retrospective in its explanatory direction. It always appeals to a
backward reference and is in no way forward looking.
Dr. Freud discursively deduces that if the aim of the instinctual compulsion to
repeat is to return to an earlier state of things, then we must eventually arrive at nonexistence, although here he says “death.”288 Again the recapitulatory echoes of biological
and organic death repeat themselves here in a psychoanalytic theory of the instinctual
death drive. To paraphrase Bakhtin, physiological death is born of Eros to become
thanatos on a higher level.289 Importantly, the inorganic pre-life historical state of nature
is assumed to be somehow contracted in the instinctual memory of the individual; this
instinct-memory is then redeployed as a forward-looking death-orientated inflection of
this so-called original historical state. This future orientation does not contradict what we
have said about the backward referential directedness of psychoanalysis, since it is only
looking forward in order to return to a previously extant state.
Freud speculates that returning to the inorganic state of affairs may have been
delayed by unavoidable and indefinite suspension of individual death. Taking into
consideration the great time of evolutionary progress a great many circuitous “détours”
may have become hardwired in the instincts, and “what we are left with is the fact that the
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organism wishes to die in its own fashion.”290 Thus Freud asserts the second, primeval,
“ego-instincts” which compel the organism to return to its original inorganic state. As a
result he commits himself to a dualistic theory that distinguishes two primary instinctual
principles, namely Eros and the death instinct:
ego-instincts [the death instincts] arise from the coming to life of inanimate matter
and seek to restore the inanimate state; whereas as regards the sexual instincts,
though it is true that they reproduce primitive states of the organism, what they are
clearly aiming at by every possible means is the coalescence of two germ-cells
which are differentiated in a particular way.291
We are now in a position to analyses the meaning of what I am calling Freud’s
Weismannian turn.
The Weismannian turn represents a somatic revolution of sorts in psychoanalysis;
specifically, Freud’s turn toward the dualism of Eros and the death instinct and away
from the monism of libido. The biologist August Weismann’s theory of the relation
between species and individuals posits a dualism between immortality and mortality in
the figures of the germ-cell and the soma. While the soma is “destined to die” the germplasm concerns reproduction.292 However, Weismann makes a clear distinction between
these two struggling tendencies only in the higher organisms. Freud cannot follow him in
this and uses his recent dualistic amelioration to psychoanalysis to refute this claim.293
He does not accept natural death in organisms on face value but wants to provide an
account of death from the point of view of the natural forces which drive living beings
toward death. In Weismann, death is nothing but a “matter of expediency.”294 The
trouble with this account, in Freud’s opinion, is that the elemental forces that drive
reproduction and death must be traced back to the first appearance of life upon earth.
This cannot be done if physical death only appears with multicellular organisms. That
said, Freud is not interested in the merely internal physical death of the organism. He
wants to define death from the point of view of the forces operant in it. In this way Freud
actually proves a more subtle thinker than Weismann—although Weismann is actually in
the laboratory conducting observations of protozoa and metazoa, whereas Freud is only
speculating from a textual and subjective position. Nevertheless, Maupas and Calkins
provide evidence to contradict Weismann’s assumption that physical death only applies to
metazoans. It would appear from these experiments that even protozoan organisms will
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die if they are not rejuvenated through conjugation.295 What is more, Freud goes further
to grant that death is the result of an organism’s “incomplete voidance of the products of
its own metabolism.”296 He therefore suggests that far from invoking physical death for
the first time, metazoans may actually have the power of self-rejuvenation and the
prolongation of life precisely by dint of their multicellularity, since one cell may help to
rejuvenate another.
What happens next is most extraordinary and essential for our purposes. While
Freud claims to have arrived at his dualistic theory of Eros and the death instinct
independently of biology, and while he purports to be searching for the real internal
primal forces responsible for reproduction and organic death, he shows very little interest
in doing anything but appropriating from and critiquing biology. Yet he is willing to
apply elements of his metapsychology to germ-cells by attributing to them a form of
narcissism: “to use the phrase that [he is] accustomed to use in the theory of the neuroses
to describe a whole individual who retains his libido in his ego and pays none of it out in
object-cathexes.”297 Thus the avenue Freud constructs between bio-science and
psychoanalysis is a one-way street.
Naturally, we ought to be suspect of a retroactive implementation of the biological
theory of Weismann et al. to bolster Freud’s dualist principles, Eros and the death
instinct. Our suspicion is well-founded since for all of Freud’s borrowings from biology
to, ostensibly, architectonically answer psychoanalytic dualism, nowhere does he attempt
to struggle with contrary evidence—at least with regard to the influence of evolutionary
biology. In fact, he claims to have arrived at his dualism independently of Weismann’s
mortal and immortal soma and germ-plasm. As a result, his production in “Beyond the
Pleasure Principle” is artful, no doubt, but it is also wholly mechanical. That is, Freud’s
synthesis of biological and metapsychological theory at times remains entirely aesthetic
intuitive in method and at other times theoretical cognitive, but nowhere does it seek to
ground itself in the dialectical materialist movement of biological or psychological
theory—or for that matter in everyday life. As such, it cannot truly pretend to objectivity.
Nowhere does Freud present us with methods of testing his hypotheses that are
repeatable by anyone and yet he claims the scientific—i.e., objective—validity of his
theories of the pleasure principle, the ego and its vicissitudes, internal-external polarities
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of the organism, the biological, real, and economic polarity, the germ-plasm and soma,
dream analysis, Eros, and the death instinct. It is this lack of objectively repeatable
methods, combined with his apparent disregard of the socioeconomic history of biological
and psychological practice, more than anything else, which has contributed to his demise
in the latter half of the 20th century. This is not to say that Freud no longer has any value.
His theories remain useful descriptions—if entirely bourgeois and subjective in their
concepts. Ironically, they offer us a unique historical plane from which to view, rewrite,
and reanalyse the fin-de-siècle cultural milieu in which he himself was immersed.
In closing this section I want to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” was published hard on the heels of Freud’s introduction
to a book on war neurosis. The cessation of hostilities at the end World War One loom
large in the background, with all its political, socioeconomic, and historically traumatic
disjecta membra. Perhaps it would be reading too much into Freud’s trauma at seeing
Europe descend into an apparent death wish. Would it be too much to suggest that the
repression of the social in Freud begins to suggest itself to him after the catastrophic
collision and suicidal conflagration of the whole of society? In any case, I am certainly
not the first to do so. History surely plays its part as ghoulish persona non grata in
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, as well as in Freud’s theory of the instincts—although I
would argue that “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” is written from a completely ahistorical point of view, whereas in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” Freud is clearly
beginning to think the socio-historical implications of his theory, even if he will not be
ready to give this aspect of psychoanalysis a self-conscious evaluative utterance until
Civilisation and its Discontents. It is transparently clear that the pleasure principle does
not remain dominant in Freud after WWI.298
Finally, to my mind the gap between the individual and species remains what is
essential to “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. While the vast majority of ink has been
spilt on the compulsion to repeat, the dualism that opens up between the individual and
the species in this essay is one of those ‘big picture’ problems with which philosophy will
always concern itself. I cannot help but think that there is a great deal more to the idea
that once the individual has reproduced it becomes superfluous. I am aware that this
supposition will not be warmly received by all readers. Nor should it. It is not that I lack
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belief in the sanctity of all life, but when our world has brought itself to its knees, as I
believe it will in the coming years, through the perceived absolute import of individual
pleasure seeking, we ought to take this proposition more seriously than we do. I will
provide an anecdote as a microcosmic example of what I mean to say. In the 1960’s my
grandfather watched as the many family-owned farms surrounding his were bought up
one by one. When he retired he passed his farm on to his son, who wanted to work it.
Eventually his son was also tempted away from the life he loved simply because it was
economically infeasible that he keep it. The life that had persisted for the vast majority of
people in this hemisphere since they arrived here—and we could trace this back by
millennia if we followed their antecedents into Europe—disappeared overnight. My
grandfather was a simple man, and he had one question: but who will feed my
grandchildren when all the farms are owned by these big companies? I am not an
economist or an agriculturalist, and I do not pretend to be an expert in markets. But I am
a grandson and I do know a lack of foresight when I see it. Given the present rapidity of
the growth in income disparity, drought, species extinction, global warming and famine,
should it not concern us that it now seems the world would be better off without us? The
individual, after all, is supported by the generations which came before him, and ought to
try to save something for those who will come after he has long since passed on in great
time.
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§ 4.

Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Freudianism: A Marxist Critique

4.1

Between Marxism and ‘Freudianism’:
Valentin Voloshinov & Psychoanalysis
You’re like my yo-yo
That glowed in the dark.
What made it special
Made it dangerous,
So I bury it
And forget.
—Kate Bush, “Cloudbusting”299
It would be futile to say that love has to do with proteins and society. This would amount to
reviving yet once more the old attempts at liquidating Freudianism.
—Deleuze & Guattari300

In this section I intend to review, in brief, Valentin Voloshinov’s critique of Freudian
psychoanalysis. In order to do this I will first distance myself from Clark and Holquist’s
view that Voloshinov’s supposition that Marxism is a legitimate avenue to critique Freud
is somehow disingenuous and merely a prevarication aimed at flying under the Soviet
censors. I will then show where there actually are shortfalls in Voloshinov’s analysis and
attempt to make clear the merits of a Marxist critique and an analysis of official and
unofficial discourse in Freudian psychoanalysis. This will require us to look closely at
the last two sections of Voloshinov’s treatise, especially in terms of the highly
introspective type of psychological method that Freud prescribes. It will also entail
making visible the bourgeois ideology that everywhere infiltrates Freud’s theories of
transference, the Oedipus complex, and his introspective approach to psychology in
general. Once we have reviewed these central aspects of Voloshinov’s Freudianism: A
Marxist Critique, I will then show what I perceive to be the proper extension of both
Freudian theory as viewed through the lens of the Bakhtin Circle and Allon White’s paper
“Hysteria and the End of Carnival: Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis.” This in turn will
implicate Bakhtin’s notions of the carnivalesque and the grotesque, and will therefore
prefigure the last section of this thesis, which takes up Rabelais and his World directly. I
believe White’s paper goes a long way to show how sociology and psychoanalysis can be
brought into an architectonic relation of the type Bakhtin has in mind. In this way I hope

81
to consummate my exposition on the Bakhtin Circle’s work on Freud, both in the
previous section and in what follows.
First published in 1927, Valentin Voloshinov’s Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, presents
psychoanalysis as an introspective, subjective, and bourgeois ideological inflection of the
sciences. Generally speaking, this critique follows the same pattern of the
Bakhtin/Kanaëv essay and Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.
There is the obligatory exposition of the monological, isolated, basis of Freudianism as
wholly subjective. Voloshinov shows how both the psychoanalytic and behavioural
methodologies go wrong, and ultimately undercut their own socioeconomic ground. As
such, these approaches to psychology prematurely draw indiscriminate lines between the
everyday discourse of life and the more specialized discourse of the sciences. Bakhtin’s
“Speech Genres” also performs this line of critique. Proper attention to the “primary”
everyday genres is not stressed in the monological approach to science and theory tends
to outstrip practice.301 This one-sidedness in turn effects a vulgarization of the
purportedly objective scientific theory, and in psychoanalysis specifically the cult of
bourgeois subjectivity prematurely forecloses its larger socio-historical and material
context. The writings of the Circle then tends to emphasize the diachronic and historical
mutualism between science and discourse in everyday life. Bakhtin and the Circle seek to
establish the importance of dialectical materialism between scientific practice and
scientific theory; this ultimately leads to an attempt to supplant the established
monological theory directly with what Holquist calls dialogism. Finally, the
architectonics of answerability which the young neo-Kantian Bakhtin first sought to
establish, with all of its ontological commitments to a fixed gulf between life, science and
art, everywhere underpins and bolsters the Bakhtin Circle’s critical method. In every way,
Voloshinov’s critique of Freud follows this pattern.
Clark and Holquist rightly acknowledge in Bakhtin’s stead that Freud made an
attempt to incorporate sociological method into psychoanalysis in his final texts
Civilization and its Discontents and Moses and Monotheism.302 However, in my
estimation, the biographers are largely mistaken that Voloshinov’s text is not
authentically sympathetic to Marxism. This méconnaissance leads them to a second and
more profound error: they deem the final chapter of Freudianism, “The Content of
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Consciousness”, to be largely a critique of Soviet psychologist appropriations of Freud.303
Far from utilizing Freud to critique behavioural psychology, however, Freudianism is
very much a polemic against the essence of Freud’s subjective methodology, and its
greatest merit is along these lines.
Where behavioural methods are concerned Voloshinov is ready to endorse Pavlov,
so long as he sticks to quantitative analysis of outward behaviour and likewise seeks a
socioeconomic ground in the discourse of life on which all science is founded.304 Clark
and Holquist argue that the book “is a critique less of Freud himself ... than of Soviet
psychologists who sought to appropriate Freud into a new science of the mind.”305 This
proposition seems to me to be in bad faith. One might just as well argue that Voloshinov
is trying to do is to disprove in one blow the theories of introspection and behaviourism in
order to put up in their place a middle term grounded in gestalt theory, as Wolfgang
Köhler attempts to do in his Gestalt Psychology.306 While the work certainly serves to
warn against following the psychoanalytic edifice, since its concepts remain in essence
entirely subjective, the general thrust of the book is certainly directed as a polemic against
Freudianism proper. If one were to follow Clark and Holquist’s lead here, one could
again disregard the fact, which I believe is quite clear, that Voloshinov and Bakhtin are
everywhere influenced by Marxism and want to found psychology and all sciences on the
firm ontological grounds of a socioeconomic theory and dialectical materialism;
regardless of how Voloshinov may privately resent Soviet interference and censorship,
both he and Bakhtin were ready to engage in a dialogue with Marx and Engels. They
seem to have perceived in the sociological theory of Marxism and in dialectical
materialism the last-best hope of grounding psychology, which was still in its early stages
of development. As we saw regarding biology, science cannot afford to wait for its last
word to begin constructing its conceptual framework, hypotheses making, and building a
methodology. The simple fact of the matter is that Voloshinov is attempting to critique
both the subjective, thinly masked, bourgeois psychoanalytic method of Freud as well as
the Soviet trends in behavioural psychology. He wishes to ground both in the
socioeconomic discursive practice of dialectical materialism without destroying what is
truly valuable in either theoretical direction. He is not always successful, but we must not
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mistake his missteps and cul-de-sacs for a veiled liberalism and disingenuous
prevarications.
Nevertheless, while Voloshinov’s critique of Freud is correct in essence, he does
tend to gloss Freud’s marked evolution from his early days in studying and hypothesising
on hysteria with Josef Breuer. From that point in his career until his abandonment of “the
cathartic approach,” which led eventually to the formulation of his systematic theory of
the Unconscious, Freud constantly changed his mind and, I believe, genuinely attempted
to modify his theory to fit his observations.307 The trouble is that he did so, by and large,
in isolation, and as such, his theory remains wholly introspective. Notwithstanding the
fact that many of these changes came within the influence of the milieu of Freud’s inner
circle of psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists, Alfred Adler, Otto Rank, Stanley
Hall, Ernest Jones, C. G. Jung et al., introspection everywhere remained Freud’s primary
mode of concept creation and analysis.
By 1912 Freud had already publicly explicated the different vectors of the theory
of the unconscious, distinguishing between the descriptive, dynamic, and systematic
unconscious.308 Perhaps the most notorious amelioration of his theory, as we have seen,
is the dualist approach he presents in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. There, the
addition of the death instinct, which caused Wilhelm Reich and others to abandon the
International Psychoanalytic Association altogether, probably marks his greatest
evolution since The Interpretation of Dreams appeared in 1900.309 Reich acted rejected
Freud’s turn away from the univocality of the pleasure principle to the dualism between
Eros and the death instinct. Voloshinov describes this dualism as follows:
By Eros Freud means the instinct striving toward organic life, toward its
preservation and development at whatever cost, whether in terms of the
continuation of the species (sexuality in the narrow sense) or preservation of the
individual. The death instinct is understood as aiming toward the return of all
living organisms to the lifeless state of inorganic, inanimate matter—a striving
away from the exigencies of life and Eros.310
Voloshinov goes further than we have, and states that where there is life the Eros
principle retains its dominance.311 He calls this period the “third period of development”
of psychoanalysis.312 To this period also belongs Freud’s move away from the merely
systematic unconscious, which dream analysis played no small part in helping him
formulate, to the dynamic unconscious model. Here all important theory of the id comes
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to play the central role. What is important in this shift away from system is the renewed
emphasis on the “shadowy, elemental force” which accounts for the pulsion of the
instincts.313 I will not deal with the superego, or the elemental and rational aspects of the
id and ego, as does Voloshinov. It is enough that we have pointed to the renewed
importance of the primal forces of the unconscious during this third period. Below, this
will become essentially important to Voloshinov’s critique.

4.2

Freudianism: A Marxist Critique

Freudianism presents an uncanny presentiment of the possibility of a semiotic Freud
avant le mot—and before Lacan. Here we see the possibility, in seed form, of reading
Freud contemporaneously through Marxism and Saussure. In the final two chapters of
Freudianism, Voloshinov attempts to show that the “strife” of the psyche can actually be
better interpreted as a struggle between two ideological positions in conflict, what
Voloshinov calls official and unofficial discourse. This seemingly idiosyncratic and
superficial Marxist reading runs counter to the official psychoanalytic attempt to posit
“psychical” forces wholly from the subjective position of the great man of science, as
Freud himself tries to achieve.314 Amid admonishment, Voloshinov evinces a great
admiration for Freud, later echoed by Bakhtin, since even as a proponent of subjectivist
psychology his ingenuity broke away from classical introspective starting points and
specifically their “naïve psychological [and] biological optimism.”315
As we have seen in the biological sciences, every new science has a honeymoon
period in which it must remain merely descriptive. Nascent science is developmentally
delayed by its lack of field knowledge, but this is only true retrospectively. However, in
evolving from psychoanalysis’ first theory of the unconscious—the descriptive, to the
systematic unconscious, Freud’s theory moves in the opposite direction, away from
distinctly objective ideas grounded more strictly in observation. Psychoanalysis becomes
progressively more subjective; the methods for determining the systematicity of the
unconscious rely to a great extent on dream analysis and talk therapy. But this talk is
limited to doctor and patient, and therefore it remains saturated with a bourgeois and
highly-subjective ideological perspective.
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Voloshinov wants to make the claim that Freud has not exposed ontologically
different kinds of entities in the consciousness and the unconscious—a claim implicit in
psychoanalysis, but only that consciousness and the unconscious are ideologically
different kinds of evaluative inflections, namely the official and the unofficial.
Psychoanalysis’ claim that it has discovered the “elemental forces” of the psyche are
simply mistaken:
The motives of the unconscious that are disclosed at psychoanalytical sessions
with the aid of ‘free association’ are just such verbal reactions on the patient’s
part as are all other, ordinary motives of consciousness. They differ from the
latter not in kind of ‘being,’ that is, ontologically, but only in terms of content,
that is, ideologically. In this sense Freud’s unconscious can be called the
“unofficial conscious” in distinction from the ordinary “official conscious.”316
Since consciousness is, according to Voloshinov, packaged in the shape of “verbal
expression,” and since all verbal expressions are axiologically intoned by ideology, and
since finally everything made conscious “operates through words,” there is no ontological
distinction possible that can be posited by the subjective methods of psychoanalysis.317
It follows from what we have said that not only is psychoanalytic method not
objective, neither can it be made objective without a thoroughgoing justification. This
justification is delivered from the “social situation in which the utterance emerges.”318 It
must find its ground there rather than in the non-witnessed unseen primeval psychical
forces—even if these do exist, we simply have no evidence with which to theorize this
existence. Without this theoretically bounded social territory—let us give it the visual
image of a socioeconomic eruv, all that is possible are the “arbitrary constructions” of the
type that Freud provides.319 The systematic topography must first be assembled. The
personalities, if we may refer to them as such, of the systematic unconscious—i.e., the
ego, the id, and the superego remain descriptive, not truly objective hypostasized
elements in psychic life, as Freud presumes. They are objectively “unverifiable” and, like
all merely descriptive and purely theoretical conceptualizations, entirely one-sided.320
Freud seems almost to have implicitly understood the weight of social context in
his conception of doctor patient transference. It is not the persona of the id that will
ground psychoanalysis, but the real socioeconomic and specifically bourgeois familial
relations—i.e., the holy family. The family becomes the ür-structure of all human
relationships in Freud: “Here is the source for the dramatism that marks the Freudian
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construct. It is also the source for that personification of psychical forces which we have
already mentioned. Here, indeed, people, not natural forces, are in conflict.”321 To be
precise, this quotation refers to the doctor-patient relation, but transference is built upon
the Oedipus complex, which in turn is directed primarily back to the familial relation
before it becomes embedded and shapes the doctor-patient relation. Voloshinov separates
these two moments, but I believe this to be a mistake. The doctor, insomuch as he is
informed by the ‘science’ of the Oedipus complex, injects the entire baggage of the holy
family—and by it a microcosm of capitalist hierarchy—into this moment of the doctorpatient relation. It is not easy to untie these knots, as even the present social milieu,
which Voloshinov privileges, implicates absent ideological constellations.
The attribution of mental illness—as well as the psychopathology of everyday
life—to personified psychical forces is nothing other than a typically bourgeois resistance
to social life in all its forms. Freud simply projects the dynamic, strife-ridden,
relationships between people, in their social and ideologically saturated context, onto his
theory of the unconscious. He does this by making a distinction between thought and
things where there is no clear distinction here—for Voloshinov thought and things are
inseparably tied together in the materiality of the word:
When contemporary psychology attempts to draw a borderline between
experience and things, it is compelled ultimately to come to the paradoxical
conclusion that there is no such borderline, that everything depends on the point
of view. One and the same thing, depending on the connection and context in which we
perceive it, is now a psychical body or social phenomenon.322
As we will see, Voloshinov seeks to ground the discourse of the sciences and arts
architectonically in the verbal and extraverbal socioeconomic base of everyday life—i.e.,
in the social milieu with all its axiological inflections of ideology. It is only by first
preparing this propaedeutic sociological research that ethics, biology, psychology, and
linguistics can objectively answer once-occurrent being-as-event and thus seek to form an
architectonic method of answering between these disciplines. All of this, points back to a
philosophy from the point of view of becoming; for Bakhtin, this becoming is a dialogical
or architectonically answerable disposition in which the autonomy of the event, or the
other, is respected.
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Freud’s leap of faith from his discursive and symbolic practice to the
hypostatisation of the Oedipus-complex is an especially telling example of where his
introspective psychology fails. The edifice of this complex is built not on the testimony
of children but only ‘retrospectively’ from the point of view of the grown-up. Deleuze
and Guattari also make this point in Anti-Oedipus: “Oedipus is first the idea of an adult
paranoiac, before it is the childhood feeling of a neurotic.”323 Freud’s error is to have put
too much faith in the adult’s perspective and the evidence presented therein. Regardless
of the fact that he must then interpret this evidence, he treats this testimony as if it were
wholly transparent and amenable to interpretation. What is more, his interpretation is
founded on his bourgeois idea of sexuality and the holy family. The result is that the trial
is rigged. There is no chance of finding objectivity by interpreting childhood ‘complexes’
strictly from the “point of view of the present.”324 Why is this? It is because the purely
verbal point of view of the present cannot escape the evaluative intonations of the
ideology of the adult witness. Who is the witness? The adult patient who views the
world through an adult ideological lens! Who is the judge? The bourgeois doctor—and
in this case a doctor for whom the ‘holy family’ is the cornerstone of his social milieu.
Nevertheless, the ideological significance of the doctor-patient relationship is
privileged in psychoanalysis and mimics the holy family’s little milieu at the expense of a
wider social sphere. Voloshinov puts the case as such:
“Sexual attraction to the mother,” “the father rival,” “hostility toward the father,”
“wish for the father’s death”—if we subtract from all these “events” that
ideational significance, that evaluative tone, that full measure of ideological
weight which accrue to them only in the context of our conscious “adult” present,
what would they have left?325
The answer is a deserted anteroom in the Freudian psyche.
Freud’s leap is no doubt informed by factual observations and by patients who
want very much to help their doctor help them, but this is not what is at issue.
“Freudianism is not at all a series of facts.”326 It is a naïvely formed ideological
construct. Voloshinov provides us with the example of Otto Rank’s birth trauma, which
is little more than a birth drama built on the top of the bare fact of physiological trauma
during birth. The facts, real as they are, have been staged to appear under a certain light,
are clothed in a particular disguise, as if someone were rearranging the scene of a crime.
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The room is the same, but the furniture has changed position. Certainly “the organism
experiences a physiological shock at the moment the child is born into the world,” but
Rank wants to make of this fact a “purely ideological formulation projected into the
psyche of a child.”327 All we are left with is a psychologically introspective
methodology; as a result, psychoanalysis is impoverished by its absolute adherence to
bourgeois individualism: What is your problem? Why don’t you tell me? I can’t possibly
answer for myself! Aren’t you the doctor, why don’t you tell me? The wider social milieu
of the we has dropped out entirely. In hysteria, for example, it is assumed that it makes
no difference that Anna O., Breuer, and Freud together established the efficacy of
catharsis. Likewise, the causal effect of the milieu in which psychoanalysis establishes its
practices is assumed to have, at best, a benign influence.
The challenge to psychology, according to Voloshinov, is to avoid the Scylla and
Charybdis of subjectivism and “naïve, mechanical materialism.”328 It would appear that
for Voloshinov only dialectical materialism can institute a dialogue between the methods
of objective psychology and “the extremely important issues raised by
psychoanalysis.”329 Only dialectical materialism begins from presuppositions which
effectively serve to ground psychology, since it begins by assuming that the
socioeconomic social milieu has a determining role to play. Because dialectical
materialism answers psychology with what has been learned in translinguistics, it
endeavours to account for both verbal and extraverbal ideological content. In short, a
dialectical materialist psychology begins from the materiality of the word and can account
for its shifting axiological meaning, since this ideological-linguistic component itself is
given with the whole of the event as a task to be accomplished. Voloshinov supports
dialectical materialism as the proper method for the science of the psyche because it alone
can keep one eye trained on the mutual influence of psychological practice and the theory
of the psyche.
Bourgeois psychoanalytic subjectivism attempts to retain an ontological divide
between psychical forces and the material basis of everyday life while at the same time
arbitrarily isolating doctor and patient as privileged purveyors of these forces. Thus
psychoanalysis puts aside the “sociological essence” that not only ought to ground the
work of objective psychology but is germane to all its hypotheses and practices.330 In
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essence, psychoanalysis haunts behavioural psychology, since left to its own quantitative
practices, the latter steers too close to the eddy of mechanical reductionism. The former,
meanwhile, so long as it remains isolated from its sociological grounding, will inevitably
flounder on the rocks of bourgeois subjectivism. Meanwhile, Voloshinov prescribes a
broader historical account grounded in material practices and socioeconomic context: visà-vis dialectical materialism. Nevertheless, the interface between praxis and theory
cannot be reduced to a dialectics of nature, but in keeping both polarities connected,
dialectical materialism can “illuminate” the ‘fact’ that ideological conflict is inherent in
all scientific utterances.331 No neutrality is possible. An objective account is at the same
time an account that illuminates the ideological undercurrents of the scientific hypotheses.
With an eye to this omnipresence of ideology, science can thereby embed a corrective
measure with the teeth to make visible the axiological motivation behind all scientific
utterances—even, for the sake of argument, where this ideological content is simply ‘I
want to present a theory that is ideologically neutral.’ The investigation of the
unconscious through strictly verbal and behavioural analysis is not sufficient. These
verbal utterances and behavioural patterns have been given shape by wider
socioeconomic forces; these are essentially historical forces, and these utterances cannot
be understood—and understood in the active sense we spoke of above—if these material
roots of psychological phenomenon are not likewise considered alongside them.
I am not wholly transparent to myself. Freud understood this very well and
founded the entire edifice of his project on what is in essence a psychology of the double,
of the I and thou, of the ghost in the machine. But his introspective methods run too
deeply in one direction, they are wholly one-sided, and as a result he misses the
externality of this otherness of self. As we have already said, the self originates from the
external social environment and not the other way around. Even though words are not
things, they begin as things and have primarily a material basis for us when we first
become conscious of the world.332 This is to say that I cannot become more transparent
to myself merely by looking inward. My own subjectivity begins in objectivity and not
the other way around. The personalities of the unconscious, however inchoate they may
be, are produced as a result of the social sphere in which I am immersed. One can think
here of the individual who tries to use a wholly private language. As Allon White says,
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“Freud’s insistence on a purely sexual aetiology and an individualist perspective obscures
a fundamental sociohistorical matrix of his narrative.”333 This matrix is made up
fundamentally of the verbal and extraverbal material content of the everyday life of the
patient, which is always-already historical and which is evinced in the uttered and the
axiologically intoned word. Ideology, for Voloshinov, is as deep as perception. There is
no unconscious realm in which ideology is manufactured; the mental unconscious, if it is
anything, is more akin to a warehouse then a factory. Words are produced between living
ideological subjects, between semantic persons. Meanwhile, Freud’s ego-logical subject
can only enter discourse through the door of the descriptive. This is why Voloshinov is
right—rather than idiosyncratic—to say that the unconscious and consciousness are not
ontologically but ideologically different. They exist on an immanent plane; they are
descriptive.
Voloshinov’s accusation that the high degree of isolation of the bourgeois subject
has been detrimental to the objectivity of psychoanalysis is judicious, but he does not go
far enough to show how socioeconomic factors enter into the dialogue between doctor
and patient. John Parrington also espies a gap between Voloshinov’s claims regarding the
socioeconomic and material base of the word and his exposition of how he would
transform this observation into a scientific or linguistic method: “what Voloshinov’s own
work lacks is the empirical scientific evidence that proves such a connection [between
consciousness and reality] exists.”334 Likewise, his supposition that Freud has
monstrously overestimated the role of sexuality is correct to the letter but insufficient in
substance.
If sociology, as a psychologically transgredient discipline, is to form an
architectonic unity—an idea that has itself fallen out of fashion, then it must make this
architectonic unity from the art of what we now call interdisciplinarity. Thus, I agree
with Kant that we would need to see a “schema” which would give a blueprint or map as
to how this answering might take place, but I also disagree with Kant that this schema
could ever be provided a priori.335 In this sense, Freudianism requires something more.
What is missing is precisely the spadework of showing that the psychological event can
be made answerable—i.e., brought at least temporarily into a unity of a systematic
consciousness, if I might be allowed this play on Freud’s terminology. Again,
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Voloshinov is right, this consciousness cannot be perceived as isolated unto itself as it is
in bourgeois naivety—and, for that matter, in Kantian philosophy. The ground of
consciousness is not transcendental categories but living linguistic beings. Nevertheless,
this unity is not achieved outside of consciousness, as Bakhtin has stated and as everyone
intuitively knows—there is no collective consciousness, no sphere of unified intentionally
directed acts outside of people. As an aside, this is a source of great frustration for many
of us who would see a more collectively directed effort in shaping our global economies.
That we only find the ground of this unity in consciousness does not mean that ideas do
not have an immanent power to move, only that they need the fuel of living unified
organisms to turn over the engine. It is not enough to say that consciousness is multisided, or that words are material or that genres and official and unofficial ideologies are
the “drive belts” moving history and scientific theory along their road. This road must
lead somewhere.336
All of this is to say that I am thankful that Freudianism is not a stand-alone
manifesto on interdisciplinarity, for as such it is insufficient and preaches rather than
practices grounding the work of psychoanalysis. We must peregrinate elsewhere, into
other texts and other thinkers if we want to establish a method of ideological analysis, and
I am not hopeful that even with a thoroughgoing self-reflexivity that these relations would
ever bring anything like a scientific systematicity from sociological to psychological
practice as Voloshinov envisions it. It is therefore difficult to imagine that we could
likewise re-establish psychoanalysis as an objective science through the broad strokes of
official and unofficial ideological and historical research. This brand of analysis is much
more conducive to scientifically dialogic practices that are themselves descriptive rather
than quantitative and analytical—i.e., I believe we can use Voloshinov to attempt to
establish a self-reflexive hermeneutics of science rather than a science proper, but I do not
believe this propaedeutic can seriously and everywhere ground psychology in social
science.
Before closing this section I want to take a look at a piece of work that actively
takes up the Bakhtin Circle’s work on Freud in what I consider to be a productive and
natural extension of the propaedeutic presented in Freudianism and also in Bakhtin’s
work on the carnivalesque. Taken together, Allon White’s retrospective on Freud’s
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studies on hysteria and Bakhtin’s writings on carnival present an excellent case study on
the type of hermeneutical and critical work that can come of Freudianism. I will
therefore proceed to a brief description of White’s paper and try to tease out the art of
hermeneutical answering of the historicised ego-logical subject of psychoanalysis with
which it engages.

4.3

Extending the Bakhtin Circle’s Critique of Psychoanalysis

To my mind, there is no question that White’s paper “Hysteria and the End of Carnival:
Festivity and Bourgeois Neurosis” is the right kind of addition to the work implicitly set
as a task by Freudianism—vis-à-vis placing psychoanalysis within its historical and
cultural milieu. White understands Voloshinov’s insight into the bourgeois ideological
sublimation of the so-called elemental forces into hyper-individualized personifications—
the id, the ego, the super ego, etc. For White, an organized process of substitution, or
repression, began sometime in the 17th century, whereby ancient folk-festive and carnival
culture became re-inscribed by state ideology, militarization, and symbols. This process
gradually pushed carnival from the centre of public life. Symbolic forms gradually coopted ritual. Sublimation of the real everyday life of the lower orders of social practice
forced the internalization of carnival forms of catharsis. This in turn led to the growing
dissolution of unofficial public gatherings, to the victory of Victorian common sense, and
especially to bourgeois hysteria. The result was a sort of hyper-individualized, überintellectualized, popular isolation. Under these circumstances, what Bakhtin calls the
lower bodily stratum was driven into the underground of psychic life.
White cites the transformation of folk-festive culture by state apparatuses of
capture into a militarization of carnival as the site which still requires the most attention
from Bakhtinian cultural critiques of the carnivalesque:
By and large, literary critics have not asked how or why this ‘carnivalesque’
material should inform modern art because, busy with the task of textual analysis,
they move too rapidly away from the social practice of textual composition. Yet
the social historians who have charted the demise of carnival as social practice,
have not registered its displacements into bourgeois discourses, like art and
psychoanalysis: adopting a naïvely empirical view, they have outlined a simple
disappearance, the elimination of the ‘carnivalesque.’337
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White’s paper is motivated by two essential suppositions in the work of Voloshinov and
Bakhtin. He follows the distinctively—although not exhaustively—Marxist claims in
Voloshinov’s Freudianism that bourgeois ideology distorts the true empirical value of
psychoanalysis. Secondly, he takes up one of the essential and yet inchoate claims made
by Bakhtin in Rabelais and his World. The Romantic error degrades carnival by
interpreting it wholly from the perspective of “individual life and death” and thus glosses
the importance of its cyclicality.338 Romantic sublimation effectively reduces the
grotesque to its negative polarity alone, and the trope of renewal emphasised by the
grotesque is forgotten—in the gothic genre for example. In the Romantic epic the
importance of the hero’s “individual destiny” short-circuits the emphasis on cyclicity that
emerged historically within the Rabelaisian chronotope and in Medieval cultural more
generally. Thus the positive nature of carnival and its populist roots are hidden beneath
19th century ideology.339
Bakhtin notes that Goethe’s description of the Roman carnival in his Italian
Journey, to which we shall return in the final section of this thesis, senses the “cosmic
principle” of this cyclicity, but also leaves it underdetermined.340 But if Goethe comes
close to diagnosing cyclicity as a symptom of the larger historical and collective social
body, the Romantic movement on the whole misunderstands it and interprets it from a
largely individualist point of view: “The negative aspect of [the Romantic’s] appreciation
[of the grotesque] is its idealism, its false concept of the role and limitations of subjective
consciousness... human freedom broke away from necessity and became a supermaterial
force.”341 The negative aspect contributed to the repression of the lower bodily stratum,
to the clinicalization of the material flows of the body, to the degradation of carnival
laughter and the loss of its rejuvenating power, and lastly to the acquisition of “a private
‘chamber’ character” in the Romantic genre.342 Most importantly, Romantic idealism
misunderstands both the form and especially the content of Rabelaisian discourse;
because it fails to recognize the cyclical and rejuvenating character of the Rabelaisian
chronotope, Romantic idealism becomes instead the “expression of subjective,
individualistic world outlook [that is] very different from the carnival folk concept of
previous ages.”343
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As we have seen, psychoanalysis improperly interprets the past from the point of
view of the present. The retrogressive transference of adult hysterical symptoms onto
childhood games “obscures the fundamental sociohistorical matrix of this narrative.”344
White points to a lacuna in the historicity and sociological reconstructions of “the
complex relation of the discourse of psychoanalysis to festive tradition.”345 Interpreting
the copious disjecta membra of carnivalesque ritual as it surfaces in the symbolic
symptoms of hysteria, White provides us with a compelling account of bourgeois hysteria
as a “return of the repressed” of the once cathartic traditions of carnival: “The language of
bourgeois neurosis both appropriates and disavows, fears and longs for, a communal
festive tradition no longer available.”346 Social historians have missed this connection,
according to White, and they have missed it precisely because they do not give enough
attention to either sublimation or the so-called return of the repressed.347 In this
supposition, White not only follows a properly Bakhtinian critique of bourgeois neurosis,
nor just a simple repetition of the Bakhtin Circle’s critique of psychoanalysis, but he also
manages to carry the banner of carnivalesque critique forward by making a productive
use of Freudianism itself. Thus psychoanalysis and Bakhtian cultural critique are drawn
into an architectonically answerable relation in which both benefit from their mutual
interaction.
What we are dealing with here in this submersion of the carnivalesque is
essentially an inversion of an inversion—what White calls an uncanny reversal.348 White
reworks Dr. Schnyder’s analysis of a patient named Renata. Here the negative aspect of
the Romantic carnivalesque surfaces. Renata’s symptoms can possibly describe a case of
clinical anorexia nervosa, and in any case can certainly be diagnosed as an internalization
and symbolic inversion of the grotesque. According to White, Schnyder’s patient
symptomatically expresses the repression of populist elements of the carnivalesque in
favour of the merely subjective image of the body. The body qua other is therefore anticathected as if it were the source of a painful memory from childhood.349 In Romantic
idealism, we also see this growing self-isolation among bourgeois culture. Renata wakes
every evening to don a corset, she vomits when she eats or when she thinks of her womb,
and she tries to push back these unpleasant sensations (‘repousser ces sensations’) which
arise from the somatic, the chthonic, vis-à-vis her body.350 White’s perspicuity is a

95
convincing argument that Renata’s hysteria can be interpreted as this same bourgeois
inversion of material lower bodily stratum. By converting repressed carnivalesque
images and memories “into symptoms of the top half of the body,” bourgeois culture
effectively cuts itself off from the now abject earth, which is its ground and origin.351
Thus the inversion of the inversion is accomplished. Although this inversion may have
begun with the Romantic and lyrical hero, it nevertheless continues throughout the 19th
century. I will argue below that it can also be traced in the modernist writings of
Gertrude Stein, Mina Loy, and Djuna Barnes.
Bakhtin paints in broad brush strokes and the grotesque image of the body may
indeed be at work here, but let us consider this proposition for ourselves. First there are
poles of the grotesque body, both positive and negative. This is, as we have noted,
likewise true of the Romantic image of the subject and the other. Only, the polarity is not
entirely one-sided in the grotesque body. In the Romantic image, the subject is wholly on
the side of himself; there is a strict topographical division between subject and body qua
other, without the ability to actively “understand the possibility of combining in one
image both the positive and the negative poles.”352 Bakhtin specifically refers to G.
Schneegan’s “The History of Grotesque Satire” (1864).353 Schneegan makes the typical
error common throughout the 19th century, of ignoring the positive aspect of the
grotesque. Schneegan’s grotesque is relegated to the satirical species of literature; as such
it is wholly formal in content and leaves out the positive pole of the grotesque genre
altogether. Bakhtin follows Schneegan’s example of Harlequin in the Italian commedia
dell’arte also discussed by Flögel and Fischer before him. In this clownish genre,
Harlequin gives birth after much labour to a “difficult word.”354 The latency in the image
of the pregnant body that nearly chokes on the satirical word can be understood as a
virtual pointer to the lower bodily stratum, but Schneegan’s interpretation encompasses
only the self-directed subjective laughter of Harlequin. The positive collective laughter
that would point to the comedy of life as a cycle is omitted from Schneegan’s
commentary. By the 19th century the Rabelaisian intonations that carry with it both the
negative and positive polarities is missing.
Grotesque laughter in satire revolves around the axis of pleasure and displeasure
with uncrowning as the elemental force to effect this symptomatic laughter. The comic
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aspect is supposed to be created by “the impossible and improbable nature of the image”;
the image is “hyperbolic,” but it also has a foot in reality.355 What the late 19th century
ideological lens misses in the comic and grotesque alike is that the colour, warmth, nonsense, transgression, and joy makes possible the bi-polarity of Rabelais’ world.
Schneegan is blinded to the possibility that birth and death can reside in precisely the
same grotesque image: “The pregnant and two-bodied images could not be grasped by
Schneegan; he did not see that, in the grotesque world of becoming, the limits between
objects and phenomena are drawn quite differently than in the static world of art and
literature of his time.”356 What is most interesting for our purposes is that Bakhtin places
in the middle of his review an image of Schneegan as psychologist: “he sought to
discover through analysis the purely formal psychological mechanism of their perception,
instead of concentrating on the objective content of these images.”357 Schneegan’s model
of the psyche is likewise one-sided. He simply does not recognize the reversible polarity
of the grotesque image: “he could not understand the possibility of combining in one
image both the positive and the negative poles” of the grotesque; as a result, he likewise
represses the social ground of psychology.358 The Rabelaisian image does not have this
problem, since “the limits between the body and the world are erased, leading to the
fusion of the one with the other and with surrounding objects.”359
The scene in which Harlequin nearly chokes on the word, properly understood,
marks an inversion of high and low and emphasizes the unofficial image of cyclicity over
the official Byzantine-hierarchical image. This inversion is the source of the humour
because of the polarity of pleasure and unpleasure, and the audience therefore laughs at
this degradation. Here the satire emphasizes that the material word necessitates that even
official discourse is born in a low state. There are echoes here of Christ’s emptying out of
his spiritual divinity to be reborn in this low state. The word is associated with the head,
with the discursive light of reason; no doubt, this is the grotesque actively understood
according to the logic of hardnosed Victorian realism. But if the grotesque and comic
elements in Schneegan’s example were properly emphasized, the unborn word’s inverted
association with the genitals, the abdomen, and the “ugly Proserpine, queen of the
underworld,” are all reminiscent of the chthonic character of the underworld—i.e., the
unconscious.360 It is the Victorian axiological refraction of the grotesque that provides
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the polarized view of the grotesque, just as the petit bourgeois analyst makes sexuality the
cornerstone of his theory. The ‘official’ ideological inflection of Romanticism and 19th
century realism glosses over the lower bodily stratum and what is suggested in the
unofficial ideology of folk-festive images. In these it is as if the very elemental forces of
life were about to be unleashed; it is as if individual life existed as so much fodder for the
assurance that the cosmic and collective aspect of life will continue unrestrained:
The mighty material bodily element of these images uncrowns and renews the
entire world of Medieval ideology and order, with its beliefs, its saints, its relics,
monasteries, pseudoasceticism, fear of death, eschatologism, and prophecies. In
this world to be swept away the pilgrims are only tiny, pitiful figures, which can
be swallowed down unnoticed in salad and almost drowned in urine. The material
bodily element has here a positive character.361
But this positive character is lost in the revulsion of the 19th century repression of the
lower bodily stratum.
Similar examples of revulsion at the phallus, for example, can be found in the
modernist poet Mina Loy. The influence of Gertrude Stein’s poetics cannot be
overestimated in Loy’s work, and both poets sought to “recapture the value of the
individual word, [and] find out what it meant and act within it.”362 Both Loy and Stein
fashioned the word after its immanent ideological content, but they tend to place this
content entirely on the side of official discourse. This is typical of the Bohemian
sublimation of carnival, as described by White.363
Loy’s poem “Gertrude Stein” is more than a character sketch or ode, and it reveals
as much about its author as its subject; here there is a surfacing, symptomatic
preoccupation with the consciousness of the artist:
Curie
of the laboratory
of vocabulary
She crushed
the tonnage
of consciousness
congealed to phrases
to extract
a radium of the word364
This radium of the word is, notably, a metal extraction—categorized chemically as an
alkaline earth metal. In ‘Aphorisms’ Loy writes “you stand not only in abject servitude to
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your perceptive consciousness—/ But also to the mechanical re-actions of the
subconscious, that rubbish heap of race-tradition—.”365 For Loy, there is a distinct
connection between the act of becoming conscious of the systematic and the unconscious
nature of the mind as it unearths the word. In her poem “The Effectual Marriage or the
Insipid Narrative of Gina and Miovanni”, an early attempt to exorcise her estranged lover,
Italian futurist Giovanni Papini, it is Loy’s preoccupation with the emptiness of married
life and lack that is conveyed in an image which expresses absence:
In the evening they looked out of their two windows
Miovanni out of his library window
Gina from the kitchen window
From among his pots and pans
Where he so kindly kept her
Where she so wisely busied herself
Pots and Pans
She cooked in them
All sorts of sialagogues
Some say
that happy women are immaterial.366
The tension is heightened by the “sialagogues,” another abject addition that implicates the
bodily fluids and the connection between love-making and cooking. But here both are
noticeably absent. The pots and pans are now empty, and although the libidinous images
remain, the connection between consummation and consumption do not draw together in
a positive fashion; since the image of the body is likewise absent, they cannot be
positively united within the same image. Finally, Loy’s infamous “Love Songs” provides
us with an image of the phallus as “Pig Cupid” whose “rosy snout root[s] erotic
garbage.”367 Again, the bare nature of the language and the degraded image of the
phallus do not achieve the bi-polarity of the Rabelaisian grotesque image. Like
Napoleon’s caricatured proboscis in Schneegan’s example of the grotesque—an obvious
metaphor for the phallus—Loy’s “rosy snout” is grotesque without being positive and
linked to the communal ground of the cosmic bi-polar image.368 The snout/phallus ought
to link high and low, positive and negative polarities, but Loy fails to fuse the image with
the all-important comic element. What Bakhtin calls “the social, choral nature of
laughter” is simply not present—nor is modernism, in general, prone to its invocation.369
Laughter is wholly absent, as is the rejuvenating possibility of the pleasure-unpleasure bipolarity of the Rabelaisian image.
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The laughing rejuvenating function of carnival is likewise repressed in the work
found in Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood. In the latter case, the theme of class turns on the
dying aristocratic culture and circus imagery. In Nightwood, the character Felix is
latently motivated by the unofficial life of the circus but quietly remands himself to the
solitude of official life in the church:
The emotional spiral of the circus, taking its flight from the immense
disqualification of the public, rebounding from its illimitable hope, produced in
Felix longing and disquiet. The circus was a loved thing that he could never
touch, therefore never know. The people of the theatre and the ring were for him
as dramatic and monstrous as a consignment on which he could never bid. That
he haunted them as persistently as he did was evidence of something in his nature
that was turning Christian.
He was, in like manner, amazed to find himself drawn to the church,
though this tension he could handle with greater ease; its arena he found was
circumscribed to the individual heart.370
White himself cites the example of Jean Rhys, for whom autobiography is equally
revealing of this continued bourgeois repression of the lower bodily stratum.371
Moreover, White also contends that modernism continues the (originally Romantic)
privileging of the individual and the introspective over the rejuvenating and collective
elements of carnival: “The modernist novel in general tends toward a selective
sublimation of certain carnival practices and as such is deeply ambivalent, both
comforting and disturbing a polite and decorous culture.”372
The fact that Ulysses was censured and banned would seem to reinforce this
repressive aspect of modernism. Joyce’s novel tidies up the gore of childbirth by
obscuring it in old English roots and high Germanic etymons. Bloom’s onanism on the
Strand while watching Gerty MacDowell is the height of lower bodily expression in the
novel, and the most overt image to attract the censors. But it is hardly an image at all. In
spite of my own passion for both Joyce and this novel, it does not work with images, and
it does not paint pictures for its readers. Under this circumstance, it would be difficult to
understand Ulysses as without a like repression of the lower bodily stratum, which is
textually omnipresent and yet never quite made visible. Bloom’s masturbatory adventure
may adeptly capture the modernist tropes ‘stream of consciousness’ and ‘Edwardian
indecency’—Gerty’s thigh is showing “high up above her knee”373—but one has to
rationalize these images before taking pleasure in them. In short, the lower bodily
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stratum has to enter through the head. The modernist “‘agency of disgust,’” described
with such acuity in White’s paper, is also keenly felt in the sterility of modernist
stylistics. This sterility makes itself felt with ubiquity from Virginia Woolf’s To the
Lighthouse to Ezra Pound’s ‘imagism’—home to some of the most antiseptic images in
the canon.
Looking forward, we may say that the materiality of the sign becomes the
ideological dominant in Voloshinov’s work. While Ferdinand de Saussure seems to have
known this implicitly, his dualism between langue and parole negates the effectiveness of
conceiving of words as part of the real fabric of everyday life that helps to shape
consciousness. Marx and Engels likewise stop short of providing a full account of how
language shapes consciousness qua its materiality. This does not mean that the formation
of consciousness by the materiality of language is in any way transparent. Ideology is
refracted in language and to gloss over this fact would be to oversimplify the relationship
of the word to other ideological, and material, phenomena:
Words cannot wholly substitute for a religious ritual; nor is there any really
adequate verbal substitute for even the simplest gesture in human behaviour. To
deny this would lead to the most banal rationalism and simplisticism.
Nonetheless, at the very same time, every single one of these ideological signs,
though not supplantable by words, has support in and is accompanied by words,
just as is the case with singing and its musical accompaniment.374
Nevertheless, even where ideological refraction occurs, the word is implicated both as the
vehicle of intonation and axiological inflection and is actively employed by the
understanding and the work of hermeneutics.375
In their critique of Freud, the Bakhtin Circle shows that psychoanalysis leans too
heavily on introspective methods of analysis, and thus its propositions regarding the
primal forces in which the instincts find their origin cannot be raised to the level of
objectivity. While Freud does turn toward sociological theory toward the end of his
career, he never quiet acknowledges the full importance of the social and linguistic
vehicle through which his theory is formed and practiced. As such, he could use a good
dose of the Marxist theory of consciousness and its dependence on the socioeconomic
milieu with which it is saturated. Moreover, Freud pays lip service to history and natural
history but his method, like Saussure’s, effectively castrates the diachronic and relegates
history itself to the dustbin of scientific praxis. For this reason, and because he is not
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keenly aware of the importance that the medium of language plays in the externalisation
of thought, psychoanalysis has, to this day, been largely unable to pretend toward
objectivity. For their own part, the Bakhtin Circle’s invocation of dialectical materialism
does not seem to be disingenuous, but neither does it really add any serviceable method to
found a closer relationship between scientific theoretical discourse and practice. It is true
that scientific speech genres found themselves on everyday utterances, but one must say
more in order to effectively assemble a self-consciously productive relation between the
two. In order to compel science to answer the everyday, to bring to life what one has
learned in science and art, it is not sufficient to write propaedeutic treatises. This will
only reinforce the disconnect between scientific method and philosophy. The need to
show to practitioners of science the importance of philosophy grows each day, but the
growing complexity and specialization of researchers daily makes this task infinitely
more difficult. For John Parrington, the work of L. S. Vygotsky is a useful extension of
Marx’s tenet that life determines consciousness.376 To my mind, as I hope that I have
shown, the work of Allon White likewise builds bridges over the gaps that both the
Bakhtin Circle and contemporary social theorists have opened between what is and what
ought to be within the territory of their own research fields. The task of science, as well
as the task of building bridges between the disciplines, must be understood not only as a
collective task, but also as a task for generations to come.
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§ 5.

Discourse: A Critique of Saussurean Linguistics

5.1

Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Saussurean Linguistics:
Child Psychology and Pedagogy: the Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952

In this section I will first provide a critique of Saussurean linguistics along the lines of
that provided by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his recently translated Child Psychology and
Pedagogy: the Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952. Although on first glance this may seem
like an odd digression, Merleau-Ponty’s appraisal of Saussure will lead directly into
Voloshinov’s own account—which for its own part lacks the breadth of Merleau-Ponty’s
exposition. The first part of this section will therefore serve to ground my subsequent
exposition of Voloshinov’s own critique of what he calls abstract objectivism in
linguistics—i.e., the species of linguistics to which Saussure belongs. This critique in
place, I will then show that Voloshinov and Bakhtin’s approach to discourse in everyday
life and verbal artistic creation establishes the concrete social reality of real living human
beings at the centre of their own linguistic thought. This trajectory will accomplish four
objectives. First, it will serve as a survey of both this previously obscure lecture of
Merleau-Ponty regarding the ontogenetic development of language in children, as well as
continue our estimation of the merits of the Bakhtinian corpus by taking on their
linguistic work. As such, Voloshinov’s texts Marxism and the Philosophy of Language
and “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, and Bakhtin’s own “Content, Material, and
Form in Verbal Art” will be essential to our little study. Second, it will, as we have just
stated, clarify both Merleau-Ponty and Bakhtin’s critique of Saussurean linguistics.
Third, the present analysis will set out clearly the Bakhtin Circle’s own concerns
regarding linguists and discourse in life and art. Finally, in delineating the Bakhtin
Circle’s linguistic commitments, this section will prepare the ground for the penultimate
section of the present work which deals with Problems in Dostoevsky’s Poetics.
The origin of language is the “prehistory” of language, explains Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
in his lecture notes on Child Psychology and Pedagogy: “to explain the origin of language
is to try to derive it from other things,” and he espies just such a misstep in Otto
Jespersen’s Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin.377 In other words, to try to
locate the aggregates of language before its formation presupposes a sort of hysteron
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proteron pre-existence of language itself—as if language could be found avant le mot,
preformed and encapsulated, in the elements from which it is composed. But this
etiological line of reasoning ignores the spontaneous creation of language in history—or,
indeed, in prehistory. Proceeding in this way ignores the phenomena of language itself as
it truly arises in the life of its community of users. It is not to recognize that the origins of
language are obscured, and not only by our lack of historical evidence—not the least of
which is the lack of a record of how our first linguistic ancestors actually spoke. There is,
after all, no vehicle outside of language to convey this record. We must realize, once and
for all, against Herder and his contemporaries who sought to explain our linguistic
origins, the fundamental contradictory nature of the search. As it will turn out, a
community of speakers is not even sufficient. We must try to understand language as the
stuttering active internal difference of creative utterances in themselves. These arise with
no small degree of spontaneity, and Saussure’s structural account of the negative
differential relation of signs is not wholly sufficient to explain the essence of the
linguistic phenomena in itself. As we will see below, it is as if language leads a life of its
own.
Part of the trouble in coming to an understanding as to the nature of language can
be attributed to a “gap between expressive forms and language” in-itself.378 Both 19th
century philosophy and proto-linguistics attempt to close this gap with a theory of the
spoken utterance as a complex form of phonation that was built on top of, or evolved out
of, onomatopoeia.379 If a mimetic theory of language were a sufficient etiology, however,
the origin and development of language could be shown to have continuity between the
first human stuttering toward speech and that prelanguage which came before it. We
would find our linguistic roots everywhere in the natural world. Thus one could trace the
communicative function of language back through simpler forms until reaching an
animistic society that took its spoken language directly from sonorous nature, but “no one
supports this idea anymore.”380 Still others thinkers thought the origin of language is to
be found in the interjection. However, almost all interjections can be shown to be, after
all, conventional constructions.381
Linguistics does not study signs as if there were a mimetic relation between
spoken word and the object to which it refers. In structural linguistics, the signifier does
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not bear a natural resemblance to the signified and in fact has no positive or affirmative
value. It is the task, therefore, of post-Saussurean linguistics to deconstruct the negative
differential relation of the sign.382 For the Saussurean linguist, the signifier can achieve
its referential power to the signified only in virtue of the virtual negative differential of
one sign to another; in Saussurean linguistics it is the structure, or what is called the
negative space in the plastic arts, that can do the accounting where the structural bestowal
of meaning is concerned. A sign has its value according to all other signs within a given
language, and especially its relation to all other signs that congregate around it, due to
their difference from and relational position to all other signifiers. A sign is given weight
only through the negation of all other signs—A is A because it is none of the other
significant values in the alphabet, but A in itself has no positive value. It is only through
this multiple negation, through these negative sets, that A qua sign, holds its place and
takes its meaning.
Since Aristotle, objects have usually been thought of as having an essential quality
or species which makes them what they are. ‘Furniture,’ for example, is what it is
according to its species, vis-à-vis being that which furnishes, whether this connotes
comfort, or holding our bodies or furnishing our lives, etc. The same logic of species and
genera has come to be applied to signs themselves, and especially from the influence of
Boethius onward.383 Again, for linguistics it is the differential between species of signs—
furniture, vehicles, animals, buildings, which help each to take their meaning according to
its negative associative value.384 Is it sufficient to say that ‘furniture’ may also
distinguish itself according to the genera and species of other signs? Is it sufficient to say
that the sign ‘electric chair’ is the sign ‘not love seat,’ ‘not hammock,’ ‘not my favourite
chair,’ and ‘not the chair of Le Collège de France,’ and that it is not any of these at once.
Saussure answers a resounding yes: all of these negations hold their positions insomuch
as they also sediment within a linguistic community to form a static structural unity of
language—at least for a time.385 However, Saussure’s idea of a state of language, a
synchronic system, leaves wholly to one side the question of the historical movement and
foundation of language. Synchrony goes a long way to explain the significant value of
the sign in relation to all other signs, but it cannot account for the (spontaneous) birth of
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the sign, nor does it leave any room for the emotional valuative intonation of the sign as it
is used in the living speech of flesh and blood human beings leading real lives.
The linguistic state, as studied in “synchronic linguistics,” purports to deal
exclusively with “coexisting terms” and not diachronically fluctuating signs, just as the
historical study of epochs excludes the study of historical periods, which are to be
understood as successive events.386 Thus it would seem to hold that the study of signs in
terms of the unique historical utterance can gain no purchase according to their
negatively determined synchronic and associative clusters which surround that historical
utterance. Synchrony alone, according to Saussure, is responsible for its sense. This
would effectively render the work of philology, and we also must admit, all work of
linguistic reconstruction of the past—in short the question of origins of both word and
world—puerile and superficial in comparison with synchronic linguistics:
Generally speaking, static linguistics is much more difficult than historical
linguistics. Facts of evolution are more concrete, and stir the imagination more
readily: the connexions link sequences of terms which are easily grasped. It is
simple, and often entertaining even, to follow through a series of linguistic
changes. But a linguistics concerned with values of coexisting terms is much
harder going.387
Moreover, the diachronic study of the emotional-volitional tone in the utterance would
require the addition of the self-understanding of historical subjects as revealed through
their utterances. Since, however, these speech acts remain utterly tied to an unknown past
synchronic system of emotional-volitional tonescapes—if I may be allowed the coinage,
the diachronic is left entirely outside of the study of linguistic states. These past states are
epistemologically and critically excluded. Yet for this to be the case, it must be admitted
that the history of words—their genealogies, and their evolution—can add no significant
weight to the molar mass of the sign. To admit anything less than this axiom would call
into question the very possibility of a science of synchronic linguistics as Saussure
imagines it. We could call this the problem of the steady state of language. One must
assume language has a steady state through time, that through it linguistic phenomena can
be studied from the point of view of being rather than becoming. The reverse proposition
is to admit that language proceeds entirely according to becoming and is tantamount to
application of a version of the uncertainty principle to linguistics.
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The problem of the historical utterance does not magically disappear into the ether
of history; quite to the contrary, the diachronic calls into question the methodology of
synchronic linguistics as a science: “we cannot deny, at the very least, the historicity of
language ... In certain constellations, there is a given creation that was not possible until
now. To admit a history of language is to simply admit that we cannot come to a certain
state without passing through successive stages.”388 Thus Merleau-Ponty complicates
Saussure’s desire to draw a hard division between the historical development of
language—i.e., a “diachronic” linguistics—and the unchanging states of language, or the
“synchronic.”389 The synchronic cannot escape its diachronic movement of linguistic
change and verbal creation (and spontaneity), and the establishment of a new utterance
that was until this time not possible remains outside of the scope of the linguist’s territory.
Nevertheless, this spectre that haunts Saussurean linguistics makes the puissance of
history felt even in the Cours:
Demarcation in time is not the only problem encountered in defining a linguistic
state. Exactly the same question arises over demarcation in space. So the notion
of a linguistic state can only be an approximation. In static linguistics, as in most
sciences, no demonstration is possible without a conventional simplification of
data.390
The question we would pose to Saussure, then, is how scientific can this conventional
simplification be? Since you seek a mathesis of language, what is the coefficient of error
and how is it determined?
If we attribute to the synchronic system alone the cause of the utterance, then we
truly have no foothold on the past utterance, having privileged a once living “system” of
language that is now dead and subjected it to the striations of mathematical calculation.
This is not to say that one cannot submit the linguistic event to calculation, but merely
that in doing so one makes of it a paschal lamb readied for (s)laughter. If we look at the
past condition of language simply as what is given in a historical example, we have left
out the spatial and temporal problem of its becoming—we have said nothing of the living
interval which lies between Saussurean states. It is this interval, in which the mystery and
creativity of language comes into being that was, after all, the origin of human linguistic
curiosity. But in turning toward the speech event Saussurean linguistics inevitably casts it
aside and has captured only a dead butterfly to add to its collection of patterns and
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hypostatized linguistic structures; it has totally disregarded the linguistic state’s indirect
relation to and transcendental dependence upon the living speech event. Therefore, even
the past, dead, utterance must be grounded in the living tongues of human beings who
may breathe into it a new life—what we might call the Pentecostal linguistic moment.
Language, like fire, is a process not a state. It carves out a space for itself where nothing
had previously existed. However, this is not where the question of historical utterance
itself dies, nor is it rendered unintelligible; quite on the contrary, the question of this
vector, with all its mysteries, fractures, splitting and especially where it leaves no
discernible future legacy, presents itself as a question to the living linguistic community:
Language neither accommodates itself to one or to the other. It obliges us to
consider history as a contingent course and a logic of things where phenomena
can outline themselves and then be systematized by acts of social life or of
thought. For example, the negation “pas” was begun by being a word that
designated a man’s progression when walking (“I do not do that” {je ne fais pas}
in the sense of “I am not advancing a step” {je n’avance pas}. It is by a sliding
that the word “pas” is given its negative sense.391
Therefore, to short-circuit Piaget and the behaviourists, we may also state that whatever
else might be the case, there can be no possibility of an “empirical origin of language.”392
If we still take seriously, then, the question of the origin of language, we need
some conception of a pre-history of language—a “‘prelanguage.’”393 As Merleau-Ponty
points out, Otto Jespersen proceeds precisely along this vein. He proposes the emergence
of language from an analysis of song,394 a process by which a verbal sign may be
produced. The central tenet here is that language diachronically grows progressively
more complex—“more expressive forms [grow] from the less expressive.”395 Deleuze
and Guattari are helpful here:
Speech communities and languages, independently of writing, do not define
closed groups of people who understand one another but primarily determine
relations between groups who do not understand one another: if there is language,
it is fundamentally between those who do not speak the same tongue. Language is
made for that, for translation, not for communication.396
Were this not the case, language as representation would not so much be impossible as it
would be wholly unnecessary. In this sense the Babel moment of humanity is not the
providential destruction of language, but the gift of its necessity—i.e., its very condition
of possibility. Language is from the beginning a multiplicity and therefore it is a struggle
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between differences by its opposed users. Against Hobbes, we may say that language is
born through the need to translate collective forms of thought into action between
different social groups; it does not come into being through the Adamitic bestowal of
proper names.397 Indeed, one wonders if the linguistic concept could have ever grown out
of a unified community—but then at base such a concept as ‘unified community’ is
etymologically and otherwise a contradictio in adjecto, as Derrida has made clear.398
Whatever retrospective foothold linguistic science achieves after the speech event, it is
clear that it nevertheless arises from the necessity to dialogue—i.e., between users.
In terms of the origin of language, therefore, what we want is a theory that has the
power “to describe certain forms of prelinguistic expressions that, without being causes of
language, would be language’s cradle.”399 The mystery of language is such that it is first
nowhere to be found and then it is omnipresent as a multiplicity. Saussure’s great
achievement is to prove once and for all that there can be no first word exclusive unto
itself, for were this the case, the theory of the negative differential, which is supposed to
give language its sense, would lose all effectiveness. Language springs forth like a geyser
up from a reservoir (Ursprung)400; it is a dehiscent and emergent phenomenon. Saussure
recognized this and therefore exhorted his students to study the immanent system of
negative differential signification instead of looking outside of the linguistic circuit, but in
doing so he misses the positive nature of linguistic expression at the site of its creation.401
He did this for fear of muddying the waters of linguistic evidence. However, Saussure’s
axis of simultaneity, which “concerns relations between things which coexists, [and in
which] relations from the passage of time [are] entirely excluded,”402 leaves behind
precisely the momentum of expressivity and the becoming of language (spontaneity).
In brief, by relegating the study of language to the synchrony of this simultaneity,
and by doing so at the expense of the successive diachrony of the historical utterance, we
not only leave out the non-empirical question of origin completely, but we sacrifice our
original question: what is language? We put in its place the truncated empirical question:
how can we effectively capture, quantify, and decline the utterance according to what it is
not. Neither the philosophical project nor the scientific one, therefore, is open to
completion. Both are open, however, to interpretation and reinterpretation—or if we like,
to definition and redefinition. Saussure’s linguistic science remains descriptive, since it
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actually does attempt to study ideal forms from the concrete speech event, or to deduce
causes from effects—and this can only be done descriptively and is never finalizable.
That said, it also remains true to this day that no more thorough going scientific method
has taken us so far up that mystic linguistic river than has Saussure’s two fundamental
and related distinctions: the one which is between langue and parole and the other
between synchrony and diachrony.403 The philosophy of language stands forever in his
debt:
Whether or not we can expect from science the knowledge of being itself, in no
case can philosophy dispense with finding a philosophical link and status for its
“verification” methods. Linguistics is the most rigorous examination of language
as an institution; we cannot conceive of a philosophy of language that is not
obligated to collect and articulate on the basis of its own truths the truths that
linguistics establishes. If we consider philosophy to be the elucidation of human
experience, and science as an essential moment of that experience, the dilemma
disappears.
Thus, what we will ask linguistics is not their philosophical conclusions
(as philosophers, they are not more solid than others). We will seek to participate
with their experience of language.404
In contradistinction to Saussure’s assertion that it is the sign system of simultaneity, the
synchronic that determines the structure of language, Merleau-Ponty suggests that parole
has a fundamental role to play, since it contains within it an immanent “pregrammar”
which would contain the necessary pitch for erecting a conventional and written
grammar.405
The evolution of language seems to proceed according to a law of sufficiency and
a ‘law’ of play. When a sufficient expression is found that is considered necessary—i.e.,
essential—to a linguistic community, it may take hold for a time, but there is nothing as
sure as change in language and this change would seem to proceed according to chance.
It is not an accident that there are relatively few discernible parts of speech.406 As
Merleau-Ponty tries to show, these forms of semantemes and morphemes are far from
stable across time, nor are they steadfast at the frontiers of particular languages. At no
time are we able to call prescriptive or even universal grammar essential to language
itself—for language is of another order which does not exhaust itself with its play upon
the phonatory organs, the written form, or the ostensibly unified system present in the
Saussurean experience of language. Let us be clear: language in the moment of its
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creation escapes the circuit. It can no longer be a question merely of reducing language
to its most essential and categorical structures or grammatical aggregates, and we cannot
do so even if they appear to be universally realized across all human languages—for
language would seem to have its own essence that is not anthropomorphic, but which lies
outside of all linguistic communities and is beyond a communicative telos, convention, or
mimesis. It has one foot in all of these to be sure, but is also otherwise engaged with that
“which has no name in any philosophy” and which the ancients hinted at in their
designation “element.”407 It is as if it were personified and stood at the Four Corners,
simultaneously a visitor in each state, but a citizen to none.
For his part, Saussure cannot embrace at once both of the “Humboldtian aspects of
language, ergon and energeia, but must focus exclusively on the ergon, or structure, of
language phenomena, and to abandon as hopeless any leaping over this seemingly fixed
gap between the synchronic system langue and the diachronic dynamism of parole. 408
The virtue of Saussure’s method is that it cuts short all the lacunae—those usual
epistemological gaps, which always come to the surface when one wishes to quantify
qualitative experience: “one solution only, in our view, resolves all these difficulties. The
linguist must take the study of structure as his primary concern, and relate all other
manifestations of language to it.”409

5.2

Between Ergon and Energeia:
Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language

Voloshinov identifies two distinct “trends” or “arteries” of language study in the modern
period—namely “individual subjectivism” and “abstract objectivism.”410 Not surprisingly
this distinction essentially follows the vein we have already seen in the previous section
between the two major trends in psychology, vis-à-vis introspection and behaviourism.
The first trend takes language to be essentially an individual creative act of meaningmaking that regards ready-made forms of language a mere “inert crust,” heuristically
useful but otherwise inessential to the formative linguistic act.411 The second takes the
reverse approach and regards linguistic phenomena as essentially a ready-made, closed,
non-ideological system in which individual creation amounts to little more than an
ineffectual and temporary distortion of the otherwise stable synchrony.412 Wilhelm von
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Humboldt is the preeminent proponent of the first trend and, not surprisingly, Saussure is
that of the second. Voloshinov also distinguishes two dispositions toward linguistics
which he rejects outright; they are “academic eclecticism” and “academic positivism.”413
As we have already seen, Bakhtin and Kanaëv reject positivism for its refusal to develop
a working bio-scientific method and for its misleading argument for neutrality;
Voloshinov likewise charges academic positivism with a “surreptitious” disposition
toward the facts of linguistic inquiry.414 Academic eclecticism fares no better; in fact,
both theoretical positions “amount to one and the same thing,” since by either accepting
or rejecting all theoretical propositions neither school can establish a foothold on
linguistic science.415
Voloshinov’s critique of abstract objectivism, and by implication of Saussure, is
materialist in its approach. It is self-evident, according to Voloshinov, that the view from
above—i.e., objectivity—will never provide us with a wholly synchronic system of
negative differentials based on an unchanging normative state.416 Quite to the contrary,
this normative aspect of language is itself in constant motion. A truly objective
linguistics would have to grant that the life of language in-itself is a ‘state’ of pure
becoming:
Thus a synchronic system, from the objective point of view, does not correspond
to any real moment in the historical process of becoming. And indeed, to the
historian of language, with his diachronic point of view, a synchronic system is
not a real entity; it merely serves as a conventional scale on which to register the
deviations occurring at every real instant in time.417
Therefore, and quite remarkably, the synchronic is actually a wholly subjective view of
language—it exists only for the subject. The critical move that Voloshinov condones
prefigures the post-structualist tenet that the normative is subjective and historically
based. It also looks back to Marx and Engels insomuch as the normative-subjective must
admit to standing in alliance with the official.
We must be clear here, however, that the normative-subjective can be understood
as temporarily objective, but it is not unchangeable and it relies on its situatedness for its
power qua objective fact. What is objective here is precisely the relation between a given
semantic person and his normative disposition toward his language as a synchronic
system of linguistic facts, but this no more makes it an “incontestable” and unchanging
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set of facts for all time—or for a given state, in the sense we discussed above—than a
geocentric model of the cosmos. Without denying a truly objective transcendental state
of affairs—a question which he leaves open—Voloshinov is interested in a “certain kind
of objective relationship”; that is to say, the type of factuality which can be admitted to
has more to do with what is perceived to be effectively real rather than reality per se.418
For the most part, therefore, abstract objectivism depends upon a faith in the
transparency of linguistic facts—the parts of speech, etc.—and the uncritical acceptance
of the existence of the synchronic system of negative differentials and the linguistic state.
The problem of objectivity sits on a razor’s edge—do we put the word objective in scare
quotes of not? Abstract objectivism “provides no clear-cut solution.”419
As it turns out, for Voloshinov the very idea of language as an abstract objective
system is itself an idiosyncratic—and ideological—point of view; moreover, it is also
limited to a handful of highly specialized theorists. The average language user does not
produce the verbal utterance from the position of the linguist, and least of all from the
ideologically synchronic vista of the Saussurean. To put this another way, a normative
‘objective’ notion of language adds nothing to the ability to speak from “some particular,
concrete context.”420 Abstract objectivity ignores the speaker and bases its theory on the
listener who understands what is said—even Saussure admits this, since it is the
understanding that is equated with the ready-made synchronic unity of langue rather than
the messiness of the production of a verbal utterance from the point of view of parole.421
But the understanding—vis-à-vis she who understands—likewise does not rely on the
deployment of the synchronic system of signs in order to comprehend what has been said.
Here abstract objectivism has confused the understanding with recognition and the sign
with the signal: “only a sign can be understood; what is recognized is the signal.”422 The
signal is most certainly a moment in linguistic activity, but it is not an essential moment,
nor does it originate in linguistic activity. The signal can even become an obstacle to
linguistic production. We see this in foreign language learning—a form of linguistic
acquisition that is wholly different from the learning of one’s native language. If I am
learning French, for example, and I do not understand that the sign ‘repousser’ means ‘to
push (to the) background,’ then the word is nothing more than an obstacle to my learning.
This is a problem of recognition rather than of understanding. The whole point of the
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understanding is that it removes the necessity of recognition by making language
immediate. It makes no difference that this recognition can become a passive moment,
since synchrony is supposed to function universally as a necessary moment of
understanding, yet here the signal actually becomes an obstacle to the understanding.
Saussure’s theory simply cannot incorporate this contradictory evidence.
The case is entirely different once the absorption of the signal by “pure
semioticity” has taken place.423 Here the personal historical context in which a word has
been used comes to the fore. Everything depends upon context where the understanding
is concerned. The present situation invokes past associations of usage, and these
situations insomuch as they are invoked are material and embodied, ideological, and find
their home in the consciousness of the speaker—her verbal intonation, axiological and
evaluative inflection, and the like. Voloshinov goes even farther. The word itself is
pushed to the background. What is presented front and centre, so to speak, is value:
In point of fact, the linguistic form ... exists for the speaker only in the context of
specific utterances, exists, consequently, only in specific ideological context. In
actuality, we never say or hear words, we say and hear what is true or false, good
or bad, important or unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on. Words are
always filled with content and meaning drawn from behaviour or ideology. That
is the way we understand words, and we can respond only to words that engage us
behaviourally or ideologically.424
We find a similar critique of Saussure in the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl
Bühler. In fact, his work can be read as the application of a theory of linguistic context to
Saussure’s theory itself. In his Theory of Language, Bühler contends that Saussure’s
systematic displacement of inner sense is unanalysable, that the intuition of the language
researcher plays an altogether more fundamental role in erecting an architectonic of
language study than has hitherto been admitted. One does not arrive at the historical
epoch of Saussurean synchrony without already owing a debt to the previous evaluations
of the linguistic phenomena, and one cannot simply proceed in the reductive manner of
the physicist. Just as we have seen with the laboratory practices in the biological sciences
between biologist and biological theory, there is a mutualism in the evolution of linguist
and linguistic theory. The language researcher must turn once again to “the concrete
speech event,” as it is embodied, and one must do so without attempting to answer it
according to its immanent and individual sense: indeed, the concrete speech event is
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“something unique like each stroke of lightning and sound of thunder and Caesar’s
crossing of the Rubicon, a happening here and now that has a certain place in
geographical space and in the Gregorian calendar.”425 We therefore proceed not in the
manner of the physicist, who is free from the incumbency of giving an account of the
qualitative phenomena of thermodynamic entropy in human bodies. The physicist, of
course, does not deny that he lights a stove to keep himself warm and not to increase the
entropy of his kindling, but neither were Boltzmann or Joule concerned to record the
emotive vicissitudes of an increase or decrease in body temperature. Roy Orbison’s
evaluation that “love is like a stove that burns you when it’s hot” will never be relevant to
the quantitative entropic analysis, but it is relevant to the person who has just broken up
with his partner. By analogy, the language researcher ought not to be primarily interested
in the particular amplitude or pattern of sound waves issuing from the phonatory
equipment of a speaker—the history of structural and behavioural linguistic analysis
notwithstanding. While doing so, linguistic research does provide valuable quantitative
results which may be objectively paired off against one another; but where linguistics
assumes such exclusivity, it is bound also to achieve only a limited result which, in the
final analysis, misses altogether its original object of investigation—an answer to the
embodied speech event provided “in vivo.”426
As John Parrington notes in his paper “Valentin Voloshinov”, there is no
ontological difference between inward and outward speech for Voloshinov, both are
essentially of a material origin.427 The materiality we are concerned with here centres
around the material nature of the word itself: “we do, after all, think and feel and desire
with the help of words; without inner speech we would not becomes conscious of
anything in ourselves.”428 Language is always-already social in character. Neither
linguistics nor psychology can be studied without a view to this social and objective
character of language, and in fact they presuppose this social ground; indeed, for
Voloshinov no conscious thought is possible without a corresponding grounding in the
material aspect of words themselves. What we have already said about language
becoming possible only between societies is a fortiori true about communications
between organisms, and in this Voloshinov—like Bakhtin—has in mind the long view of
history—i.e., great time: “The complex apparatus of verbal connections is worked and
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put into practice in the process of long, organized, and multilateral contact among
organisms. Psychology cannot, of course, dispense with objective, sociological
methods.”429 Indeed, the material and organized labour of organisms has, since Engels’
Dialectics of Nature, been the interface for not only the attempted application of
dialectical materialism to nature herself, but is nothing short of the attempt to unify a
theory of linguistic and social production:
the development of labour, necessarily helped to bring the members of society
closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by
making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men
in their making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other.
Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but
surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed
modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one
article sound after another.430
While Freud brings to centre stage the conflict between inner and outer speech by
attempting to develop his theory of the psyche as part unconscious and part conscious, he
misses the social origin of this process and, by implication, ignores the possibility of a
wholly objective grounding for his psychology. Likewise, Saussure cannot account for
the mediation of language as a tool of communication between a speaker and an
“understander.”431 It is for this reason that Voloshinov feels that he has found the proper
grounding not only of a Marxist philosophy of language, but has managed to correct
Freud’s gloss by asserting history as the material basis of the word and therefore, by
extension, of consciousness itself.432
Insomuch as words are the fulcrum on which the social text is authored, therefore,
they are also the dialogical slate on which all ideologies of the organism—always already
social, are written, erased, and rewritten:
This “content of the psyche’ is ideological through and through; from the vaguest
of thoughts and dimmest and most uncertain of desires all the way to
philosophical systems and complex political institutions, we have one continuous
series of ideological and, hence also, sociological phenomena. Not a single
member of this series from one end to the other is the product solely of individual
organic creativity.433
Nevertheless, this ideology cannot simply be reduced to meaningless dichotomies as is
sometimes done in vulgar Marxism. We are not dealing here with a naïve Manichaeism,
and over-simplified binary distinctions between individual and state, between good and
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bad, or right and wrong, or proletariat and bourgeoisie, or insider and outsider, or
especially between false consciousness and class consciousness. That said, there is
always an uneven conflict between the unofficial discourse and what Voloshinov calls the
“ideological dominant” of any discourse434—and this dominant therefore perpetuates a
Manichaean-like struggle, not between opposites, but between active and affirmative
differences in themselves.
Ideology is not wholly transparent. There is no one to one ratio between the
materiality conditions that shape consciousness and their expression. The Bakhtin
Circle’s linguistic turn couched in a nuanced formulation of Marxist ideology—itself
diversely formulated throughout Marx’s life—is necessarily inchoate and unfinalizable.
In an attempt to formulate ideology as it is, to quote Gardiner, “imbricated with language,
or, more precisely, with its concrete instantiation in forms of oral and written
discourse,”435 the Circle first wanted to bridge—rather than close—the gap perpetuated in
the dualism of form and content. This involved “stressing that the formal organization of
discourse was itself essentially a social construction, and that the signifying medium
influenced the production and reception of ideological messages as much as overt
thematic content.”436 In other words, because ideology is itself a material phenomenon,
its form and its content are always found together in an interplay that is productive of the
conscious subject, but in a way that adds the “refraction” of reality to Marxist
“reflection.”437
Ideology adds an emotional volitional tone such that, when speech interference
occurs in the quoted utterance, for example, the active listener can hear two voices
somewhere between syntax and intonational difference—the utterance is found to be
“serving two masters” as it were.438 This struggle occurs through the immanent
manifestation of what the Circle came to call “speech genres,” roughly the conventionally
accepted mode of speech within a given particular social context. There are primary and
secondary speech genres, those of the everyday patois and those of discourse within the
scientific and literary faculties. There is, however, no such thing as a discourse of the
individual and therefore it does not make any sense to pit individual against society in
terms of ideological discourse—just as we have seen was the mistake made by bourgeois
psychoanalysis.
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Speech is always a social phenomenon and it always partakes in more or less
overtly ideological speech genres. As we have said, the distinctions between everyday
and scientific speech genres are not absolute but transform one another in a dialogic give
and take. In Bakhtin’s essay “The Problem of Speech Genres” he attempts to show that
these genres are both topographical and dynamic, that their form is open and influences
and is influenced by their socially determined content. To quote Bakhtin:
Hence the more or less distinct dialogization of secondary genres, the weakening
of their monological composition, the new sense of the listener as the partnerinterlocutor, new forms of finalization of the whole, and so forth [come about].
Where there is style there is genre. The transfer of style from one genre to another
not only alters the way the style sounds, under the conditions of a genre unnatural
to it, but also violates or renews the given genre.439
Speech genres are for Bakhtin the “drive belts from the history of society to the history of
language.”440 They are that force which perpetuates the constant shift in meaning. “The
Problem of Speech Genres” argues that no utterances escapes from a relation to one or
multiple speech genres, but they are instead “real unit[s] of speech communication.”441
As such, they are constitutive of the meaning, style, and grammar appropriate to words
and sentences and by extension are constitutive of the subject herself—vis-à-vis her
semantic personhood.

5.3

“Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”

As we have seen, the once-occurrent being-as-event requires a response from the position
of the subiectum, or subject. Voloshinov’s works reflect and refract this ideological point
of view. His most concise word on the matter is to be found in the short essay “Discourse
in Life and Discourse in Art”. The intention of this essay is to show that discourse in art
is grounded in discourse in life. Discourse in everyday life relies on extraverbal
socioeconomic content from the surrounding milieu and is a necessary and transcendental
condition of literature, although everyday discourse in no way exhausts the species
characteristics of artistic discourse. At the same time, the essay serves as a two-fold
critique of the formal method in literary criticism and of the hyper-subjectivism of
psychology—and as such echoes the critique of psychoanalysis contained in
Freudianism. Here, verbal and non-verbal intonation and gesticulation serve to bridge the
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abyss between the formal properties of the utterance and the evaluative, ideological,
undergirding of all dialogical speech acts.
In artistic discourse the speaker from whom the utterance issues is called the
author in both Voloshinov and Bakhtin. But no true utterance is left to metastasize on the
lips of the speaker; all utterances require a listener. There is always a doubled direction
of vector of the utterance present in every intonation; dialogue is not limited to two
interlocutors diametrically opposed faccia a faccia.442 Certainly, the utterance is directed
toward the “ally or witness”443; this is Voloshinov’s name for the listener in discourse.
But there is also a second vector which is always directed toward “who or what” is being
addressed in discourse, although stating it this way will sound deceptively oversimplified.444 There is always a “third participant” in discourse, and not simply the
author—or speaker—addressing the witness or listener,445 as we typically understand
authorial activity or as we naïvely understand everyday speech. In both discourse in life
and discourse in art, there is always a third participant. This third term, the who or what
that is addressed, can be equated with an apostrophe, and it is therefore usually
understood as a personified agent whom Voloshinov names “the hero.”446
We are now in a better position to understand Bakhtin’s apparent mystical
relation to projection that we spoke of in Section Two of the present work. Voloshinov’s
hero, the apostrophic other, has a regulative function within discourse; she is addressed as
if she were present. The relation to the apostrophic other, and by implication to Christ
qua third party addressee, could be called mysterious, but only so long as we naïvely
assume that there are only two interlocutors in discourse. Theologically, Christ would not
even be the proper analogy here; one would have to admit that the apostrophe or hero is
something more allied to the Holy Ghost. Typically we do not think of the apostrophe
when we address a listener, and its invocation in this tripartite scheme therefore seems to
mark a religious or mystical turn in Bakhtin’s thought. This is, however, not the case. In
discourse we always address a listener even while we implicitly address a situation or
ideal listener—i.e., an apostrophe. Again this second form of address is merely regulative
in speech. We may chose to see it as mysterious—the very fact that we can convey
inexhaustible meanings to each other through the finite material body of signs can be seen
as a mystery in human conversation. From the phonetic and auditory apparatuses
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somehow an infinite world of sense emerges. Another way to say this is that form and
content have a mysterious relationship to one another, and that while the idea is very
much a spiritual aspect of life—insomuch as it is virtual, it is nevertheless inseparable
from the matter which conveys it. However, where Christian apologists would have us
convert Bakhtin into the Saint John of the Cross of discourse, we cannot follow them.
There is nothing mystical in this tripartite schematic of author, reader, and hero in art—or
alternately of speaker, listener, and apostrophe in life.
Authorship and interlocution is very much grounded in the real material situation
and everyday experience of discourse. In Salinger’s Franny and Zooey, Franny’s maxim
that she has lifted from The Way of the Pilgrim to “‘pray without ceasing’” functions as a
perverse form of asceticism, and would run counter to our argument here.447 The problem
is with Zooey’s interpretation of this maxim, not with its possible content. We could
understand the exhortation as a simple reminder to be attentive to the fact that every
utterance we make is akin to a prayer to a third party interlocutor: a fact that once again
we normally forget in naïve everyday interlocution. Mysticism was a late arrival in
Russia.448 The idea to pray without ceasing seems to have originated with Saint
Theodosius, who preached “perpetual” prayer—what is commonly known as the Jesus
prayer.449 As Fedotov reminds us, the prayer was indeed practiced by religious mystics,
but for Saint Theodosius it was “but a form of ejaculatory prayer, the shortest and easiest
formula for perpetual prayer.”450 Likewise the apostrophe is omnipresent in speech, but it
is not to be regarded as a hypostatization of a Pentecostal spirit from on high.
Why is this important? Let us take the example of a literary theorist who works
with Dostoevsky. If he omits the apostrophe regulative function in speech, then he has
lost sight of the hero’s own context altogether and will inevitably attribute the hero’s
motivation to that of the author’s. In essence the theorist will conflate the author with the
hero—their intentions and ethically answerable acts will be entirely undifferentiated.
Thus, what Raskolnikov or the Underground Man say in earnest may be inflected by the
theorist as merely ironic—or vice versa. The intonation will be wrongly interpreted. In
life the consequences might prove more dire. Problems of the omission of the apostrophe
from the utterance often occur between cultures, since within speech communities the
apostrophe is usually implicit and understood. When the first pacts were made between
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the aboriginal tribes of North America and their colonizers, for example, the phrase ‘as
long as the waters run and the grass is green’ was a ubiquitous phrasing of the promises
made to seal the treatise. But the colonizers usually ignored such promises as mere
nonsense, since they were interpreted merely from the point of view of a written and
legalistic culture rather than from the understanding implied by the oral culture—where,
as we have seen, one’s word still implied a promised action. The apostrophes in this case
are wholly different on either side. For the colonizers the apostrophe is meaningless or
puerile, but from the aboriginal vantage point it implies a situation in which nature will
continue to follow her course, and therefore the pack is believed to be vouchsafed for all
time.451
The inchoate interlocutor in discourse, however, serves to demythologize the hero
as the omnitemporal participant in speech. Voloshinov also likens speech directed toward
the apostrophic hero, the “agent of life,” to a prayer or incantation.452 We do not have to
understand the agency of the hero here as hagiographic, since the intonation of speech can
swing both ways on the Manichaeanesque fulcrum—like the listener, who can be
interpolated as either an ally or enemy. The apostrophe is not to be understood as a
mystical or divine agency. Nor is the hero fully formed, he (it) remains open and
unfinalized. It is as if the form of address to nature which is present in animism has
survived in the verbal art of intonation, which not only bridges the gap between
evaluative ideological disposition and the situation of the surrounding world, but also
brings the very utterance with which it is pregnant to life:
The aboriginal myth-making spirit seems to have remained alive in it. Intonation
makes it sound as if the surrounding world were still full of animate forces—it
threatens and rails against or adores and cherishes inanimate objects and
phenomena, whereas the usual metaphors of colloquial speech for the most part
have been effaced and the words become semantically spare and prosaic.453
It is in virtue of this animistic element that the hero becomes personified in speech. As
we have already hinted, in “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” this personification
assumes the figure of ‘Christ’ of the Pentecostal ghost, and here Voloshinov gives the
hero an archaic spiritual shape. This shape is no less material for all its virtuality; it is
present in every inflected word. Material is the metaphor of spirit, just as form is carried
along with content that is germane to it. 454 Formal content and material-form are
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restorations of the properly embodied event. The uniqueness of any given utterance
depends upon both verbal and extraverbal gesticulation and intonation.455 Only the
abstractions and anxieties of a “déclassé” formalism, psychological subjectivism, or
linguistic abstract objectivism could project this self-ostracy of sense into the mere signal.
As such, the utterance that remains purely formal or introspectively subjectivist and does
not find its home in the extraverbal socioeconomic milieu is nothing but an empty husk.
Voloshinov describes the heroic regulative function as an enthymeme which
implicates the un-vocalized, non-actualized premise grounded in the broader social
milieu.456 Where this milieu is by and large in sympathetic harmony with the speaker,
where the listener is conceived of as being in ideological agreement with the speaker,
here Voloshinov posits a “choral support”; the choral support, like the supporting
stretcher of a painters canvas, serves to provide a surface on which intonation can be
“embroidered.”457 Of course, it is not always the case that this choral support will be
present to the reader or apparent to the listener. Sometimes the utterances come in the
presence of an enemy. The provisional exemplar given here is the man who laughs aloud
only to find that he is laughing alone. Under this circumstance of conflicting ideologies,
the utterance may take on the character of tactile, sometimes visually haptic, anxiety—as
when one says ‘you could cut the tension in the room with a knife’458:
Thus, we now have a right to claim, any locution actually said aloud or written
down for intelligible communication (i.e., anything but words merely reposing in
a dictionary) is the expression and product of the social interaction of three
participants: the speaker (author), the listener (reader), and the topic (the who or
what) of speech (the hero).459
Discourse in life and discourse in art are not wholly co-extensive. The above tripartite
schema of discourse in life—vis-à-vis speaker, listener, and topic (apostrophe), is selfcomplicating and requires a special, albeit related, analysis of discourse in literary
creation—vis-à-vis author, reader, and hero.
In art form and material are not to be conflated. Content is likewise distinct, but
inseparable from the form and the material. If, for example, Earth was visited by sentient
beings long after all human beings had evacuated the planet, and these beings happened
to come upon Michelangelo’s David, we could forgive them if they did not recognize the
form of a man let alone the ideological content signified by this hero in the service of
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King Saul who stands triumphant after having slain Goliath.460 Nor should we presume
they would read the implicit ideological content present in David. Content is always an
ideologically refracted evaluation—here the “triumph” of Florence over the expelled
Medici clan, and in art it always reflects the evaluative authorial intonation and gesture.
Form must likewise be distinguished here, although it could not be by the extraterrestrial
creature who had no surviving human being with which to compare David. The form of
Michelangelo’s best known work would look like little more than an oddly shaped slab of
marble—perhaps idiosyncratically so, but certainly not artistic. Bakhtin believes that the
artist has an answerable responsibility to the work which alone can form and select the
right content for its unified consummation: “it is impossible to isolate some real moment
in a work of art that would be pure content … content and form interpenetrate, they are
inseparable.”461 Yet the artist does not, or ought not inject his own personal ideological
intonation into the work. Instead, to create a true work of art it is necessary to raise the
evaluative tone of the piece to “the level of social significance.”462
It is the artist’s position outside of the work alone—and his ethical
disinterestedness that provides him with the capacity to actively wed form and content
into a unity within the work.463 An overbearing artist who conflates his personal
ideological beliefs cannot do justice—i.e., answer—the work. Here we already note a
difference from the ideological intonation in the discourse of everyday life; there the
speaker does not attempt to represent someone else’s social milieu but speaks as a
semantic person—he attempts to reflect his own evaluative intonation; however
successful he may be in this assay we leave to one side. Yet the verbal artist must be
prepared to participate consciously in art as if he had no other interest than the “adequate”
relation of form and content. Without this disinterested outsideness the artist cannot hope
to achieve his purpose. He must, in a sense, get out of the way of this higher social
purpose: “‘the enemy’ might even be repulsive, the positive state, the pleasure that the
contemplator derives in the end, is a consequence of the fact that the form is appropriate
to the enemy and that it is technically perfect in its realization though the agency of the
material.”464 Nevertheless, the discourse of life remains essential to the artist’s activity,
but not in terms of its everyday personal ethical and cognitive component, which is
regarded only in terms of its aesthetically appropriate relation to the work.
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When we turn from discourse in life to discourse in art, therefore, there is a shift
from the ethical and ideological intonation to the aesthetic intonation of the author. As
theorists we must attune ourselves to this shift so as not to mistake the person who writes
with either the authorial ideological position or the heroes. The first consideration should
have very little weight regarding how we read a text. The author should be thought of as
in scare quotes and present in the text rather than as a separate living entity; and again, the
hero and author’s ideological positions ought not to be conflated. Rest assured the verbal
and non-verbal intonation and gestures remain constantly present, although active reading
in terms of ‘hearing voices’ within the text is also an art—and one that also, no doubt,
requires the commitment of a lifetime to master.465 We have already discussed the
tripartite relations of the author, listener, and hero as they appear in real life, but it bears
repeating that these relations change drastically when they inhere in the world of the
verbal art; they are no longer “to be understood… as entities outside the artistic event but
only as entities of the very perception of an artistic work.”466 This perception is that of
the author’s, but again not of the author’s merely personal ideological intonations.467
Unlike the everyday semantic person, the artist shapes his material toward an adequation
of form and content; he must raise the axiological inflection of the work to a socially
significant achievement. The most drastic shift is with the listener, who must not be
conflated with the reading public; the reading public must remain outside of the author’s
sphere of influence, who is again to be thought of as (phenomenologically) within the
text. Instead, the listener becomes the authorially-perceived ideal listener.468 This
listener, like the hero and the author himself—since he is also heard strictly according to
his social significance, are formed qua form with an adequation to their immanent
content. Shakespeare would be a lesser author if he did not set aside a personal distaste
for Iago and instead liquidated his detestable characteristics. Iago must remain beyond
redemption. Without Iago’s genius for evil, Othello would not fall by his subterfuge, and
the tragedy would amount to little more than a forgotten Elizabethan farce.469
There are three significant ür-relations involved in verbal work of art. These are
the hierarchical value between the hero and the author, their “degree of proximity,” and
the proximity and relation to the hero borne by the listener.470 At times the listener is the
ally of the author; this is often the case in classical works where there is no “presumed
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disagreement” between them.471 This is a repetition in the discourse of art of what
Voloshinov calls choral support in the discourse of life. When the listener and the hero
are understood as mutual enemies of the author, both are the object of the author’s
ridicule—this is often the constellation heard in polemics and satires.472 If the author
finds himself in league with hero and at war with the listener, the result is something akin
to the Byronic hero, where any resultant laughter is at the expense of the listener.473 In
the case of “playing the fool” and “lyrical irony” species of utterance, a complexity of
relations can emerge; here the listener is given full autonomy to make what she will of
what has been said and what is hiding, ideologically, beneath the verbal integument.474
It is essential for the verbal artist to have the ‘sides’ of discourse ever-present in
his mind. Short of this the author-listener-hero tripartite relation threatens to collapse into
mere “stylization.”475 Without outsideness, the author cannot sustain its aesthetic
existence, and what ought to be perceived as exterior speech collapses into interior
speech.476 Style itself cannot be controlled, but is a matter of the verbal artist hearing his
own voice, and again this takes a lifetime.477 Anyone who has attempted to edit his own
work of verbal creation knows precisely how his daimon can toy with what he believes he
is actually conveying to the listener. One’s own voice is likewise elusive and it requires
real artistry to master it. Moreover, mimicry of other voices is easily as difficult: “It is
naïve to suppose that one can assimilate as one’s own an external speech that runs
counter to one’s inner speech—that is, runs counter to one’s whole inner verbal manner
of being aware of oneself and the world.”478 Without this lifetime dedication to listening,
style becomes forced, and the creation of the artist achieves nothing beyond the highly
subjective form, a monologue, what Voloshinov calls the “maxim.”479 Thus the ends
which are ideologically reflected in the verbal work of art are thereby degraded and
resemble the ends of a bourgeois publisher more than the verbal artist. More importantly,
the implied socioeconomic base—meant in the widest sense—likewise collapses, and we
are left with nothing more than a highly idiosyncratic piece of black letter legalism and
not a work of art.
In closing this section we will attempt to connect what has been said about
discourse in life and discourse in art to the art of answerability. For Voloshinov, and a
fortiori, for Bakhtin, theoretical poetics necessitates the propaedeutic study of
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socioeconomic theory, but they cannot be exhausted by sociological study. Aesthetics
depends upon the disinterest of the verbal artist to sustain a unique artistic discourse
grounded in the discourse of everyday life. But it is also necessary to construct an
architectonic, an art of answering, between the various genres of everyday life, between
the scientific disciplines, and between the two types of genres. Michael Gardiner
describes architectonics aptly as
a continuous dialogue with the ‘other’, with oneself (inner speech), and with the
external world—which involves the active construction of relations between
diverse phenomena… [and which] is constitutive of human subjectivity as such
and represents an inescapable component of any possible creative thought or
deed.480
The advent of an architectonics then always signals a moment of conflict between
competing ontologies and competing voices. Competing ontologies because the
subiectum is always experienced from within as an open and unfinalizable entity, whereas
the other is always seen as a finished project complete unto herself. The subiectum can
only be “consummated” as a whole and autonomous person through the evidence given
him by the grace of the shared and constructed world and by the other. It is the
“transgredience” or “outsideness”—i.e., the excess of the subiectum’s being beyond its
own self-disclosure and his overflow into the world, through which the other has a
surplus of my character. I am only given access to this excess of seeing through my
interaction with the other. This conception is not unlike the Greek idea of the daimon—
that side of myself that only others see directly and which follows me like a shadow. The
related idea of exotopy, or an excess of seeing—of my own character and behaviour—
grants to the other a perception of myself as a complete and whole unity, final and as real
as the bread that sustains her. I likewise perceive the other as complete and whole unto
herself. It is only through a dialogue of self and other, only through their non-coextensive
presence to one another, that meaning can enter into the world—that there can be
meaning or a world at all. The witness and the judge forever modify the world. The
ontology of the subiectum is, contrariwise, not perceived as a closed system unto itself,
but is open to interpretation and competing voices.481
The deed or act in Bakhtin is not only this act of sense bestowal and
consummation of the other through my ontological outsideness. The deed is also the
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word itself (slovo). Words and actions exist on a continuum with each other. In Marxism
and the Philosophy of Language, Voloshinov writes “the organizing centre of any
utterance, of any experience is not within but outside—in the social milieu surrounding
the individual being.”482 In other words, the dual character of the word, or what
Voloshinov calls outer and inner signs, or official and unofficial discourse, is alwaysalready formed and given shape in the world as a social phenomenon outside of the
individual. The word is therefore addressed to a ‘who’ in the outer-world that I
understand myself to be addressing within a “concrete social milieu.”483 This ‘who’ is the
imagined apostrophic hero—i.e., a situation—to whom I direct the personal intonation of
my voice. In other words, while the ideology expressed in the word is never completely
fixed, it is nevertheless framed within the confines of a particular social context and by
the always-already social discourse of a particular class. Linguistic abstract objectivism
of the type we find in Saussure simply cannot account for this milieu even though, as we
have seen, it is the ground from which significant abstraction first takes place. As
Voloshinov states this idea: all “utterance … depends on their real, material appurtenance
to one and the same segment of being and gives this material commonness ideological
expression and further ideological development.”484 This development therefore is not
simply an upside-down reflection of material conditions but is itself a creative refraction
of both material and ideological form and content. Abstract objectivism leaves to one
side the expression of this concrete ground.
Ultimately the various ideologies are expressions of competing values, and
systems of values strive to extinguish and obliterate one another in an attempt to “make
the sign uniaccentual.”485 But the word itself is resistant to such stasis, just as all
ideologies are ultimately unstable and may contain the seeds of their opposites.
Voloshinov privileges language and understands the sign as a critically important “arena”
of class struggle.486 If these various social ideologies have their base in material, they
likewise have a history—i.e., diachrony—that may be understood as the history of signs
acquiring “social value” through a struggle of competing ideologies. Signs require more
than a state or manifold unity that is prescribe in the theory of synchronic systems of
language. A ‘system’ that is wholly synchronic is merely a system of signals that must be
first recognized before they can be absorbed by the understanding. Of course, diachrony
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is not a pristine forward progression. It is first and foremost in periods of crisis,
according to Voloshinov, that the inner dialectical struggle within the sign becomes
externally visible.487 In Marxism he writes,
This inner dialectic quality of the sign comes out fully in the open only in times of
social crisis or revolutionary changes. In the ordinary conditions of life, the
contradiction embedded in every ideological sign cannot emerge fully because the
ideological sign in an established, dominant ideology is always somewhat
reactionary and tries, as it were, to stabilize the preceding factor in the dialectical
flux of the social generative process, so accentuating yesterday’s truth as to make
it appear today’s. And that is what is responsible for the refracting and distorting
peculiarity of the ideological sign within the dominant ideology.488
What we have seen in the categories of prescriptive grammar and in the linguist’s
experience of language holds doubly for objective knowledge. We therefore put
objective truth into scare quotes. As Voloshinov hints in the above quoted passage, that
which is considered common knowledge for us today will tomorrow have grown stale.489
No knowledge beyond the tautological ought to be considered objectively true for all
humans now and for all time. It is my position that no laws are immune to this rule, not
even our cherished laws of physics. Moreover, that prized trophy of all human
intellectual activity—namely pure logic—may stand as an exception, but only if we could
be sure that we really do have a tautology in mind. Only the syllogism admits of a true
unity of opposites, and such tautologies are hard won and difficult to reduce to selfevidence. There is a truth, therefore, which lies beyond us, but listening for its voice is
like attempting to listen to one of those wax cylinder records of Caruso as it melts in the
sun, or like listening for an extra-terrestrial voice from deep space via satellite. It is like
listening for what Merleau-Ponty has called the “voices of silence.”

As we move

forward into the penultimate section of the present work, we shall keep in mind the
ideological nature of objectivity and the difficulties posed in what Bakhtin has termed
Dostoevsky’s ability to hear voices in the “dialogue of his epoch.”490
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§ 6.

The Polyphonic Novel: Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics

6.1

Hearing Voices: Polyphony in the Novel
“I do not judge. These characters praise one another, condemn one another—all that is none of my
business”
—N. G. Chernyschevsky491
“Dostoevsky was capable of representing someone else’s idea, preserving its full capacity to
signify as an idea, while at the same time also preserving a distance, neither confirming the idea
nor merging it with his own expressed ideology. The idea, in his work, becomes the subject of
artistic representation, and Dostoevsky himself became a great artist of the idea.”
—Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics492

Bakhtin published Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo in 1929 shortly before he was
arrested.493 Caryl Emerson tells us in her preface to the book that Bakhtin may have had
the book ready for publication as early as 1922.494 A second extensively reworked
edition appeared in 1963 at the encouragement of a new group of scholars who had
stumbled across the original publication.495 According to both Tzvetan Todorov and
Michael Gardiner, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics consists of three perspectives on
Dostoevsky’s oeuvre: first, the formal perspective and through the lens of German
ideology—although polemically so; the second view places the literary corpus in line with
Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque; from the third vantage point Dostoevsky’s work is
viewed from the vista of merging and diverging novelistic discourses.496 I will only
cover the first perspective—the first three chapters of Problems—since we have already
taken up the theory of discourse and the carnivalesque in the previous sections of the
present work. As a result, we will be centrally concerned here with three major themes of
the volume, namely the polyphonic novel, the emphasis on heroic self-consciousness, and
the idea as it appears in Dostoevsky. These three aspects are intimately related to one
another and are expressions of what could be formulated by the following proposition: as
an author of the polyphonic novel, Dostoevsky is primarily motivated by a “profound
personalism” which locates the idea between subjects where it exists as an open-ended
and living object of dialogical struggle.497
Both Bakhtin and Bakhtin’s ‘Dostoevsky’ found univocity to be entirely
antithetical to life as it is expressed by real people in everyday life. As a novelist
dedicated to accentuating polyphony—i.e., diverging ideological voices within
simultaneous space of the novel—Dostoevsky’s works mark a new achievement in the
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millennial folk-festive culture crystallized in novelistic discourse. The search for a
univocal system in German ideological philosophy is a highly rationalized genre of
discourse, highly specialized, and torn out of real everyday contextual foundations; we
have already seen a similar disconnect between the specialist’s account and everyday life
in linguistics as abstract objectivism and in introspective psychology. German Idealism
seeks a unity outside of individual and personal inflections of truth; the gnoseological
subject requires a universal truth that would be true in any context for any thinking being
what-so-ever—a subjectless transcendental field. In contrast, Dostoevsky sought to show
the relation between the idea and simultaneous inflections of it by individual
consciousnesses, through whom the supposed ideal truth is inflected in a movement
between a “pro and contra” with a double-voiced logic.498 In Saussurean terms we might
call this the synchronic aspect of the polyphonic novel. However, Dostoevsky wanted to
show the future life of the idea as it extended—still dialogically—from its current
historical epoch into future. To likewise call this the diachronic aspect would be
somewhat misleading, however, since Dostoevsky is all simultaneity, even as regards the
future. The possible future worlds he heard within the idea still emphasized how the idea
was inflected in the present. In this way, the life of the idea could be shown in its
perpetual re-appropriation by individual consciousnesses within their personal-historical
situation without ever coming to rest in one avatar or finalized embodiment.
In the polyphonic novel, all relationships between personalities, and between
individual personalities and an idea, are essentially dialogical, and only those relations
that are understood as merely mechanical are truly monological—that is, those relations
which are merely externally related to one another and do not affect any immanent
change within the personalities or events of the novel499: “one could say that for
Dostoevsky everything in life [is] dialogue, that is, dialogic opposition.”500 Unlike
monological novels in which the author conflates his own idea with that of the hero and
makes of the personality a mere mouthpiece of the author’s dominant theme,
Dostoevsky’s particular brand of realism attempts to show life from the perspective of his
heroes themselves. The hero’s self-understanding is more important than ‘getting it right’
in terms of a moral or philosophical/rational idea. The hero interests Dostoevsky as a
particular point of view on the world, and not as the spokesman of the author’s ready-
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made agenda: “What is important to Dostoevsky is not how his hero appears in the world
but first and foremost how the world appears to his hero, and how the hero appears to
himself ... ultimately the hero’s final word on himself and on his world.”501 The author
must therefore cut the “umbilical cord” between himself and the hero, and must stand
outside him as one more consciousness among many with no privileged perspective.502 If
the author is unable or unwilling to achieve this distance then the realistic aspect of the
work suffers and the novel takes on a univocal manifesto-like quality in which realistic
personalities are not given the opportunity to speak for themselves. In the
homophonous—single voiced—novel there is no objective distance from the hero; the
author presumes to stand over and above his hero and assumes an ostensibly objective
and God’s-eye view over the novelistic universe. Contrariwise, the polyphonic novel
portrays the hero not according to “who” or what he is, but in line with how he
understands himself and his relation both to the idea and to others.503 Heroic selfconsciousness is therefore the “artistic dominant” the dominanta in Dostoevsky.504

6.2

Heroic Self-Consciousness

Since we have no absolute authoritarian position from which to view the hero under these
polyphonic conditions, what becomes important is the vocal evidence presented to us by
the personalities of the text. Instead of finding out the elements of the hero’s biography
or what it is like to know him definitively, we are given voiceprints, confessions,
testimonies from the hero and those who know him, editorials and journal articles written
in the hero’s hand, memories, dreams, fears, and all of these are given first and foremost
by way of the utterance.505 In the polyphonic novel the truth is perspectival, polyvocal,
and determined according to what the personalities say about themselves; once again, no
neutrality is possible:
the ‘truth’ at which the hero must and indeed ultimately does arrive through
clarifying the events to himself, can essentially be for Dostoevsky only the truth of
the hero’s own consciousness. It cannot be neutral toward his self-consciousness.
In the mouth of another person, a word or a definition identical in content would
take on another meaning and tone, and would no longer be truth. Only in the form
of a confessional self-utterance, Dostoevsky maintained, could the final word
about a person be given, a word truly adequate to him.506
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According to Bakhtin, Tolstoy’s stories do not broach this kind of truth. Even where
characters are “ethically unfinalizable” we nevertheless know them so completely that we
could never mistake them for actual personalities. The truth is everywhere determined by
the author’s message. We get the sense that they could not hide anything from us or from
the omniscience of the author. Tolstoy’s characters are simply unable to achieve a real
autonomy. They are ready-made in the sense that they always serve the ends of the
narrative and never serve their own implicit ends; neither are they capable of
circumventing the larger blueprint of the novel. In his short story “The Overcoat”, Gogol
caricatured Devushkin as Akaky Akakievich, the “little man” who cannot change—not
even in death.507 Bakhtin explains that it was this static and inept quality of Akakievich
that raised Devushkin’s person ire. What really offended him was the character’s
finalizability and inability to speak for himself. What offends Bakhtin’s sensibilities is
the reduction of the personality, with all its contradictions, to the voiceless automaton
created simply to serve its master—namely, the author; for Bakhtin there is something
false in this kind of reduction: “In a human being there is always something that only he
himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does
not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition.”508
Representing mere characters in this way—i.e., without a real personality—
denies the author the ability to truly bring them to life. Even if some aspect of these
characters is true to flesh and blood reality in general—for example, Ivan Ilych’s
hypochondria as symptomatic of his superficial relationship with the world, in the end
these aspects either serve the author’s pre-established system or have the flavour of a
blemish on the purported artistic purpose. As such, the artistic dominant in the
homophonic novel by-passes self-consciousness as the primary mode of revealing
character; it surreptitiously betrays the personality by subjugating it to the all-knowing
“high-altitude thought” of the author Pantocrator.509 In a sense, how they see themselves
can only achieve a secondary and tangential importance. The homophony of these novels
takes on the reductive and solipsistic character of the modern cult of Cartesianism.
Characterological representation never ascends to the level of the real life experience and
the free action of other embodied subjects. Yet, “man is not a final and defined quantity
upon which firm calculations can be made; man is free, and can therefore violate any
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regulating norms which might be thrust upon him” even by the supposedly omniscient
author.510 To speak for the person, to interfere with his autonomous sovereign power to
speak for himself, one attempts to define him “from above.”511 Between the monologue
and the dialogue there are in effect two logics of sovereignty at work. On the one side,
the monologue, a hyper-cognitive embodied subjectivity is displaced in favour of what
Michael Gardiner calls the “irrefutable system of crystalline logic and conceptual rigour”
of Cartesian rationalism, in which the cogito splays out the embodied world and reduces
it to the singular ideological value of knowledge.512 Gardiner paints us a picture:
“Accordingly, the world lies prostrate before this omniscient subject’s preview, like the
captured booty and slaves paraded triumphantly before a victorious warrior-potentate.”513
On the other side exists the respected sovereignty of the self-conscious subject qua other,
whose autonomy is equal with those of all other characters and the author himself, just as
in everyday life the subject appears among a multitude of other subjects and is not
solipsistically left alone at sea with only himself as company.
The difference between the dogmatic or authorial representation of dialogue that
is ready-made and reducible to the author’s solipsistic vision and that of the true dialogue
in Dostoevsky’s work, according to Bakhtin, is that the former is the mere image of a
dialogue, while the latter is a real dialogue with actual conflicts and moments of
intractable disagreement; as a result, Dostoevsky legitimately grants to its hero an
autonomous life that testifies on her own behalf: “the author speaks not about a character,
but with him.”514 As we saw in Section Two, the transgredience or outsideness of the
subject must not attempt to achieve a co-extensive life with the other. Under such
circumstances the subiectum could never provide an ethical answer for the other’s life
from outside and therefore could not consummate that life. The same situation occurs in
verbal art. If the novel is to represent actual life and not simply deploy the philosophical
message of the author, then the lives of each of the characters must maintain their proper
weight. The author’s voice ought not to fuse with the heroic voice, “not swallow it up,
not dissolve in itself the other’s power to mean.”515
In this situation, the personality is in no way transparent to either the reader or the
author, and indeed the hero can hide his deepest darkest secrets and even misrepresent
himself throughout the course of the novel. Raskolnikov, for example, provides a
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rationalization for his murderous actions in a newspaper article, but the article is
published, as it were, off stage, “before the action of the novel beings.”516 Moreover, just
as in life, the personalities of Dostoevsky’s poetics are not even fully transparent to
themselves. They exhibit something akin to what Antonio Gramsci called “contradictory
consciousness” in which one consciousness is indeed legion517:
the consciousness of the solitary Raskolnikov becomes a field of battle for others’
voices; the events of recent days (his mother’s letter, the meeting with
Marmeladov), reflected in his consciousness, take on the form of a most intense
dialogue with absentee participants (his sister, his mother, Sonya, and others), and
in this dialogue he tries to “get his thoughts straight.”518
At no time, therefore, is the self-determination of the heroic consciousness co-extensive
either with the author or with itself. It is portrayed as a slice of consciousness taken
simultaneously within a milieu of other convergent and divergent consciousnesses in
becoming.
None of what we have said regarding the self-conscious autonomy of the hero is
meant to imply that he exists independently of the work itself—i.e., as if the hero could
actually write himself into existence or could compose his own story. As we saw in the
previous section, the Circle’s tripartite structure of discourse in art—vis-à-vis the author,
hero, and reader, asserts itself within the textual and semiotic plane of consistency and not
in real life. It nevertheless retains a fundamental relation with real life—i.e., partially
maps onto the speaker, apostrophe, and listener, but again discourse in art cannot be
reduced to this ground as a mere textual repetition of actual—non-textual—existence:
we must warn against one possible misunderstanding. It might seem that the
independence of a character contradicts the fact that he exists, entirely and solely,
as an aspect of the work of art, and consequently is wholly created from beginning
to end by the author. In fact there is no such contradiction. The characters’
freedom we speak of here exists within the limits of the artistic design, and in that
sense is just as much a created thing as is the unfreedom of the objectivised
hero.519
In the next section we will see how human beings have defined themselves over the last
two millennia first according to the image of God and later according to the image of
‘man.’ In the verbal work of art the hero takes shape adjacent to the wholly textual image
of the author, and in Dostoevsky most frequently according to the image of the idea. We
repeat, the hero takes shape adjacent to the image of the author and not fused with the
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authorial intent or thesis statement. As far as it goes, this was the writer N. G.
Chernyshevsky’s notion of authorship. He is almost correct, according to Bakhtin, but
authorship is itself not a merely negative support on which the characters become selfaware. The author-image is itself involved dialogically with the text; the author enters as
a voice within the polyphony of the truly multi-voiced novel. Here a pattern is emerging
for us in the Circle’s corpus—within each polarized proposition there is a second pole
that struggles to be heard. In this case, the wholly negative image of the author hides the
bi-polarity of authorship. As such, Chernyshevsky’s proposition is not wholly
monological but neither does it achieve a fully polyphonic status, since for
Chernyschevsky the author is merely the negative tabula rasa on which the text is
written. His poetics represent a middle ground between the older image of the author
Pantocrator who does not enter the text himself and the truly polyphonic novel in which
both author and hero enter and dialogue as equals.
It is not enough for the author to refuse to fuse his perspective with the hero’s
into a dialectical synthesis of oppositions. The author must not only let his characters
speak of their own accord as unfinalized open and embodied wholes, he must also
“actively broad[en]... his consciousness” in order to communicate directly with his
hero.520 Rather than to stand over novelistic personalities from above by assuming the
God-like status of the artistic creator, and rather than pretending to absolute passivity, the
writer actively shapes his material by selecting what is important, by deciding what to
leave in and to leave out. As such the author’s own voice does enter the text to a limited
degree, but again he nowhere attempts to subordinate the hero’s perspective to his own.
The polyphonic artist is not the dogmatic artist. This is easy enough to see, but we must
not mistake him for the artist of pure relativity either.521 Just as every voice is given its
proper weight—and therefore its proper autonomy, the author also respects his own voice,
which must not be simply brushed aside as one more arbitrary position. No ideologically
unique voice in the polyphonic novel is to be regarded as merely relative—quite to the
contrary, every voice is a monologically authoritative voice which asserts its essential
correctness. What makes the polyphonic novel—as a whole—dialogical, is both that no
voice can be simply annulled and neither can it achieve supremacy. The so-called “great
dialogue” in the novel depends upon this struggle of competing voices, at times over-
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lapping and at times opposing the wills of the author and hero. Bakhtin provides the
counter-example of Tolstoy’s “Three Deaths.” In this story the author compares the death
of “a rich noble-woman, of a coachman, and of a tree,” but he does so from outside of
their worlds, without ever entering into them and thus achieving an immanent position
with which to dialogue with these characters; they are not allowed the possibility of
resisting or testifying against his authorial vision, since they never meet and dialogue with
the author himself.522 He unites their deaths within his vision, but the characters only
mechanically relate to each other—i.e., their relations are merely external to one another;
they never co-exist on a plane in which they could enter into dialogue. As such, Tolstoy’s
homophonous story unfolds from beginning to end according to a preconceived idea. At
no time is the “counterpoint” operative; at no time is the free act of creation within the
present moment of composition expressed.523 Homophony renders the novel a merely
ready-made formulation of the author’s vision, which remains dominant—“all else being
merely objects of its cognition.”524
The situation of the “Three Deaths” would have been essentially different if
Dostoevsky had composed it, according to M. M. Bakhtin. While the author, as
organiser, retains some element of transgredient excessive sight, he would not have
mechanically parsed out the worlds of the coachman, the noble-woman and the tree
completely. The three worlds would come into a proximity in which they could mutually
refract each world dialogically: “He would have arranged a face-to-face confrontation
between the truth of the noble-woman and the truth of the coachman.”525 Thus
argumentation and struggle between their competing voices would be heard—only
through such argument could polyphony and “echoes of the great dialogue” come into
play.526 However, death does not provide a suitable ground in which a living dialogue
may occur. It is the struggle, the “turning points,” the “thresholds” of life which present
the spaces in which dialogue can come to fruition, and not in the closed pre-established
harmony of the authorial vision.527 Naturally, Dostoevsky’s author does obtain a surplus
of vision, but this surplus restricts itself to the facts “necessary to carry forward the
story”; authorial transgredience “enters on an equal footing” with the other characters in
the novel.528
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6.3

The Idea in Dostoevsky

In the literary work of art, Idealism tends to utilize the idea in three main ways. First, the
idea becomes the Ürprinzip through which the entirety of the represented world takes its
shape; the world takes on a singular tonality. Second, he idea can therefore be deduced
from the material that has been represented—i.e., it can be torn out of the reality or
extrapolated from the various motifs of the novel, which themselves become a mere
secondary vehicle of their conveyance. Third, the protagonist or “main hero” becomes
the mere mouth-piece of the absolute idea; he is nothing more or less than its
personification.529 However, these three pathways to the idea do not have to be absolute,
but so long as the text is monological any deviation or contradictory voice will not
establish itself as anything more than an error or flaw in the artistic edifice: “Idealism
recognizes only one principle of cognitive individualization: error. True judgements are
not attached to a personality, but correspond to some unified, systemically monological
context. From the point of view of idealism, only error individualizes.”530 When the hero
is conceived of as only advancing the ideological tenor of the author, the plot suffers; it is
treated as interchangeable with any given number of alternate plots. In this situation plot
is perceived as “merely accidental.”531 Romanticism takes this view of plot; the situation,
the chronotope—i.e., the perceived space-time of the novel—is uniform and empty and
serves only to advance the author’s idea. Even here the character often maintains an
individual personality, but he can be found stating a thesis of the author or the singular
idea of the work that is quite alien to this personality. This singular intonation of the
monological work of literature is “expressed directly, without distance”; the
homophonous source of the work, even where it truly sets the narrative world in motion,
reduces all differences to an occasion for the negation of all dissent voices532: “within the
bounds of that monologic world shaped by [authorial ideas], someone else’s idea cannot
be represented. It is either assimilated, or polemically repudiated, or ceases to be an
idea.”533
According to B. M. Engelhardt’s essay “Dostoevsky’s Ideological Novel”, the
hero of Dostoevsky’s novels is the idea itself.534 Strictly speaking, however, this is not
the case. According to Bakhtin the idea for-itself does not exist in Dostoevsky. Ideology
is always embodied within the personality of the hero and cannot be torn away from him.
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The converse is also true: the “person is born of that idea.”535 The two are wed
inseparably to one another and wedded unto death. But until death occurs, of course,
neither the life of the “‘man in man’” nor the life of the image of the idea can be
finalized.536 But this does not mean the idea and the hero wholly map onto one another;
the idea is not merely the cookie-cutter shape of the personality of the individual hero.
Instead of conditioning the hero absolutely according to the idea or vice-versa, the two
exist in a relationship with one another. The hero pursues his idea throughout the novel,
trying to understand it, and the idea likewise actively changes the hero:
Dostoevsky’s ideology knows neither the separate thought nor systemic unity in
this sense. For him the ultimate indivisible unit is not the separate referentially
bounded thought, not the proposition, not the assertion, but rather the integral
point of view, the integral position of a personality. For him, the referential
meaning is indissolubly fused with the position of a personality. In every thought
the personality is given, as it were, in its totality. And thus the linking-up of
thoughts is the linking-up of integral positions, the linking-up of personalities.537
Personalities and ideas are united in a dialectical relationship, but one that finds no
synthetic moment. At heart, the hero remains unfinished; he is set out as a task for the
author.
In his pursuit of the idea, the hero in Dostoevsky’s novels attempts to live beyond
himself in some sense; he cannot be enclosed even by the ideas he purports to belong to
in taking them as his guiding principle—as his most essential characteristic and as that
tenet which he holds most dear. Without this dialogic overlapping non-coincidence of
idea and hero there is no real danger that the hero will fail to live up to the task his idea
has set out for him. In other words, he will not be human. If Alyosha pursues virtue, it is
only to find that he will disappoint himself and remain human and irreducibly other than
his ideal self, which can never be finalized or arrived at. He will pursue this ideal self
unto death in a dialogical struggle and without ever achieving the all-elusive synthesis
between his particularity and the image of the idea that floats above him just beyond his
reach:
It is given to all of Dostoevsky’s characters to “think and seek higher things”; in
each of them there is a “great and unresolved thought”; all of them must, before
all else, “get a thought straight.” And in this resolution of a thought (an idea) lies
their entire real life and their own personal unfinalizability. If one were to think
away the idea in which they live, their image would be totally destroyed. In other
words, the image of the hero is inseparably linked with the image of an idea and
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cannot be detached from it. We see the hero in the idea and through the idea, and
we see the idea in him and through him.538
In this marriage the hero sacrifices himself to the pursuit of the idea and the idea remains
conditioned through the particular life circumstances and utterances of the hero. Bakhtin
calls even the most atrocious deed—Raskolnikov’s murder of the pawnbroker—a wholly
“unselfish” act.539 His crime can only be understood as unselfish if we subordinate this
atrocity to Raskolnikov’s unwavering devotion to the idea that even the most heinous act
is permissible—i.e., if we always have before us his self-sacrificial commitment to
nihilism: “We repeat again: what is important is not the ordinary qualifications of a
person’s character or actions, but rather the index of a person’s devotion to an idea in the
deepest recesses of his personality.”540
Ideas do not exist in a vacuum and there is no one absolute Platonic Idea of Ideas
in Dostoevsky.541 Unlike the bourgeois subjectivist spirit of isolation or the liberal
feeling that the individual is sufficient unto himself—that is, so long as he is provided the
basic infrastructure to achieve the necessities of life, the idea in Dostoevsky exists only
by dint of its dialogic interaction with other ideas. In this way ideas are born, struggle
with one another, comingle, give birth to yet new ideas, grow, ripen, weary, rot, die, and
are reborn. In short, they live their lives within a quarrelling and cooperative
environment among allies and enemy ideas alike. Ideas cannot be wholly subsumed
within an individual knowing consciousness; they are “intersubjective” and as such, they
have an event-like quality toward which individual consciousnesses flock to struggle over
their meaning. Just as linguistic sense seems to have a life of its own, and just as the
event requires an answer from the ethically active subject, the idea calls to the various
Dostoevskian personalities to be heard, embodied, and ideologically inflected from
various perspectives:
The idea is a live event, played out at the point of dialogic meeting between two or
several consciousnesses. In this sense the idea is similar to the word, with which
it is dialogically united. Like the word, the idea wants to be heard, understood,
and “answered” by other voices from other positions. Like the word, the idea is
by nature dialogic, and monologue is merely the conventional compositional form
of its expression, a form that emerged out of the ideological monologism of
modern times.542
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Bakhtin therefore links the idea, specifically as it is enframed within the great dialogue
between consciousnesses, to the greater edifice of both his translinguistics and the
architectonics of answerability. As such, the idea, like the event, requires an answer from
the ethically active semantic person. We have said that a personality both knows himself
through the idea and the idea through the personality—they are wed, but this is not to say
that the semantic person is reducible to the idea he pursues nor the idea to the person.
Such a monological conflation of the two would stop all movement in Dostoevsky’s texts;
it would set out in advance the answer for the event as it arises in the present living and
creative context. The monological conflation of the author and hero performs this
reduction of the embodied person to the mere image of the idea. That is why the
monological text provides the key to all its secrets ab ovo. It gives us the formula to the
novel’s blueprint at the outset. It is only by providing a multiplicity of incomplete
inflections that the reader receives an image of the idea as it exists as a living dialogue
that spans over a whole “epoch” and makes a forward and backward reference to other
epochs.543 It is only because the idea cannot be reduced to one consciousness or one
historical period that it can achieve the weight of its historicity. The reduction to a
synthesis or even to the so-called life of the Hegelian Spirit would, ironically perhaps,
negate this very conflict that brings it to life and that raises it as a question for
consciousness in the first place. The dialogic life of the idea can only exist between
consciousnesses and between these voices which struggle to reduce it—to tame its feral
existence—to an easily handled and inevitably “easily refuted” state.544
The idea of ‘Dostoevsky’ himself—as an author-image—is therefore something
that we must continue to struggle over. As an author he equally exists for us as a ‘hero’
or apostrophe which we address but cannot wholly tame. As such, Bakhtin has built into
his Problems a dialogic self-critical stance, for ‘Bakhtin’ is also an author-image.
The primary thesis in Problems is that Dostoevsky could hear the dialogic conflict
over the ideas of his age, and within this conflict he could likewise hear the genealogical
life of this struggle stretching backward and forward in history. Dostoevsky bore witness
to the ground being prepared for their future life; he had no interest in creating ideas from
scratch, but listened for them in this intersubjective ground. The wholly personal idea is

140
short lived. Ideas are conveyed across generations and are pulled and stretched within
different and often opposed ideological and socioeconomic milieus.
Let us look at the example of the European idea of nihilism and show how it is
ideologically inflected into opposite polarities and yet remains the same idea. We will
take Ivan Karamazov’s inflection of the idea that “infamy must be and is permitted.”545
Ivan’s nihilistic idea of absolute permissibility prepares the ground for his future act over
the course of the novel, but we also witness it in the Second World War and in Hitler’s
‘final solution’ as Arendt reminds us. Arendt explains that where not even the
Fürhrerprinzip could bind certain members of the upper echelons of the Nazi party under
a common cause, they where nevertheless bound by the idea that had been born in
European nihilism:
the loyalty of those who believe neither in ideological clichés nor in the
infallibility of the Leader also has deeper, nontechnical reasons. What binds these
men together is a firm and sincere belief in human omnipotence. Their moral
cynicism, their belief that everything is permitted, rests on the solid conviction
that everything is possible. It is true that these men, few in number, are not easily
caught in their own specific lies and that they do not necessarily believe in racism
or economics, in the conspiracy of the Jews or of Wall Street.546
The particular inflection of the idea, insomuch as we take Arendt’s thesis to be correct—
and this is itself contestable—is markedly different from Ivan’s. For those of Hitler’s
inner circle who did not believe in his personal infallibility still believed that they could
expunge substance itself through the absolute will of the over-man—who was above all
morality. Contrariwise, for Ivan the very possibility of the ‘man in man’ can only be
understood if everything is permitted, since only thereby could a space open up for his
ability to know good and evil, and without this knowledge no morality could exist.
Therefore the same idea—that everything is permitted—is inflected to into opposing
polarities: “Do you understand why this infamy must be and is permitted? Without it, I
am told, man could not have existed on earth, for he could not have known good and evil.
Why should he know that diabolical good and evil when it costs so much?”547
I have stated that Dostoevsky’s special talent in Bakhtin’s eyes was that of
hearing voices in the personalities of his characters; however, it would be more exacting
to say, in choral support with Bakhtin, that Dostoevsky heard “the dialogic relationship
among voices, their dialogic interaction.”548 The artistic material of The Brothers
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Karamazov or Crime and Punishment or The Possessed is not fabricated from the
author’s mind, as we have typically come to understand the image of the author
Pantocrator under the myth of the artist-genius. To no small degree, Dostoevsky
possessed the ability to step outside himself and incorporate the real political and social
matter that surrounded him—what Bakhtin calls the prototypical idea-images in human
history.549 Where this material was monologically inflected he also expanded it to fit into
the great dialogue of human history; he had the ability to step aside and allow the great
dialogue to express itself—without assuming that he could or should dismiss the
importance of his own voice as author. In this way, the image of the idea as it appears in
Dostoyevsky’s polyphonic novels does not evolve into the typically monological ideal
type often found in philosophic and scholarly works.550 In fact, “there is no evolution, no
growth” of the idea at all.551 While it is true that ideas have a life of their own, they only
appear to change as they are inflected through various consciousnesses. Insomuch as they
are open and not fully conditioned, they will of course appear to evolve, but they
themselves do not actually change as if they could exist wholly independent, as objects,
outside of individual consciousnesses. On the contrary, like the once-occurrent event,
they themselves do not change but are struggled over hermeneutically within the
biographical lives of personalities. From the point of view of a single consciousness, the
idea is monological. It is only when it is torn out of its static and univocal point of view
and placed outside itself between voices that it can be perceived as dialogical. The great
achievement of the polyphonic novel is that it shows the dialogical flexibility of the idea
where the basic intentional relation between an individual consciousness and the idea
cannot.
The world represented in Dostoevsky’s multiple ideological mosh pit is therefore
not systematic. Against the current of typical systematic ideology, the polyphonic novel
places the litmus of veridicality back at home in the person to whom it is attached and
inflected. Logic of the Hegelian sort runs in the opposite direction—and we might add
Plato and Husserl’s Ideas to this species. There the truth belongs to no one and is not
perspectival. In order to circumvent psychologism, Husserl was forced to define truth as
universal and outside the influence of particular inflections, even if the manifold of
relations must enter into an individual consciousness. The whole point of the
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phenomenological reduction is to ground meaning in the absolute truth of a unified set of
relations. Dostoevsky does not approach these types of unities at all. His world is
unapologetically messy. But his idea does not seek to ground itself in an atemporal aspatial no-man’s land.552
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§ 7.

Chronotopicity: Bakhtin’s Writings on Rabelais and Goethe

7.1

Seeing Auras:
Bakhtin’s Concept of Chronotopicity
“There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends
into the boundless past and the boundless future). Even past meanings, that is, those born in the
dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all)—they will always
change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future development of the dialogue. At any
moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten
contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue’s subsequent development along the
way they are recalled and invigorated in renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely
dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival. The problem of great time.”
—Bakhtin553
“Death is swallowed up in victory.” “O Death, where is your sting? O Hades, where is your
victory?”
—The Apostle Paul554
“Everyone treats death as an important matter: but as yet death is not a festival.”
—Nietzsche555

In this, the last section of our little survey of Bakhtin, I want to explore the theme of
chronotopicity as it is applied to François Rabelais and Johann Wolfgang Goethe. I will
begin by saying a few words regarding the development of Bakhtin’s notion of the
chronotope, its derivation, and its context within the wider cultural and philosophical
milieu with which Bakhtin is in dialogue. In this section I will make the case for why the
major works on both chronotopicity and novelistic genres exhibit a continuity in
Bakhtin’s oeuvre as well as where his theory of both are lacking—with respect to
distinctly modern forms of time and chronotope. The major essays with which one must
struggle to gain insight into the concept of chronotopicity are “Forms of Time and
Chronotope in the Novel”, “The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the History of
Realism (Toward a Historical Typology of the Novel”, and certain thematic trends in
Rabelais and his World. I will then review the major forms of chronotope in the novel
which Bakhtin himself explores in the first two of these works. This done, I will explore
what I see as the central chronotopic theme in Rabelais and his World which is by no
means overtly stated therein. In doing so I will tie together what is essentially a
genealogical account of the shifting understanding of time and space between the
Medieval and the Renaissance world—this account is dispersed throughout the Rabelais
book. The shift occurs, as we will see, according to the fracturing of the rigid hierarchical

144
great chain of being which we have already begun to discuss as it emerged out of neoPlatonism.556 This exegesis will serve two purposes. First, it will undercut Caryl
Emerson and Gary Saul Morson’s supposition that the carnivalesque and chronotopicity
are nearly mutually exclusive concepts. This is not the case. In fact, the Rabelaisian
chronotope depends upon the horizontalization of hierarchical structures; this
horizontalization could also be called the historicization of Medieval culture which takes
place during the Renaissance—but which has its roots in the unofficial folk-festive
chronotopes that date back to at least a millennium before the dawn of modern ‘man’;
Bakhtin provides us with a thematic but compelling narrative of a human reawakening to
the positive function of time and becoming during the Renaissance. Finally, I will pass
from the Rabelaisian chronotope to the image of time and space as it is taken up during
the Romantic period by Goethe. Let me say at the outset that Goethe’s chronotope is by
no means wholly Romantic, however, and in many ways it resists the conflation of the
individual and bourgeois image of ‘man’ that emerges in that epoch. I will somewhat
tangentially provide an account of Goethe’s relation to carnival as it appears in his Italian
Journey.
Bakhtin shares Kant’s belief that time and space are crucial to cognitive processes, but he
moves away from Kant’s supposition that they are merely empty formal conditions of
experience.557 Furthermore, Bakhtin makes no secret of his reliance on Einstein’s theory
of relativity, but the latter’s theory of time and space is invoked more than it has any
methodological or performative influence on Bakhtin’s usage of the term chronotopicity.
He picked it up, no doubt, on the occasion of the Ukhtomsky lecture that he and Kanaëv
had attended. Loosely following Einstein’s theory of relativity, chronotopicity was
defined by Ukhtomsky as “the perceptions of intervals of time and space,” and therefore
we may see at once both the importance of the Kantian Copernican turn and the 20th
century addition by Einstein, who makes time-space relative to perception. 558
As is true elsewhere, we can confirm that Kant looms large in the background of
his theory of the chronotope in that Bakhtin wishes to distance himself from the merely
epistemic basis for Kantian and neo-Kantian apposition and temporality. Kant radicalized
time and space after Newton, who treated them as absolute and empty forms outside of
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‘man.’ Kant rejected any talk of time and space from the vantage point of the things-inthemselves, and instead makes of time and space empty forms of intuition which in turn
make possible synthetic a priori perception of objects.559 As transcendental conditions,
however, they remained unconditioned and outside the categories of the understanding—
hence this special restriction of time and space to forms of intuition. Kant’s account,
however, is merely an epistemological critique of the extent to which time and space are
presupposed by our experience of objects. As such, the Kantian Critical notions of time
and space are nothing more than the “gnoseological subject” thinking time and thinking
space; they are not lived space-time itself.560
In a seemingly surreptitious comment, now infamous among scholars, Bakhtin
states that he has borrowed Einstein’s Theory of Relativity “almost as a metaphor
(almost, but not entirely).”561 As to what degree Bakhtin truly meant it as metaphor we
will leave to one side. He says that he utilises the term as a literary-theoretical device and
although we may presume he was familiar with Einstein’s General and Special Theories,
he makes no direct use of them. Nevertheless, Emerson and Morson note five points of
intersection between Einstein’s theory of time-space and Bakhtin’s chronotopicity.
First of all, time-space connotes an irreducible whole.562
Second, there are multiplicities of time-space, and we “must entertain the
possibility, or consider the necessity, of choosing among available ones or discovering
new ones.”563 Morson and Emerson point to Lobachevsky’s thesis that space has multiple
possible autonomous logics and the Euclidian “cannot be assumed in advance.”564 We
ought to think about time-space as a unity but with a multiplicity of virtual—i.e.,
possible—actualizations that cannot be determined beforehand or deduced apodictically.
Morson and Emerson also point to what Bakhtin calls the “Galilean chronotope
consciousness.”565 The reference is not given but they seem to be referring to the socalled “Galilean linguistics consciousness,”566 which is a polyphonous linguistics that
relativizes discourse to its particular “double-voicedness” and seeks to give an account for
it in its “living and evolving” dynamism. If Morson and Emerson did misspeak it has
nevertheless been a productive parapraxis, since it emphasizes the special theory of the
chronotope which relates to Bakhtin’s theory of discourse in the novel. In any case,
Bakhtin chooses to focus on the age old trope surrounding the epochal change effected by
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Galileo. Galileo’s celestial discoveries and the Copernican heliocentric model of the
universe led to the displacement of ‘man’ from what was hitherto his cosmic centrality in
creation. Here the idea of a point of view, or perspective, casts doubt on the divinely
fixed order of nature and of ‘man’s’ place in it. Reflexively this new order of nature will
further complicate the Renaissance and modern image of ‘man,’ and we will return to this
theme below. Third, Morson and Emerson point out that we can assume a special
organization of the chronotope centred around the body of each individual; and by this we
mean bodies and individuals in general and not only the bodies of human individuals.
These bodies may include but are not limited to molecular bodies, social organizations
and institutions, individual persons, texts, utterances, extraverbal phenomena, and so
forth.567 In the concept of the chronotope Bakhtin links certain types of the novel—as a
body of literature—with the specific genres and thematic content that lends to it its
specific sense of space-time. Buy these genres are themselves treated as irreducible
bodies around which space-time is uniquely structured.
Fourth, the chronotope is a diachronic concept and is in flux. Later ameliorations
to the Newtonian chronotope as expressed in celestial mechanics, for example, can stretch
and change the chronotope without breaking it; for example, specialists can work
antagonistically but recognizably as Newtonians within Newtonian physics.
Nevertheless, Kant’s a priori intuited time and space as pure “sequence” and “apposition”
which have a wholly transcendental character would necessitate a chronotope of its own
that is essentially different from the Newtonian.568 Likewise Galileo and Einstein would
have their own distinct time-space perspective.569
Finally, the focus of Bakhtin’s conceptualization of chronotopicity may not be
transcendental, as in Kant, but the chronotope is presupposed by all experience
nonetheless. Time-space is not an object of experience but is a condition of its
possibility. The chronotope could be understood as a transcendental category in the sense
that it opens up all possibility of experience, but it is nevertheless relative in that each
particular chronotope is subject to contextualized ideological inflections and a historically
conditioned faculty of perception. To be more precise, there is no chronotope—singular;
there are only chronotopes. Insomuch as they implicate a particular socio-historical
space-time, chronotopes are essential to axiological intonation.570
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Central to both Bakhtin’s theory of discourse and chronotopicity in the novel is
the image of ‘man’ which a particular motif embodies.571 In fact, all images can become
saturated with “chronotopic motifs”; they can carry an “aura”—the gothic castle is an
example.572 Yet even though the chronotope plays a large role in the background, and
even though the notion of chronotopicity informed Bakhtin’s thought at least since the
Ukhtomsky lecture, Morson and Emerson believe the carnival theory of the novel often
contradicts chronotopicity; nevertheless, they find the discourse and chronotopic theories
of the novel to be largely in accord.573 They seem to want to reduce one theory to the
other instead of setting them in dialogue. It is not clear that they understand that the
Rabelaisian chronotope envelopes the carnivalesque—that is, carnival is essential to the
Rabelaisian chronotope. For example, the much-discussed image of the “pregnant death”
ties together the historical past and future in the present.574 This grotesque image
therefore requires a certain historically conditioned perspective regarding time-space. As
such, it hardly seems possible that the theories of chronotopicity and carnival could be
mutually exclusive. Morson and Emerson’s ambitious critical work tends toward a
hyper-rationalized account of Bakhtin’s work in which all the pieces are supposed to fit
smoothly in place. This approach is impossible for a thinker like Bakhtin, who is really
more of a cultural theorist and scholar than a ‘critical’ philosopher—in spite of his early
flirtations with Kant.
The image of a pregnant death returns in highly complex way in Bakhtin’s work
on Dostoevsky. Here there is another explicit connection with a life and death series
directly associated with temporality and space. In fact, it is tempting to see the
complexity of the life-death series in Crime and Punishment raised to a higher level than
is seen in Rabelais; Raskolnikov’s crisis of existential inaction seems to point to a folding
over of the grotesque image of the pregnant death on itself. That is to say, whereas
Rabelais ‘gives it to us straight,’ Dostoevsky adds another layer of complexity. His
images—where there are any at all—are incomplete and rely on what is said or thought
by the personalities in the novel. Although suffocating, Raskolnikov’s room opens onto
the world and is the very opposite of à huis clos scenes in other existentialist works—
Sartre being the primary example, of course. Consider what Bakhtin says: “Raskolnikov
lives, in essence, on a threshold: his narrow room, a ‘coffin’ (a carnival symbol here)
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opens directly onto the landing of the staircase, and he never locks his door.”575 Here he
stifles himself in an open room. He broods and deliberates. His inaction weighs on him
like death. But the specifically carnivalesque invocation of the coffin suggests to us that
this death is also an incubation of life. How can this be? We know that what he is
waiting for is the transubstantiation of his spiritual struggle into the murder of the
pawnbroker. The life that gestates in this room, therefore, is a death. So long as he is
suspended by inactivity in his coffin/room he carries the symbol of death within himself.
When he finally actualizes this symbolic death it is as if he is giving birth to death.
If we regard the threshold between the life-death series in terms of this bi-polar
double-voiced carnivalesque image, the positive polarity of Raskolnikov’s delay
immediately emerges. During the long slow movement of Raskolnikov’s deliberation
regarding the brutal murder he will commit, we implicitly understand that time is
everywhere marked by a plenistic delay and threshold space which must be traversed. As
a result, the threshold images play an essential role in Crime and Punishment:
The threshold, the foyer, the corridor, the landing, the stairway, its steps, doors
opening onto the stairway, gates to front and back yards, and beyond these, the
city: squares, streets, façade, taverns, dens, bridges, gutters. This is the space of
the novel. And in fact absolutely nothing here ever loses touch with the threshold
... we can uncover just such an organization of space in Dostoevsky’s other works
as well.576
The trope of the threshold leaves the reader suspended to tarry on that which is always
about to happen. As such, it is intimately associated with positive delay—i.e., a time
which must be traversed and which actively incubates death. Once again, we can see no
reason why Morson and Emerson indict Bakhtin for having contradictory allegiances to
the notions of the carnivalesque and the chronotope; in-themselves, these notions are
simply not contradictory.
In terms of the speech genre, Bakhtin calls the invocation of an entire genre by the
use of a single evaluative word the “stylistic aura” which surrounds the word.577 By
analogy we would say that the chronotopic motif—here the threshold—invokes an entire
chronotopic organization. The motif of the public square, the façade, the doorway, and in
particular this coffin-like room in which Raskolnikov procrastinates, all auratically
conjure this chronotopic sense of delayed time and threshold space.578

149
Michael Gardiner reminds us that the idea of the aura in Bakhtin is reminiscent of
Benjamin’s similar concept; there the aura is described as the irrefutable sense that is
carried by a “presence in the here and now.”579 Strictly speaking, the aura is more limited
in Benjamin. The filmic genre, for example, cannot carry an aura of the actor or character
on screen.580 Here we begin to perceive Bakhtin’s noteworthy silence regarding
specifically modern chronotopes and genres; again, this omission has been drawn out in
Gardiner’s The Dialogics of Critique, and very interestingly for us, bears some
connection to “Benjamin’s account of the demise of ‘aura’ in the modern world.”581 If we
take an example from fin-de-siècle stage-craft, the difference between aura-less film and
auratic stage presence is akin to the different experiences one would have at watching
Sarah Bernhardt perform the role of Hamlet in the opera houses of Europe versus
watching her perform the same role in the short film Le Duel d’Hamlet of 1900.582 For
Benjamin, it is the gulf between the past—tradition—and the modern that effects “[t]he
perte d’auréole (the loss of halo, or aura)”.583 Filmic reproducibility destroys this halo
and changes the medium of art qua reproducible artefact.584 Gardiner’s observation that
Bakhtin shies away from modernist forms of artist production may be likened to the
Critical Theoretical school’s neo-luddite-esque reservations regarding modern technology
in general. Thus the evaluation of the chronotope as a stylistically auratic motif alongside
speech genres invites a stand-alone work on the modern and postmodern chronotopes in
literature and art. The same could be said of the need for a study on the postmodern or
poststructuralist chronotope. Here the Bakhtinian might suppose, in choral support of
Fredric Jameson, that the postmodern chronotope has exhibited a progressively more
depthless, weak and schizophrenic historicity, and is ultimately temporally and spatially
intensive.585 Such an analysis is quite beyond the scope of the present work, but we mark
its possibility here parenthetically. In any case, the auratic power of the genre motif
applies equally to the chronotopic motif. The chronotopic motif has the power to evoke a
“whole complex of concepts” which implicate a particular image of ‘man’ and by
implication a whole literary chronotope.586
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7.2

A Little History of the Novel:
Novelistic Genres and Forms of the Chronotope

We will now review some of these chronotopic genres as they are presented in both
“Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel” and “The Bildungsroman”.587 These
genres to follow in detail are the novel of ordeal, the Greek adventure novel, ancient
biography and autobiography (specifically the Platonic and the encomium), the folkloric,
the Medieval chivalric romance, the baroque novel, and the Bildungsroman.
The hours and days traversed in the novel of ordeal leaves no permanent mark on
its hero and heroine. 588 As Morson and Emerson explain, the novel of ordeal exhibits an
“unreal conception of the effect of experience and time in traditional romance.”589
Chance figures at the forefront of adventure-time in the ordeal, and specifically the
chance which submits the protagonists to a test by some god or Loki-like prankster.
Nevertheless, these chance happenings mark only a digressive time rather than the time of
pure “duration”590; the delay to which the hero is subjected is an empty delay for its own
sake and merely serves to create an obstacle of empty time and space which must simply
be traversed. Since the trial of the hero is not meant to change him, he emerges from it
wholly unscathed. Time therefore has an absolute “reversibility” and space is completely
interchangeable.591 Morson and Emerson point out that simultaneity plays a dramatic
influence in the development of this intensive delay—“suddenly” is frequently used.592 I
would suggest that Shakespeare’s The Tempest uses the reversible adventure-time first
found in the chronotope of the Greek romantic novel. The shipwreck, Caliban’s plotting,
Ariel’s half-mocking lament for Ferdinand’s father who is assumed dead—“those are
pearls that were his eyes”—none of this makes any difference in the least to the unfolding
of events, and everything is put right in the end.593 The world against which the Greek
romance takes place must be of the empty-husk variety—i.e., univocal, and it must also
be an “alien” world.594 If it were too familiar, if it took place “at home,” inevitably the
chronotope would be destabilized by realist or other contextualizing factors.595 The hero
must travel, just as Telemachus does at the beginning of the Odyssey in setting out to find
his father. Testing is prominent in the Greek romance, but if the hero and heroine are to
prove their mettle they must hold fast to an unchanging character: the ordeal tests their
virtue to show their character is immutable and unalloyed. There is no trace of the all
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important chronotopic motif of becoming and change.596 Certainly standard
Shakespearean comedies such as Pericles also rely on the vast empty delay of arrival,
since Pericles spends most of the adventure-time of the play racing between ports.
The second type of ancient chronotope is found in Apuleius’ The Golden Ass and
Petronius’ Satyricon; these constitute the two lonely examples of the Greek adventure
novel. These works present an admixture of two chronotopes “adventure-time” and
“everyday-time.”597 The central motif is that of the metamorphosis, and Lucius’
transformation into an ass and back is an example of the peculiar change inherent in
metamorphosis. Change is not absolute; it is change alongside identity. Lucius is both
ass and Lucius at once. Bakhtin cites three specific genealogical lines from which the
idea of metamorphosis is formed: Greek philosophy, the Eleusinian cults, and the “purely
popular folklore.”598 The Greek adventure novel moves forward in fits and starts, and it
has an unusual “temporal sequence” as a result.599 One thematic component of this
chronotope bares the stamp of cyclicity while another that of the unfolding series of
events. As the adventure novel genre changes, the trope of metamorphosis gets cut off
from its wider significance and becomes narrowly construed and employed to dramatize
the hero’s merely individual change; this hermeneutical proposition remarkably echoes
the sublimation of the carnivalesque by the bourgeois cult of the individual.600
Regardless of this diminution in status of the theme of change from cosmic to individual,
however, the “crisis” faced by the hero will compel him to change.601 The positive
polarity of time is therefore explored in the Greek adventure novelistic genre.
In antiquity, the ancient biography and autobiography genres did not exist in
novelistic form. Nevertheless there were two such examples of Greek texts which
explicitly take up this “new type of biographical time.”602 In the first type, the Platonic
form—such as is found in the Phaedo—is organized around the Platonic maxim ‘know
thyself.’603 What is Bakhtin thinking here? He posits an ancient genre for which there is
no exemplar text. The motifs of ancient biography and autobiography remain scattered
throughout various works and will become important—in changed form—in the
Bildungsroman; he obviously wants to trace the roots of biographical space-time back to
its earliest forms, even if these forms exist only in fragments. Again, in the ancient
biography and autobiography genres we bear witness to the individual metamorphosis

152
that was first developed with the Greek adventure novel, only instead of seeking the
cosmic truth of universal metamorphosis of becoming, Platonic biographical motifs tend
toward an “idealized-biographical scheme.”604 What counts for biographically pertinent
information here is not the personal and merely private affairs of the individual but the
idealized individual as he is in essence. This is perhaps the first instance of the
gnoseological subject’s entrance into Western thought. The form of time is that of the
metamorphosis, of course, but this transformation functions according to a hierarchical
logic of knowledge. We return here then to the four rungs of Plato’s ladder of knowledge
that we saw in Section Two of the present work: vis-à-vis the supernal realm of
conjecture, belief, and understanding as well as the supernal realm of knowing.605 We
will have more to say about this hierarchy below.
The second type of chronotypical biographical motif is the encomium and its
emphasis is on the real-life chronotope of the individual who is being memorialized. The
biographical form of life in the encomium is one opened outward and formed by the
spaces of the public square—the agora. The public square shaped public life completely.
It was the site of official political manoeuvring, of collective defence, of civic pride, and
even where “revealed truth [was] realized concretely and fully incarnated, made visible
and given a face.”606 One’s “public self-consciousness” is determined by the entelechy or
purpose, and the energetic and analytic biography are the two structural strategies for the
ancient biographical motif.607 In the energetic form character is predetermined from the
start, but it is only revealed through a logic of discovery or unfolding, while “character
itself does not grow, does not change, it is merely filled in.”608 In the analytic, time
remains empty and unimportant beyond providing a space for this unfolding of characterlogical traits.609 In this second type of ancient biography, we are given just enough
information throughout the life of the hero to support an analytical reconstruction of the
protagonist’s life, but again the biographical events are mere facts; they do not effect
change in the character. In neither of these cases, the Platonic or the encomium, do we
yet have a depth image of ‘man.’ The Greeks notoriously tended to ignore the home
economy of the private sphere and inner life, and therefore whatever personal inflections
and biographical information that appears here is crucial for the public exterior man and
not his inner life.
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Essential to the idea of chronotopicity in general is Bakhtin’s notion of the
fullness of time.610 This idea expresses the tenet that time cannot be understood solely by
making reference to its separate aspects. My present establishes its sense according to
what has come before it and what is anticipated to come after it. As we have said,
Morson and Emerson note the essential difference between Bakhtin’s theory of
chronotopicity and the carnivalesque. We said that they misunderstand how time-space is
subsumed in the Rabelaisian chronotope—and notably in the image of pregnant death.
The folkloric chronotope is very nearly co-extensive with the Rabelaisian, although no
doubt the Rabelaisian images of gluttony, of the grotesque body, of those infamous
billingsgate (and blasphemes), of the underworld, giagantism (scale), etc., all add such a
richness and uniqueness that Bakhtin could not help but give Rabelais his very own
unique sense of space-time.611 Bakhtin’s idiosyncratic theory of the novel is built on the
presumption that folkloric culture was, up until the modern period, the populist mode of
existence. Folkloric culture remains embedded in the bi-polar life processes of life and
death, of work and leisure, of sowing and reaping. Its chronotope is therefore everywhere
stamped by cyclicity. Nature and ‘man,’ as macrocosm and microcosm, both find
themselves everywhere marked by this cyclicity.612 There is also a second prominent
feature regarding time, namely “historical inversion.”613 Another major difference
between the folkloric and the Rabelaisian chronotope leaps out at us: the folkloric
chronotope is nostalgic for a lost golden-age, and it tends to interpret present and future
events from the vantage point of an idyllic past or a singular future event—i.e., it is
eschatological.614 In spite of this eschatological and gold-age longing, the folkloric
chronotope is steeped in the real time of natural events and processes. As such the
Rabelaisian chronotope will draw heavily from it.
As a genre, the Medieval chivalric romance is largely steeped in the Greek
romance trope of testing, only the ordeal here is distinctly that of testing Christian
virtue.615 The temporal motifs of this genre are broken down into a series of “adventurefragments.”616 The motif of an alien world returns here to set the hero on his adventure
away from home and into the ordeal. Unlike the Greek romance, the chivalric adventure
novel requires a hero for whom this miraculous alien world is welcomed with open arms.
Here the hero maintains his identity because of providential interference not in spite of it.
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The logic of the chivalric romance is therefore that of living up to one’s potential through
time rather than retaining one’s atemporal identity which is more or less set in stone ab
ovo.
In its later manifestation, in Dante, in Guillaume de Lorris’ Roman de la Rose, in
Langland’s Piers Plowman, the Medieval chivalric romance stretches itself out into an
“encyclopaedic” form.617 Here both the vertical axis of simultaneity and the horizontal
axis of succession take hold, but only the vertical axis carries with it the intuited fullness
of time, and the real historical succession of events counts positively only insofar as it can
be sensibly relocated in vertical simultaneous groups of relations. Nevertheless, Bakhtin
seems to espy the loosening of the official hierarchical (neo-Platonic) great chain of being
within the genre of the Medieval chivalric romance. Time begins to fill up with its
positive aspect; time is becoming the effectual time of becoming, so to speak.
For example, Dante’s circles of hell reorganize various historical sinners not
according to their temporally causal date of damnation, but according to the intensity of
their sin. In this way Count Ugolino is found in the ninth circle of hell, physically above
rather than temporally after Judas, Brutus, and Cassius—for Ugolino’s treachery is
merely to Florence etc., not the whole of the Roman Empire or the Kingdom of Heaven.
It makes no difference here what historical order to which each transgression belongs; the
sinners are accorded their lodgings spatially according to the grotesqueness of their act of
betrayal.618 Still, the vertical scale of nature is torqued in Dante:
The mighty impact of the upward vertical movement is opposed by the no less
mighty impulse to break through toward the horizontal of real space and historic
time, the tendency to understand and form destiny outside the hierarchical norms
and values of the Middle Ages. Hence the extraordinary tension of the balance
created in his world by Dante’s titanic power.619
This tension is caused by the ambiguity and the double-voiced tendencies in Dante that
mark, for Bakhtin, the early warning system of the poet avant-garde who sees the writing
on the wall. History is becoming positively marked. The fixed hierarchy in which there
exists nothing new under the sun is beginning to horizontalize into historical becoming.
Ugolino and Judas occupy the spatial territory they do because of Dante’s sense of the
shifting ground underneath the feet of official culture. Things are changing. Measure
according to the image of God and custom is becoming measurement according to ‘man.’
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Dante’s chronotope is therefore not marked exclusively by verticality but by a tension
between ordered simultaneity and plenary succession. It is as if the slow realization that
the pure simultaneity of the ideal world of forms began to become embedded in the real
historical formation of concepts. It is as if the roots of the supermundane began to be
unearthed to show, quite literally, the material embodied and historically contingent
source of our ideas.
The baroque novel is the last novel of ordeal that occupies Bakhtin’s attention.
The hero is writ large in the baroque novel. The ordinary events of everyday life do make
an appearance but on a grand scale.620 The interval between the normal unfolding of the
hero’s life is once again interrupted by the ordeal, and again it “lacks any real
biographical duration”; however, the baroque novel establishes a positive “psychological
time” within this interval: “this time possesses a subjective palpability and duration.” 621
Nevertheless this psychological time is not localizable to any specific situation in the
hero’s life. The hero does not effect change in the world and neither does the world
change him.
The Bildungsroman combines the complexity of the baroque ordeal with its
“psychological time” with the biographical motif. Stendhal, Balzac, and Dostoevsky all
exemplify this generic typology.622 The trope of testing breaks down into sub-generic
species: artistic competence, bureaucratic and vocational testing, ethical suitability for
life, biological fitness, intellectual and social aptitude, and the various ordeals of the ‘new
woman,’ all by times inflect the category of the Bildungsroman.623 The Bildungsroman—
typically translated as the “novel of education”—emerges as a genre in the late 18th
century in Germany and especially with Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister.624 The image of
‘man’ portrayed in the novel of education has now overturned the static characterization
of the ‘man’ who can withstand the ordeal and remain himself.625 Whether this self is
latent and must unfold or is extolled by the author from the beginning is no longer
relevant to the form of the chronotope, since the protagonist’s life now is understood as
one which is set out as a task to be accomplished rather than merely to be endured
without compromise. Thus the “ready-made hero” is discarded by the Bildungsroman for
a new image of the ‘man’ of emergence and becoming; in essence he becomes
temporalized626: “Time is introduced into man, enters into his very image, changing in a
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fundamental way the significance of all aspects of his destiny and life. This type of novel
can be designated in the most general sense as the novel of human emergence.”627
Emergence can take five different forms: the cyclical (related to the life-cycle of the
hero), emergence from youth into adolescence, biographical and autobiographical
emergence (the cyclical element is dropped), didactic-pedagogical emergence (the ‘novel
of education’ is of this type), and finally the image of ‘man’s’ individual emergence is
portrayed according to and alongside historical time.628 The importance of this last type
of emergence cannot be overstated for either the history of the novel or for Bakhtin’s
theories of chronotopicity. The novel as a thousand year-old cultural technology of folk
culture begins to move out of the shadows into a self-reflexive dialogue with the image of
‘man’ in terms of becoming. One might say the novel becomes a plateau in which human
beings culturally dialogue with themselves about where they have come from and where
they are going.
There is a real sense in Bakhtin that he is not only interested in preparing a
taxonomy of novelistic genres. In itself this would be a pointless exercise that would be
productive only for highly specialized literary theorists. The emergence of the novel of
emergence, if one might put it so circuitously, seems to have a special significance for
Bakhtin; his Bildungsroman book was, after all, dedicated to it. It is as if the novel has
itself come of age. The Bildungsroman of historical emergence presents us finally with a
literary genre that has the teeth to show not only ‘man’s’ becoming but the becoming of
the world in history. This sub-species of novel catches a view of its protagonist at the
very precipice of personal and societal change—although as we have just seen not every
type of Bildungsroman deals with both personal and historical change; in any case, what
is important here is that the genre in its entirety links the personal and social becoming.
The destiny of the individual and the destiny of the world meet in the singular series of
events portrayed, and these events “achieve a significant assimilation of real historical
time.”629 For Bakhtin, Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel achieve the greatest
synthesis of these two moments in the entire history of the novel. Goethe plays a
secondary but likewise crucial role, and the remainder of our reconstruction and analysis
shall focus on the chronotope and image of ‘man’ in these two authors. In regards to
Rabelais’ chronotope, I propose to draw from Rabelais and his World rather than simply
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to repeat what Bakhtin has said in “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel.” This
will add to what Bakhtin has said in the chronotope essay as well as help draw together
the less overt traces of the Rabelaisian chronotope in his Rabelais book, and it will also
serve to further contradict the notion that carnival folk-festive culture cannot be
reconciled to the chronotope.

7.3

A Pregnant Death:
The Rabelaisian Chronotope

I will begin with a prehistory of the horizontalization of hierarchy found in Rabelais. The
neo-Platonists believed that all things emanate and return to the One.630 PseudoDionysius’ De divinis nominibus, Proclus’ Elements of Theology, and the pseudoAristotelian Liber de causis were the Medieval sources for the neo-Platonic notion of
hierarchy.631 Not only did the Medievals believe in hierarchical order, but the order
almost always descended from high to low and was caused by the One and not the other
way around.632 Edward P. Mahoney’s commentary on Proclus shows this logic of high to
low in action: “even the last or lowest kinds of existents depend on something above
them, for if they did not they would withdraw into non-being and vanish.”633 Points of
disagreement emerge around the possibility of gaps between the gradations of being
which ascend the scale as well as whether or not these gradations represent species or
individuals.634 The One serves here as the literal zero sum from which all other beings
emanate, just as all numbers begin and progressively grow more distant from the number
one or the single unit.635 Pseudo-Dionysius’ legacy for his Medieval inheritors lay in
adding the language of spatiality and distance from the One to this zero sum hierarchy:
Dionysius’ adoption of spatial language to explicate metaphysical hierarchy is
particularly noteworthy, since it will be reflected in various Medieval and
Renaissance thinkers. In like fashion, his acceptance of a principle of continuity,
according to which the lowest in a higher rank of things touches the highest in a
lower rank, would be reflected in Medieval discussion.636
Pseudo-Dionysius also held that if God—i.e., the One—was being in-itself, then all
beings had their being only in him. This idea is called the “doctrine of participation.”637
Aquinas expanded this argument and claimed that the closer any entity climbed on the
ladder of being the more actualized it becomes. Matter on the other end of the scale is
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mere potentiality, and the further the entity falls from grace, as it were, the more potential
replaces and degrades actuality.638 Matter also plays this role for Marsilio Ficino, “since
it is closest to non-being and further from God.”639 Nevertheless, for Aquinas, humans
were the most actualized of species—likewise gold was the highest actualized mineral.640
Paul of Venice begins at the opposite pole of non-being and posits that all beings can be
ordered according to their distance from non-being.641 Paul offered this thesis as a bolster
to the idea that God himself, as a perfect being, must be infinitely—and therefore
equally—distant from all other beings. Therefore, beings must be ordered strictly
according to the pole from which they are not infinitely distant—i.e., from matter or nonbeing. The central conflict here arises from the notion that while God is being in-itself
and therefore must be the measure of all things he is likewise perfect and therefore cannot
partake in imperfect being.642 This contradiction has contributed to the philosophical
factions and fragmentation surrounding the notion of hierarchy within the scholastic
discourse of scala naturae.
Lovejoy’s central tenet, out of which emerges his entire history of the idea of the
great ladder leading up to God, is that the good as it appears in Plato sets out the
Medieval philosophic cornerstone that he calls “cosmic determinism.”643 As we have
already seen in Section Two, Platonic philosophy placed ‘the good’ outside of the world
of appearances; this had the effect of making hypotheses and testing by dialectic the
proper method to approach true knowledge of the good. Thought had to leap over
appearances. This view was, according to Lovejoy, a “dialectical necessity” in the
Academy:
The idea of the good is a necessary reality; it cannot be other than what its essence
implies; and it therefore must, by virtue of its own nature, necessarily engender
finite existents. And the number of kinds of these is equally predetermined
logically; the Absolute would not be what it is if it gave rise to anything less than
a complete world in which the ‘model,’ i.e., the totality of ideal Forms, is
translated into concrete realities. It follows that every sensible thing that is, is
because it—or at all events, its sort—cannot but be, and be precisely what it is.
This implication, it is true, is not fully drawn out by Plato himself; but since it is
plainly immanent in the Timaeus, he thus bequeathed to later metaphysics and
theology one of their most persistent, most vexing, and most contention-breeding
problems.644
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While Mahoney suggests that Lovejoy is simply mistaken regarding this latency of
cosmic determinism in the Timaeus, we can only fault Lovejoy with a retrogressive
projection of this determinism from the standpoint of the Medievals onto Plato.645 While
we mark this methodological and hermeneutical error on the part of Lovejoy, we can
nevertheless uphold the supposition that cosmic determinism did come down to us from
at least the time of Proclus in the form of a hierarchical chain of being. The mutability of
this chain is another matter entirely and we shall not deal with it here. What is essential
for our purposes is that this notion of a dialectical necessity not only existed as a profound
centripetal force in scholastic and popular thought during the Middle Ages, but also that
it held all official creeds firm within its grasp. One could (sometimes) argue as to
whether or not God’s perfection was infinitely distant from ‘man,’ but not the centrality
of God in the universe. One could (sometimes) argue whether God was the measure of
all things, but one could not argue the same for ‘man.’ This marked fixity of the Middle
Ages begins to slide during the Renaissance, and not just in the well-schooled opinions of
the philosophers, but primarily in unofficial art and popular culture. We say again: this
loosening begins in culture, in everyday life, not in philosophy! This sliding was not born
overnight, but quite to the contrary, was celebrated in unofficial folk-festive cultural
production, simultaneously alongside byzantine hierarchical agelast austerity, and the
‘sobriety’ of scholastic dialectical thought.
The new image of ‘man’ as the measure of all things is essential to understanding
the change that was occurring during the Renaissance. I would suggest that the import of
this change in the history of the West, from a vertical hierarchy where the image of God
is the cosmic determining principle to the image of ‘man’ as the new standard of
measurement, cannot be overestimated. While Rabelais was himself immersed in the bipolar sympathetic notion of microcosmic echo of macrocosm, the polarity that measures
everything from the point of view of the image of God is overturned in Rabelais and in
the Renaissance in general. This polarity was destined to fracture the hierarchical cosmic
logic that we have been reviewing; Bakhtin says: “The human body was the centre of
philosophy that contributed to the destruction of the Medieval hierarchic picture of the
world and to the creation of a new concept.”646
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Bakhtin glosses Aristotle’s influence over the Medieval hierarchical ordering of
nature. He also says nothing of Paul of Venice or other’s inversions of gradation
according to the distance from God to the distance from non-being. He does give an
account of Aristotle’s four elements—so important to the late Medieval understanding of
movement and substance, these being earth, water, air, and fire. The image of the
elements themselves is hierarchical in nature, since they are adjudged to be at home or
away from their natural cosmic quarter depending on their spatial location in the cosmos.
Above fire—often considered the highest element—there is a purported fifth element
known as the quintessence. We have already noted that the neo-Platonic and Christian
worldview of the Medieval period indeed had a polarity of high and low which was,
without fail, arranged hierarchically. We have also noted that these poles, again without
fail, were the first principle at one end and matter at the other.

According to Bakhtin

this movement from high to low shifts during the Renaissance to a reference forward and
backward.647 A sense of ‘man’ in a state of becoming begins to enter into the discourse of
the scala naturae, and this idea—which originates out of Medieval hierarchical being—is
destined to overturn it, just as, we might say, the unofficial presents from within the
official seeds of its own overturning. Bakhtin does not explicitly state this, and we must
never lose sight of the fact that the two types of being—i.e., static hierarchical being and
dynamic being as becoming—exist together as poles. Rabelais exemplifies this flattening
of hierarchies since he is “consistently materialistic” and makes the human body—i.e.,
the image of ‘man’—the measure by which all other “material components of the
universe disclose ... their true nature.”648 By exceeding his terrestrial limits, ‘man’
exceeds his own nature. By defeating his fixed place in terra nostra, ‘man’ boldly
ventures out into terra incognita. By making the unofficial-fantastic an official reality,
Renaissance ‘man’ brings to life the knowledge of the ancient world only to finally part
ways with it. The unquestioned hierarchical order of things is replaced in the
Renaissance by a new image of ‘man,’ and this image is of a human animal beholden to
becoming—to material nature—and not to the fixity of a dogmatic feudal order:
Thanks to navigation and the invention of the sail, men have entered into material
contact. Mankind has become one. After the invention of aviation (which
Rabelais foresees), man will direct the weather, will reach the stars and conquer
them. This entire image of the triumph of mankind is built along the horizontal
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line of time and space, typical of the Renaissance. Nothing remains of the
Medieval hierarchical vertical.649
The succession of generations does the heavy lifting in this paradigmatic shift. It is only
because my children’s children’s children will arrive at terra incognita and begin to map
it that this new image of ‘man’ can take hold and vouchsafe the human becoming. For
Rabelais, this horizontality of successive discovery concerns human beings in general and
not individuals. This picture of the body as the measure of all things is historical and
material but not personal. Neither is it merely biological.
One could be tempted to see in Freud and Weismann a similar account of the nonpersonal becoming of the human species, since generally speaking this notion serves to
ground Weismann’s germ plasm and soma and Freud’s Eros and death instinct. This was
the case with Freud’s Weismannian turn in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, as we have
seen. There, Freud’s conjectures that the mortal part, the soma, could be seen as simply a
means for the germ plasm to perpetuate itself—this is Weismann’s theory and Freud is
tempted to accept it. Of course, he does not. But the supposition that death itself is a
mere “expediency” to remove the “pointless luxury” of individual immortality borders in
close proximity to Rabelais’ grotesque image of a pregnant death650; however, as we
have likewise seen, Freud’s bourgeois subjectivism renders him incapable of seeing the
positive polarity in this subterfuge of the soma by the germ plasm. There is no
Rabelaisian laughter in the idea that the individual is a mere luxury—a mere plaything of
destiny. Moreover, Weismann’s mortal and immortal aspects of life are indeed merely
biological. Notwithstanding his transference of these biological hypotheses to his
psychoanalytic principles, Eros and the death instinct, Freud also omits the importance of
cultural history from this account of species unfolding. What is important for Rabelais,
and a fortiori for the Renaissance world, is the new cultural turn realizing itself through
the image of ‘man’ in historical becoming. Freud remains an agelast. He cannot see the
positive polarity of becoming—the real pleasure motive of the death instinct.
As we have seen, the gradations of being were not univocally held to be top-down
in the Middle Ages. Nor was every theologian a Thomist, and thus not everyone held that
measurement ran according to the two poles, the first principle and non-being, or
alternately God and matter. Indeed, figures such as Paul of Venice and Richard

162
Swineshead believe that if God had placed ‘man’ at an infinitely distant and fixed gulf
from perfection, then the gradation of beings must be wholly determined from the bottom
polarity of non-being.651 Bakhtin tells us that the marriage of the Christian cult of
redemption and Pseudo-Dionysius’ hierarchy of gradations lent to the Medieval world a
bi-polar and vertical logic of “ascent and fall.”652 It is clear that Bakhtin is again painting
with very broad strokes. The official Medieval world was not as univocal as he seems to
believe, but depended to a great extent on who was speaking ex cathedra; be it a
particular political family represented by Papa on St. Peter’s chair or whomever was
currently serving as Charlemagne’s de facto heir, there is not one but a multeity of
Medieval periods.
Nevertheless, one understands here that Bakhtin wants to talk about the Medieval
period thematically in order to provide a general account of the transformation to the
Renaissance without over complicating the transformation. This shift can therefore be
generally understood as the rise of a new standard of measurement. The universally
important and ostensibly unchanging image of God becomes the liquid and relative image
of ‘man’ in the process of becoming. It will be objected that we already are well aware of
this fact, and that Bakhtin adds nothing to what has been made explicitly in Pico’s preface
to the 900 Thesis, the so-called “Dignity of Man.” Nevertheless, the general thrust of the
official Medieval axiological inflection indeed seems to have been highly polarized in
favour of the supernal image of the Demiurge and Pantocrator. Bakhtin shows us that the
new ‘dignity’ of ‘man’ is centred specifically in the image of ‘man’s’ body.
The Medieval conception of time is also highly polarized high to low. The
unmoving first principle negates the movement of matter and its constant shifting of
forms. The simultaneity of the vertical insured the possibility of an instantaneous rebirth
in Christ through redemption. Officially there was no possibility of growing into this new
life in Christ, nor was the city of God built upon the real life urban denizens. All merely
human history is negated by a double movement. First the official vertical hierarchical
order is privileged and then polarized high to low. While the everyday communities of
‘men’ were by and large the exclusive sites around which our antecedent broke bread
together and suffered in silence, it was the univocal image of the city of God that
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mystified the noble, cleric, and popper alike in official life. However, Dick Hebdige
reminds us that the official polarization of the community of the realm itself has a history:
In classical Mediterranean cultures, once the hospitality traditionally extended to
the stranger had been exhausted, access to the civitas—the community and its
sustaining networks of ritual, privilege, obligation—remained contingent on a
more primeval order of belonging: an investment in the urbs, literally, in the
stones of the city. With the establishment in 18th century Europe of a bourgeois
public realm where differences, ideally, were to be ‘aired’—owning property and
speaking ‘properly’ became the dual prerequisites for being heard at all.653
In other words, if we attempt to understand the modern and ancient world through the
lens of the Medieval hierarchical order, we find that this hierarchy does not disappear
during the Renaissance and even repeats in other forms during the Enlightenment in the
form of early bourgeois ideology. Additionally, if we project this hierarchical reference
backwards, we see that this hierarchical order appears in the civitas and is organized
around the real material social structures inherent in Roman civic duty and earlier in the
political organization surrounding the Greek polis. No doubt, showing the historicization
of hierarchical forms is itself an infinite task. Although this task remains outside of the
present critique, we mark here not only that the Medieval vertical hierarchical structure
itself has a pre-history, but that it has left remainders. Hierarchy itself is subject to
becoming and does not disappear during the Renaissance.
Nevertheless, Bakhtin is correct to show, albeit retrospectively and from the point
of view of the present, that official Medieval culture “devalued time.”654 But with the
cultural rejuvenation during the Renaissance, the ‘centre could not hold,’ so to speak.
The official hierarchical structuring of high to low in which “historic time was
obliterated” began to collapse in Rabelais’ world.655 The Medieval trope of the
underworld plays this collapse out. For Bakhtin, the official fear inducing Pantocrator
that rebuked the underworld began to give way to the flesh and blood chthonic source of
real everyday and biological life—albeit a biology within a cultural history.
At the time of Rabelais the hierarchical world of the Middle Ages was crumbling.
The narrow, vertical, extratemporal model of the world, with its absolute top and
bottom, its system of ascents and descents, was in the process of reconstruction.
A new model was being constructed in which the leading role was transferred to
the horizontal lines, to the movement forward in real space and in historic time.656
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Now the lower bodily stratum which had been officially censured begins its work of
grounding—in every sense of the word—the scholastic and idiosyncratic simultaneity of
forms in their actual loam and earth origins. The abstraction from these material origins
had placed the emphasis on the soul’s personal redemption or damnation—and to hell
with the acquisition of one’s daily bread. What was important was how one spent the
next life not the millennial folk-festive celebration of collective embodied existence
through time. But in Rabelais’ world this is all supposed to have changed according to
Bakhtin. Unofficial folk-festive culture, the images of the grotesque body, billingsgate,
curse words—i.e., parodied excommunications, the low culture of the marketplace, all of
these socioeconomic realities of everyday life begin to slip into the mainstream cultural
production.657 What is at stake is no longer a merely individual abeyance to the
authoritarian Byzantine Pantocrator, but the growing awareness that our ancestors have
become, quite literally, the earth out of which our nourishment grows. And as they are,
so shall we be, as the ubiquitous late Medieval and Renaissance memento mori remind us.
Collective life does not end in individual death. The “vital process” is in some
sense a continuum.658 This is what is lost in the agelast austerity of the Medieval focus on
the deceased’s successful assent up to heaven—i.e., the knowledge that material life will
blossom anew and for its own sake. The sobriety of the bourgeois culture likewise forgot
this truth. Although it has survived—in the ‘good-old’ Irish wake, for example, by and
large, and sadly, the contemporary mind knows nothing of the promise of life inherent in
death. We see even in contemporary monotheistic religious belief of hierarchy that the
distinctly individual conception of death, as ascension to the pearly gates, or descent into
hell and damnation not only merely repeats the vertical hierarchical logic of official
Medieval culture, it also obfuscates the truth latent in folk-festive culture—death is not
impotent but full of the power of life. This truth is lost in Paul’s epistle to the church at
Corinth. There, faith is placed solely on the power of the resurrection.659 There, the early
neo-Platonic polarities of the first principle and matter, of God and earth, of being and
nothingness, of life and death, are first sown into the fresh soil of Christian dogma; these
polarities become highly polarized. There, we already see the apotheosis of the
Pantocrator at the expense of the degradation of the earth. Consider what Paul says:
So also is the resurrection of the dead. The body is sown a natural body, it is
raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. And
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so it is written, “The first man Adam became a living being.” The last Adam
became a life-giving spirit. However, the spiritual is not first, but the natural, and
afterward the spiritual. The first man was of the earth, made of dust; the second
Man is the Lord from Heaven. As was the man of dust, so also are those who are
made of dust; and as is the heavenly Man, so also are those who are heavenly.
And as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image
of the heavenly Man. Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit
the kingdom of God; nor does corruption inherit incorruption. Behold, I tell you a
mystery: We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed—in a moment, in the
twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound and the dead
will be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must
put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this
corruptible has put on incorruption, and this mortal has put on immortality, then
shall be brought to pass the saying that is written: “Death is swallowed up in
victory.” “O Death, where is your sting? O Hades, where is your victory?”660
The “man of dust” is degraded being. The first Adam who came from the dust is fated to
return to it. Only the redemption offered in Christ can vouchsafe the transmigration of his
soul, but not to the underworld. The earth becomes something wholly morbid, and is
polarized as mere corruption. The spirit and the flesh are eternally alienated from each
other. The lower bodily stratum and the grotesque, by association with all that is low, are
both corrupted by association with the seedy underbelly of life in decay. Sexuality, via its
association with the sexual organs, is merely a necessary evil. The seed can only be
redeemed through a metamorphosis into a spiritual organ. He who worships the earth and
all that is low becomes an eternally corrupted pariah by association. The flesh is soiled,
grimy, dirty, alloyed, maculate; literally and etymologically speaking, it is profane—i.e.,
“not dedicated to religious use, secular.”661
Contrariwise, in the Rabelaisian image of death, there is also the victory of life—
life does triumph over death just as in the Apostle’s epistle. However, this triumph is
announced in death; it is immanent to it—and an earthly death at that. It is not a victory
from outside and it is not a refutation of the flesh, but a rejuvenation of it: “in Rabelais’
novel the image of death is devoid of all tragic or terrifying overtones. Death is the
necessary link in the process of people’s growth and renewal. It is the ‘other side’ of
birth.”662 The birth of Pantagruel, Gargantua’s son, marks the loss of his mother;
Gargantua’s wife dies in labour. There is an ambiguity here, at the moment of the
interstice between death-life. In the bi-polar Rabelaisian images of life and death series,
death is composed from the point of view of ‘death’s’ immanent power to generate new
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life and not from the individual birth and death of Pantagruel and Badebec respectively.663
The mother-son continuum of life is emphasized.664
There is solace in death, even individual death, but it is not merely the solace that
others will be born. The joy in death is not a mere decrease in the surface population, as
Alastair Sim’s Scrooge would have it—agelast that he is.665 The merely biological
repetition of the organism is not the species of joy that Gargantua nourishes. The birth of
his son would be small comfort if it were merely the guarantee that the generations will
continue on ad nauseam; a merely biological death pertains only to bare life. Instead,
inherent in the pregnant death is the assurance of progress. Life will not go on as it has;
the death that is the cause of life is a promise of history, it is the “growth of historic
man.”666 Our children’s children’s children will inherit the benefit of hindsight—a terra
incognita—but even this truth is too polarized and idealistic for Bakhtin. Even progress
alone is not enough to provide a “gay death,”667 so long as we mean a progress that
considers only individual reward. Death is the joyful embodied rejuvenation of life.
Only once we step entirely outside of individual ego can death become a festivity.
Calculations of individual gain and loss do not belong here. Bakhtin espies in Rabelais
the celebration of the very principle of human historical progress. The sting of death is
amputated only when viewed in terms of the life historical process and the cosmic body
replaces the individual body.668 Decay is also the influx of vital minerals into the soil.
Sickness is also the quickening of a virus—viruses that also strengthen future generations
of their hosts. Christian nourishment is the sacrament; the spirit is fed on the body, blood,
and wounds of Christ. But human bio-historical nourishment is grown quite literally from
the bodies of our ancestors.
Thus Rabelais’ world begins to find official expression for the unofficial truth of
folk-festive culture and the grotesque decaying body. The double body of life and death
finds its expression in the bi-polar image of the collective social body and most especially
in the frontier between growth and decay: “if we consider the grotesque image in its
extreme aspect, it never presents an individual body; the image consists of orifices and
convexities that present another, newly conceived body. It is a point of transition in a life
renewed, the inexhaustible vessel of death and conception.”669 The cosmic body in no
way reflects the obsession of the Medieval mind with the fate of the individual soul, nor
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does it make a forward looking reference to the bourgeois morality of the individual
which we have discussed above. The cosmic body is the supernal (spiritual) body, to be
sure, but only insofar as it remains inseparable from the material body and the lower body
polarity of existence. The cosmic body is also and everywhere the chthonic body.
On a macro-level, the Rabelaisian chronotope expresses more than this dual body
of life and death viewed simply from the vista of the cosmic body. The revelation of the
historical becoming of ‘man,’ the birth of this new image of ‘man,’ is the death knell of
the “old dying world [which] gives birth to the new one.”670 In a tour de force Bakhtin
closes the chapter on the “Material Bodily Lower Stratum” by conjoining all the major
elements of his entire corpus. The dual body present in the grotesque image and the
lower moiety of the human animal must also be understood as the flesh made word. Just
as Harlequin’s stuttering sickness gives birth to the word, so the image of the dual body
gives birth to a double tonality—high and low. Just like the soma, the utterance is also
beholden to decay and rejuvenation, and is pulled into the cycle of birth and death. The
official worship of the blood and wounds of Christ is also an unofficial curse—it is
“stately, plump Buck Mulligan’s” jesting invocation: “For this, O dearly beloved, is the
genuine Christine: body and soul and blood and ouns.”671
Rabelais’ world was complex and contradictory, and his chronotope is Janusfaced as a result; his discourse is double-voiced. Within it, the inward dialogical struggle
between the official Eucharistic utterance and the unofficial joyfully parodic blaspheme
are co-present. Both the monotone of orthodoxy and the duality of folk-festive culture
are locked in an inseparable polarity. This is not to say that in the Rabelaisian
chronotopic motif the stylistic scales are wholly balanced. There is no question that
Rabelais did not extol the virtues of the agelasts and folk-festive laughter equally, but
neither does he attempt to expunge either the negative or positive poles of death, of life,
of the image of God, and of the new image of ‘man’:
In reality, it is a dialogue of the face with the buttocks, of birth with death. We
find a similar manifestation in the antique and Medieval debates between winter
and spring, old age and youth, fasting and abundance, old times and new, parents
and children. These debates are an organic part of the system of popular-festive
forms, related to change and renewal. (Such a debate is recalled by Goethe in his
description of the Roman Carnival.)672
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But this dialogue does not reduce to a unity. The struggle between the official and
unofficial, the vertical and the horizontal, simultaneity and succession, being and
becoming, these are all “incompleteness” itself, they are unfinalizable and undecidable.673

7.4

In the Fullness of Time:
Goethe’s Chronotope and the Roman Carnival

We will now restrict ourselves to a few remarks regarding Goethe’s chronotope and the
Bildungsroman. Bakhtin appears to have worked on the two major studies dedicated to
chronotopicity, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel” and “The
Bildungsroman”, contemporaneously.674 What survives of Bakhtin’s book length work
on Goethe covers much of the material we have discussed regarding the various genres of
the novel in history. The chronotopicity text is to some extent a lengthy expansion of the
Goethe monograph, and we are thankful to have an overlap in the material, although the
destruction of the Bildungsroman book by advancing German troops during World War
Two is a great loss by any standard.675 There is also a connection to later 19th and 20th
century thought regarding time and space, vitalism, and morphological and historicalevolutionary studies in both essays. As Larissa Rudova states, in “Bergsonism in Russia:
The Case of Bakhtin”, there is much that is similar in Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope
with Bergson idea of temporality, most notably his praise for Goethe’s second sight—his
ability to “see time in space.”676 For his own part, Bakhtin highlights the fact that Goethe
“did not want to (and could not) see that which was ready-made and immobile.”677 What
is essential here is to distinguish Goethe’s reliance on this time in space, and more
generally, how the theory of the chronotope merges time added to space as a fourth
dimension. There is also a felt necessity in Goethe to be present to morphological
change—to be a witness to becoming in action. It is as if time itself becomes a living
entity which can be seen “in its course” by the right pair of eyes.678
The role played by the Renaissance in loosening the vertical hierarchical fixity of
scala naturae is evidently complimented by this visual figuration of time during the
Enlightenment.679 The roots of historicity are found in the 18th century, which further
cultivated the soil of cyclical time and the Medieval immobile and ahistorical sight. A
prescience for what is to come as well as an acute awareness of the actual philological
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and socioeconomic history is sown in this period, and for Bakhtin this new kind of
see(d)ing the present through a forward and backward reference culminates in Goethe:
one begins to see signs of historic time. The contradictions of contemporary life,
having lost their absolute, God-given, eternal nature, revealed a historical
multitemporality—remnants of the past, and rudiments and tendencies of the
future. Simultaneously the theme of the ages of man, evolving into the theme of
generations, begins to lose its cyclical nature and begins to prepare for the
phenomenon of historical perspectives ... In Goethe—who in this respect was the
direct successor and crowning figure of the Enlightenment—artistic visualization
of historical time ... reaches one of its high points.680
Two points stand out here. First, we are concerned specifically with the faculty of a
historical vision, and second, this vision is properly understood as artistic. The artist’s
eye goes right to the bottom of metamorphological existence. Goethe often claimed that
he could even see ideas as they grew out of or were added to experience.681 Thought was
tied up with seeing for Goethe and vice versa. He says, “my observation is itself
thinking, and my thinking is a way of observation.”682 Yet as visually astute as Goethe
was, he had trouble conceiving of the invisible; indeed, for Goethe, “the invisible did not
exist,” and nature could not be theorized in an abstract disjunction from the object in
question.683 We will therefore note parenthetically that Goethe would have had trouble
accepting Platonic philosophy, with its reliance on what Lovejoy calls the “Idea of ideas”
or “the good,” which is itself invisible while making visible. Instead, it is the concrete
marriage of thought and objects in succession that was Goethe’s remarkable aesthetic
talent. Even words could not be detached from the occasion of their inspired poetic or
scientific instantiation, and this distinct poetics Goethe calls “objective writing.”684
The word and the diagram have a special relationship for Goethe. Ideas were
equally expressible in words and images; in fact, the word and the diagram complement
one another: “Goethe was averse to words that were not backed up by any actual visible
experience ... With a few strokes he would sketch on paper a subject or locality that
interested him, and he would fill in the details with words, which he would inscribe
directly on the drawing.”685 We see the importance of the diagram in his so-called
“propitious encounter” with Schiller. On the night he first met his future Sturm und
Drang alumni, Goethe found himself forced to resort to a diagrammatic expression of his
idea of plant metamorphosis in order to make it visible for his interlocutor.686
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Furthermore, he connects this manifold relation between the ideas, words, and diagrams
directly to time in his Italian Journey. Immediately after Goethe arrived in Italy he was
struck by the extent to which sunrise and sunset still determined local quotidian practices:
“We Cimmerians hardly know the real meaning of day ... But here, when night falls, the
day consisting of evening and morning is definitely over, twenty-four hours have been
spent, and time begins afresh.”687 ‘When in Rome’... set your watch by the local clock.
An efficacious rule, no doubt, but what if local time still runs according to a Medieval
logic of the liturgical hours or diurnal time? Daily ritual in Verona was organized
according to what we would today call the circadian clock, from matins to the obligatory
“‘Felicissima note!’”688 In order to orientate himself to the local custom of counting the
hours from sunset, Goethe devised a complicated table—a “diagram”—for comparison
with Carlsbad clock time. The tangible need to make time visible is itself made visible in
this diagram.689
The visual basis of Goethe’s thought saw the past well up inside the present. He
saw the present heavily laden with an unfolding future. If we want an image for this
phenomenon, we might compare Goethe’s imaginative seeing to Eadweard Muybridge’s
time-lapse photography. Meteorological phenomena, the expansion and contraction of
vegetative matter, geological sediment, the Medieval and Roman ruin, the whole of his
world could not be understood merely according to simultaneous apposition of objects in
space—as was the case in the Kantian chronotope of the intuitions of time and space.
Objects emerged in time and Goethe everywhere tried to show that all phenomena were in
the process of emergence, regardless of the fact that they appear to the naked eye in
ready-made form.690
We would not want, however, to give the impression that this second-sight was in
anyway mystical or omniscient. Quite to the contrary, Goethe abhorred abstract
hypotheses which “lacked any necessary and visible connection with the surrounding
reality.”691 As he told Schiller, the intentional direction of Goethe’s work always
proceeded “from the whole to the parts” and not the other way around. 692 Therefore, if
some fragment of the past could not be shown to be connected in an “unbroken line of
historical development,” Goethe was less than interested and even fearful of these
spectres.693 The “estranged past” could not be made visually coherent as a process of
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metamorphosis.694 The isolated individual object that could not be conditioned in terms
of the larger whole was unstable and one could not deduce its necessary connection with
the successive flow of time. This is the first methodological principle with which
Bakhtin’s analysis of Goethe’s vision supplies us. We may see this as the negative
polarity of Goethe’s vision of time.
The second principle can be seen as the positive polarity. If the isolated fragments
of the past are dead spectres from which Goethe could not see a visible connection with
the present, the contiguous parts which could be seen in terms of a whole were
“creative.”695 Past natural objects and cultural ruins expressed a dehiscence that
overflowed into the present and even projected themselves in anticipation of their destiny.
Where the past and future find their effectiveness in the present, Goethe’s visual
imagination bore witness to the “fullness of time.”696
The Goethean chronotope is at once forward and backward looking and is always
grounded in the duration of unbroken temporal succession. Goethe’s botanical studies
trained his sight to be active and to see beyond the mere apposition of objects in spatial
simultaneity. Thus it would not be too much to posit that temporally-continuous objects
provided him with an organic architectonic method of answering all phenomena that
displayed even a microscopic trace of continuous metamorphosis:
When I see before me something which has already taken shape, and inquire about
its origin and trace back the process as far as I can follow, I become aware of a
series of stages. Naturally, these cannot be observed side by side with the
physical eye but must be pictured mentally as a certain ideal whole.
Inclined at first to postulate certain stages, I am finally compelled, since
Nature never proceeds by skips and jumps, to regard the sequence of
uninterrupted activity as a whole, annulling individual details so as not to destroy
the total impression.697
Goethe corrected the romantic vision of the past as a golden age; he resisted the messianic
eschatological vision of the future as an unchanging mass to be endured until the
instantaneity of the second coming. These types of chronotopic vision—the folkloric for
example—denied nature her creative impulse and the law of continuous successive
development through time; for Goethe they are versions of an unnatural and perverse
seeing. By contrast, Goethe displays a poetic and scientific comprehension of the holistic
process of growth and decay according to the fullness of time.698
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Third, Goethe’s interest in the unity of time does not extend to a universal or
cosmic whole. He is not invested in reducing all of nature to a monistic principle merely
in the unity of local objects in temporalized space. Bakhtin emphasizes the
socioeconomic and historical basis of this “locality,” and therefore Goethe remains a
humanist thinker who shunned the non-human speculative perspectives of abstract
thought. The vast spaces emptied of human habitation, which are the bread and butter of
the Romantic pictorial expression, were “‘pathetic’” and impotent in his eyes.699 The
paintings of Caspar David Friedrich, for example, or the slightly later American
landscape painting of the Hudson River School, are too depopulated and evince nothing
of “man the builder” or time from the vista of human perception.700 The “living human
scale” is missing from these ostensibly sublime depictions.701 Where these Romantic
tropes do show up in Goethe—and his early career is practically obsessed with them—he
retrospectively attributes to them a “‘gloomy’” sort of omission of the real living present,
even in his own work.702 He need not have been so self-critical, since the trope of the
isolated and depopulated locality nowhere lacks a “realistic component.”703
Not every subject lent itself to Goethe’s “chronotopic visualizing.”704 Goethe
lamented that the French Revolution was an “unsurveyable subject,” and he thus
attributes the frustration of his attempts to finish The Natural Daughter to the generaleconomy and disparate openness of this event. 705 The revolution was simply too
complex and unruly to form a conception from the whole. The same impotence recurs in
terms of conceiving the invisible in Italian Journey during the Roman Carnival: “I know I
shall encounter the objection that a festivity of this kind cannot really be described, that
such a tumult of people, things and movements can only be absorbed by each spectator in
his own way.”706 The Roman Carnival is simply too big to see all at once, one must
participate and accept her perspectival view.
As is well known, Goethe was a source of inspiration to Bakhtin throughout his
career, but the descriptions of carnival here will be surprisingly familiar to anyone
coming to Goethe’s Italian Journey after reading the Rabelais book. Folk-festive and
carnival culture is still alive in the Roman Carnival. It is the time of the upside down
inversion of official culture. Here the festival is not paid for by the Vatican or the Roman
politicians, but is instead a festivity that “the people give themselves.”707 Nothing seems
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to be out of bounds during the Carnival, and there is every kind of social degradation and
merry-making—“except fisticuffs and stabbing.”708 Goethe also notes that the division
between official and unofficial society “seems to be abolished for the time being;
[moreover,] everyone accosts everyone else, all good-naturedly accept whatever happens
to them, and the insolence and licence of the feast is balanced only by the universal good
humour.”709 Perhaps most interestingly, there is actually an official signal for “complete
licence” given in the afternoon by ringing the bells of the Capitol.710 Licentiousness
between men and women is also common in the Roman Carnival, and Goethe accounts
for the permissibility of this unofficial behaviour by pointing out that the men have
travestied their gender by donning women’s garb:
Young men disguised as women of the lower classes in low-necked dresses are
usually the first to appear. They embrace the men, they take intimate liberties
with the women, as being of their own sex, and indulge in any behaviour which
their mood, wit or impertinence suggests.
One young man stands out in my memory. He played the part of a
passionate, quarrelsome woman perfectly. “She” went along the whole length of
the Corso, picking quarrels with everyone and insulting them, while her
companions pretended to be doing their best to calm her down.711
Fools, or Pulcinellas also play their role in the festivities, and notably “imitating the God
of Gardens” by, one assumes, displaying his priapic member.712 Other carnivalesque
moments include mock trials for women and their cicisbei, the wearing of Janus-faced
and “humourous and satirical masks” and caricatured costumes, confetti wars, and mock
coronations.713
As we might imagine, the interstice between parodical brawling and the danger of
earnest violence is very fine. Goethe notes this most clearly in his section on the confetti
wars which often ensue during processions through the thronged crowds: “There is no
doubt that many of these fights would end with knives being drawn if that famous
instrument of torture of the Italian police, the corde, was not hung up at various corners to
remind everyone, in the midst of their revelry, that it would be very dangerous to use a
dangerous weapon at this moment.”714
There are also so-called “grotesque performances” complete with the premature
pregnancy of a grotesquely deformed infant.715 Curses and profanities are heard during
the festival of the moccoli, or candles. In this festivity those who are not carrying candles

174
are ‘threatened’ with (s)laughter: “‘Sia ammazzato chi non porta moccolo—Death to
anyone who is not carrying a candle,’” and no doubt the threats and the curses have their
effect from the metaphorical blowing out of the candle, which of course symbolizes
death. 716 Finally, Goethe waxes sentimental in his “Ash Wednesday” entry as the
festivities draw to a close. He comments briefly on the symbolism of public obscenity
and this topsy-turvy world that combines the images of pregnancy and death, of love and
hate, of festival and war, and of the ubiquitous double-voicedness of this official and
unofficial world:
In the course of these follies our attention is drawn to the most important stages of
human life: a vulgar Pulcinella recalls to us the pleasures of love to which we owe
our existence; a Baubo profanes in a public place the mysteries of birth and
motherhood, and the many lighted candles remind us of the ultimate ceremony.
The long, narrow Corso, packed with people, recalls to us no less the road
of our earthly life. There, too, a man is both actor and spectator; there, too, in
disguise or out of it, he has very little room to himself and, whether in a carriage
or on foot, can only advance by inches, moved forward or halted by external
forces rather than by his own free will; there, too, he struggles to reach a better
and more pleasant place from which, caught again in the crowd, he is again
squeezed out.717
Most imagistically, Goethe compares the brevity of life to the horse as it rushes by on the
Corso during the race. Although Goethe does not make explicit reference to it, the
horserace is itself a millennial image that must remind one, especially in Rome, of the
political races that took place in the hippodromes of the ancient Empire. In this way we
understand that the celebrations during the Roman Carnival are not simply a moment
outside of the official quotidian time; they are instead the outward sign of the swelling
and dehiscent effusion of a folk historical culture whose living waters still course beneath
the urbs of the Roman roads.718
Bakhtin is clearly attracted to the concrete reality of the Goethean chronotope, and
likely draws from him much of his ideas regarding the carnivalesque. Even where there
exists a dialogic struggle between Goethe’s chronotope and the Romantic abstraction of
“geological and geographical landscape,” this Romantic abstraction carries along with it
the positive polarity of plenistic—human-cultural—time and space.719 We must stress
here the infused synthesis which Bakhtin espies in Goethe between living “terrestrial
space” and its reciprocal relation with historically productive and popular culture.
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Bakhtin does not speak of answerability in the Bildungsroman fragment, but it clearly
underpins this reciprocity between ‘man’ and his localized natural environs as they
achieve their visible synthesis in the Goethean chronotope—i.e., the fullness of time
taken according to contiguous human history. The Roman aqueduct at Spoleto, for
example, serves as an example for Goethe of a human cultural production that is
organically wedded to its environment. To paraphrase “Art and Answerability”, the
Roman builders had to answer ‘with their own architectural constructions for what they
had experience and understood in the natural geography of their surroundings.’720
Neither Goethe nor Bakhtin believed a sufficient historic and socioeconomic
production could be “torn from reality.”721 In discourse and in life time and space are
merged into an inseparable whole. This is not to say that time is wholly reduced to space
or vice versa, only that they must be seen together within the social milieu and
socioeconomic succession of human historical production: “space and time are bound
together into one inseparable knot. Terrestrial space and human history are inseparable
from one another in Goethe’s integrated concrete vision. This is what makes historical
time in his creative work so dense and materialized, and space so humanly interpreted and
intensive.”722
In this section we have stated that, for Bakhtin, the Renaissance break with the
Medieval world slowly replaces the image of God Pantocrator with the image of ‘man.’
Often derided for its torpid response to the “feeling for time,” the Enlightenment
nevertheless produced some of our first philosophers of historicity.723 Bakhtin names
Lessing, Winckelmann, and Herder as examples.724 Kant’s distinction between
Naturbeschreibung and Naturgeschichte, or physiography and physiogony, is an
important addition to this list.725 This awakening to the flow of time as the real everyday
historical continuity that finds its home only in the human animal became the formative
force of Goethe’s chronotopic visualizing. For Bakhtin, the force of history comes to the
fore in Goethe’s humanist sensitivity to time as it is realized by the unfolding of objects
heavily laden with the past and pregnant with the future. Goethe likewise injects the past
into the present but a past that is as much a becoming as is the present. In Goethe’s
chronotopic vision of the fullness of time “everything is intensive” 726; even petrified
nature can come alive again to the studied eye that has learned to see, while the invisible

176
Platonic worship of the ideal is something that keeps us shoe-gazing. The Bildungsroman
provides its own novel education for historical humankind with which it teaches itself a
new image of the world and our place in it; so too, we must continue to endeavour to
learn from the past which wells up around us, if we do not want to be simply swept away
in the deluge.
As it was with Pico so it is with Goethe. Humans are the “nuptial bond of the
world,” in whom the whole of the object in its history, its sense (historicity), its
productive actuality and potential, and its very living essence are wed in this plenary
effusive Goethean vision that Bakhtin calls the fullness of time.
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Conclusion
At the beginning of the last section I appended a long quotation from Bakhtin that has by
now been very well trodden by scholars. In it, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin penned
some of the last words that he would write during his lifetime. He exhorts his reader to
take up the works of the past and infuse them with a new life, since “nothing is absolutely
dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival”—I hope that I have lived up in
some small way to his expectations and answered as an ethically active reader. We read
philosophy as members of a species in becoming who are beholden to time. We are
bound by the greatest weight imaginable. Too often we are caught up for weeks and
months and years in a style of life that forgets the movement of time and the great cosmic
comedy in which we are but momentary players—but we are players, witnesses. As a
result, many of us have forgotten or never learned how to see with a temporally piercing
vision; we treat time as something to be leapt over or merely endured. We treat ourselves
as coextensive with our proper names. We forget how to laugh when the daimon comes
out and plays its little joke on us. Great time destroys our best intentions and erases our
most erroneous missteps, but we ought to try to remember—as a culture rather than
merely as individuals—that time is likewise creative. Reading the Greeks, the Medievals,
Rabelais, Goethe and Dostoevsky edify us. But this activity in and of itself is pointless if
we do not take what we have learned in these authors and attempt to ethically respond to
the world in which we are living, and if we do not attempt to anticipate what is to come.
Lastly, because in the last analysis, and with a view to great time, we really are bound up
in a comedy of human errors, we need to learn to laugh at ourselves again—as the cosmos
does.
Heraclitus personifies time as a child playing at draughts and on whose shoulders
the sovereignty of the cosmos rests.727 Shakespeare called those buffoons who are
summoned by their master to witness his death “the fools of time”; they were to mark the
greater truth in his passing and thus offer some solace.728 Marx roguishly rejuvenates
Hegel: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in
world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the
second as farce.”729 Rabelaisian laughter fits squarely within this tradition of time’s
serious playfulness:
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Time itself abuses and praises, beats and decorates, kills and gives birth; this time
is simultaneously ironic and gay, it is the ‘playing boy’ of Heraclitus, who wields
supreme power in the universe. Rabelais builds an extraordinarily impressive
image of historical becoming within the category of laughter. This was not
possible before the Renaissance, when it had been prepared by the entire process
of historical development.730
History itself has a double-voice. To seriously mix metaphors, the dust-bin of history
burst into spontaneous laughter; in the Rabelaisian chronotope, time’s laughter is
personified in the concrete material image of the fool.
In closing out this little history of Bakhtin, I would like to provide a short
narrative of my own creation. Like Ivan Karamazov, I never wrote the story down, and
half in the spirit of jest and half in keeping with the occasion, I shall allow Ivan to
introduce it in a quoted utterance:
“I made up this poem in prose and I remembered it. I was carried away when I
made it up. You will be my first reader—that is, listener. Why should an author
forego even one listener?”731
Here is my story: Nietzsche says the gods died laughing when one of their number, an
“old wrath-beard of a god,” proclaimed himself as the only deity.732 Rabelais would have
finished the story as follows: this agelast god then proclaimed himself king of all ‘men’!
He was so tightly wound, old and brittle, that every day he beshit himself so that everyday
his chasuble had to be discarded. The god said, “I must not let men see that I have soiled
my own garments! It they see that I have beshit myself, they will think that I am no god
at all, but only a lowly creature like themselves.” Saying this he hid his garments
underground, in Hades. A millennium passed like this, and then another. And, when
time it was that he came near unto the Earth, all the men cowered in fear of the ‘one true
god.’ But, when he returned on high on the days leading up to Lent, and when they were
sure that he could not hear them—for his hearing was very poor, then they themselves
burst out in laughter. It was a spontaneous bum-gut laughter like that of the old gods
before them. And when they could not laugh any longer for fear of rupture, the folk
spoke to each other and said: “By the testicles of Hercules! Who is this creature who
calls himself ‘the highest’ and ‘almighty god,’ but has not even the sense to bathe his
soiled robes and instead buries them in the earth?”733
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Every great writer participates in such a dialogue; he participates with his creativity as one of the
sides in this dialogue. But writers themselves do not create polyphonic novels. Their rejoinders in
the dialogue are monologic in form; each has one world of his own while other participants in the
dialogue remain with their worlds outside the work. They appear with their own personal worlds
and with their own immediate, personal words. But prose writers, especially novelists, have a
problem with their own word. This word cannot be simply their own word (from the I). The word
of the poet, the prophet, the leader, the scientist, and then the word of the ‘writer.’ It must be
grounded. The need to represent somebody. The poet relies on inspiration and a special poetic
language. The prose writer does not have this poetic language.
Only a polyphonist like Dostoevsky can sense in the struggle of opinions and ideologies
(of various epochs) an incomplete dialogue on ultimate questions (in the framework of great time).
Others deal with issues that have been resolved within the epoch.
The journalist is above all a contemporary. He is obliged to be one. He lives in the
sphere of questions that can be resolved in the present day (or in the near future). He participates
in a dialogue that can be ended and even finalized, can be translated into action, and can become
an empirical force. It is precisely in this sphere that ‘one’s own word’ is possible. Outside this
sphere ‘one’s own word’ is not one’s own (the individual personality always transcends itself);
one’s own word cannot be the ultimate word.
Whitman is not easily placed in this scheme, but neither is he easily excluded. He is indeed committed to
the infinitude of becoming and as such ought to be given to the unfinalisability of dialogue. Though his
poetry is formally epic, it is well known that it is prosaically so. Jason Frank picks up on the distinctly
polyvocality of the American patois which was, after all, Whitman’s immediate contribution to the
American epic. See his essay “Aesthetic Democracy: Walt Whitman and the Poetry of the People”, The
Review of Politics, p. 419:
On the topic of polyvocality and the multitudinous self, Whitman has a striking affinity with the
work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who is similarly concerned with the socially embedded forms of speech
that occupy different and overlapping regions of a given language. Bakhtin calls this complex
social background of meaningful speech production ‘heteroglossia.’ For Whitman, a key
distinction of the American language, which emerges from and helps (re)enact American
democracy, was precisely such luxuriant proliferation of speech idioms. Whitman writes that
the immense diversity of race, temperament, character—the copious stream of humanity
constantly flowing hither—must reappear in free rich growths of speech.... The opulence
of race-elements is in the theory of America. Land of the Ensemble, to hear consenting
currents flow, and the ethnology of the States draws the grand outline of that hospitality
and reception that must mark the new politics, sociology, literature and religion
[emphasis added].
In speaking with Dock Angus Ramsay Currie regarding this problem, he suggested I imagine the two
figures speaking together over a pint. Would they both recognise avenues in which they might build
bridges toward the other’s position that they might communicate with understanding? I have a hard time to
believe that they would not. And we need not look beyond the evident personalities that emerge from
Bakhtin and Whitman’s writings—Bakhtin’s theories of polyphony and authorship remains textual even
where it suggests such personalities can be heard in the texts. I also cannot help myself but quote again
Whitman’s own utterance, which betrays at once his personal commitment to language as a concretized
real-life process: “‘Language... is not an abstract construction of the learn’d, or of dictionary makers, but it
is something arising out of the work, needs, ties, joys, affections, tastes, of long generations of humanity,
and has bases broad and low, close to the ground. Its final decisions are made by the masses,’” qtd. in
Frank, p. 424. As to Dostoevsky’s own infamous obsession with journalism and especially with the
newspaper, see Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 30 and especially f.n. 40, p. 45: “‘Do you get any
newspapers?’ Dostoevsky asked one of his female correspondents in 1867. ‘For God’s sake, read them,
one can’t do otherwise nowadays—and this is not to be fashionable, but so that the visible connection
between all things public and private might be stronger and more obvious.’” Bakhtin is himself quoting
from Leonid Grossman’s Poetika Dostoevskogo.
50
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 60. During Bakhtin’s philosophical apprenticeship, the primary
nucleus of the “Marburg School” of neo-Kantianism consisted of Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), Paul
Natorp (1954-1924), and Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), see Craig Brandist, “The Bakhtin Circle”, Internet
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Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/bakhtin/>, 08/07/2012. Nina Perlina places Paul
Natorp’s paper “Free Will and Responsibility” high on the list of Bakhtian influences during his neoKantian days. See Perlina Funny Things are Happening on the Way to the Bakhtin Forum, p. 3: “The
Natorp-Bakhtin illustration is only one of many primary sources that inspired Bakhtin’s work, and all await
their definitive integration into his creative biography.” See also Ann Shukman, “M. M. Bakhtin: Notes on
his Philosophy of Man”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. II, ed. Gardiner, p. 358: “Closest of all to Bakhtin was
probably Hermann Cohen who so deeply influenced Bakhtin’s friend Matvei Kagan. In a letter of 1921, we
find Bakhtin writing urgently to Kagan to ask for a copy of ‘Cohen’s ethics’ so that he could finish his
study ‘The Subject in Morality and the Subject in Law’ (evidently never finished).”
51
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 59.
52
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 60.
53
See Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 59. Since for him there was nothing truly noumenal and
since all phenomena was conceptual, Cohen went so far as to claim that “‘matter is only an hypothesis.’”
54
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 136.
55
The original reads: “Im Anfang war die Tat,” Faust: erster und zweiter Teil, I:1237, p. 28. The full
passage follows the movement of Faust’s thought as he contemplates which comes first word or deed, as he
cannot believe that words are the apex of all things—the origin of all existence, and the supreme power he
seeks to usurp. Contemplating all the possible meanings of das Wort, before arriving at what he takes to be
the divinely inspired conclusion that the connotation is deed and not sign. The audience is no doubt meant
to assume that the impetus for this thought is John’s gospel, 1:1, p. 713, which reads, “In the beginning was
the word,” or, more precisely, Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. No doubt this passage would have stood out to the
Bakhtin who wrote Toward a Philosophy of the Act, since one of the keystone ideas found therein is
crystallized in the Russian word Slovo, which indeed carries the connotation of both word and the action
which puts it to use. It is therefore not a far cry from act or deed (postupok) itself and would doubtlessly be
understood as such in the Russian imagination. Cf. Gardiner, “The Bakhtin Circle and the Theory of
Ideology”, The Dialogics of Critique, f.n. 13, p. 209:
It worth noting that the Russian term slovo utilized by the Bakhtin Circle, which is generally
translated as ‘word’, actually means both word as it is generally understood in English (that is, as a
discrete phonetic entity forming a meaningful element of language) as well as the method of
putting words to use (their concrete implementation) in actual discourse. It is therefore very similar
to the ancient Greek logos, which designates “not merely the capacity for rational discourse but the
rational faculty underlying and informing the spoken word in all its forms” (Harris and Taylor
1989:xi).
The full passage from Faust is as follows:
’Tis writ, ‘In the beginning was the Word.’
I pause, to wonder what is here inferred.
The Word I cannot set supremely high:
A new translation I will try.
I read, if by the spirit I am taught,
This sense: ‘In the beginning was the Thought.’
This opening I need not weigh again,
Or sense may suffer from a hasty pen.
Does thought create, and work, and rule the hour?
’Twere best: ‘In the beginning was the Power.’
Yet, while the pen is urged with willing fingers,
A sense of doubt and hesitancy lingers.
The spirit comes to guide me in my need,
I write, ‘In the beginning was the deed.’
See Goethe, Faust: Part One, I:1237, p. 71.
56
“Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 129.
57
Gardiner, “Ecology and Carnival: Traces of a ‘Green’ Social Theory in the Writings of M. M. Bakhtin”,
Theory and Society, f.n. 78, p. 804.
58
Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 102.
59
Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 105.
60
See Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 104:
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Formalism, when it became a poetics, turned out and still turns out to be a discourse on nothing or
on something which does not matter.... What was new in Formalism [was] the prime importance
which it accords to the linguistic raw material in the process of drawing up a theory of literature—
and [Formalism successfully reduced] its scope to a merely technocratic level, a supplementary
proof of the conventional concept of literature as an expression of historical reality
A supplement, that is, to the “historical attitude” of early 20th century literary study which had rejected
Symbolism in favour of a method that could deliver up the internal laws of the literary device, see Kristeva,
“The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 103.
61
Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 104.
62
See Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, pp. 105-6.
63
Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 106.
64
Husserl’s first book The Philosophy of Arithmetic was indeed psychologistic, and the “Prolegomena” to
his second book, Logical Investigations, was a refutation of his earlier position regarding the origin of
numbers. See Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, § 3, p. 13: “Logic is a theoretical discipline, formal and
demonstrative, and independent of psychology: that is one view. For the other it counts as a technology
dependent on psychology, which of course excludes the possibility of its being a formal, demonstrative
discipline like the other side’s paradigm arithmetic.”
65
For these fallacies see Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 106.
66
Kristeva, “The Ruin of Poetics”, Russian Formalism, ed. Bann and Bowlt, p. 107.
67
Charles Lock, “Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology,” Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed.
Gardiner, p. 286.
68
Bocharov, “Conversations with Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, pp. 6-7. Here Bakhtin
begins to answer Bocharov’s question about the authorship debate surrounding the Voloshinov books and
Medvedev’s The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship and winds up talking more generally about
religious censorship in 1920’s Russia; presumably Bakhtin is also sorry that he had to frame his work
within the discourse of Marxism. We would have to take Bocharov at his work here, as Bakhtin’s gestures
and utterances are here quoted and inflected through Bocharov’s representation. We should therefore be
wary about accepting this account wholesale and without critical distance. Bakhtin says,
“You see, I felt that [writing those books] was something I could do for my friends. It wasn’t hard
for me to do, for I thought that I would still write my own books, books without these unpleasant
additions.” Here he grimaced at the title [Marxism and the Philosophy of Language]. “After all, I
didn’t know that it would turn out the way it has. And then, such things as authorship, a name—
what significance do they have? Everything that was created during the past half century on this
graceless soil, beneath this unfree sky, all of it is to some degree morally flawed.”
“But, M. M., if we forget about Voloshinov’s book for the moment—it’s a rather difficult
case—may I ask what could be morally flawed in your book on Dostoevsky?”
“How can you say that? The way I could have written it would have been very different
from the way it is. After all, in that book I severed form from the main thing. I couldn’t speak
directly about the main questions.”
“What main questions, M. M.?”
“Philosophical questions. What Dostoevsky agonized about all his life—the existence of
God. In the book I was constantly forced to prevaricate, to dodge backwards and forward. I had to
hold back constantly. The moment a thought got going, I had to break it off. Backward and
forward” (he repeated this several times during the conversation). “I even misrepresented the
church.” M. M. had in mind the passage in the first chapter in which he argues with B. M.
Engelgardt’s article “The Ideological Novel of Dostoevsky.” Engelgardt interprets Dostoevsky’s
world in Hegelian terms as the dialectical becoming of one spirit. But, insists Bakhtin in his book,
“the unified evolving spirit was organically alien to Dostoevsky. ... An image for Dostoevsky’s
world that reflects his perspective,” continues Bakhtin, “would be the church as a communion of
unmerged souls ... or perhaps it would be the image of Dante’s world.” This statement is indeed
followed by a qualification: “The concrete artistic links between the various planes of the novel,
their combination in the unity of the work, must be explained and demonstrated by the material of
the novel itself, and both ‘Hegelian spirit’ and ‘church’ distract equally from this immediate task.’”
Bocharov quotes from Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, pp. 26-27.
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Cf. Bréhier, The History of Philosophy: The Middle Ages and the Renaissance, pp. 3-5. Bréhier charts
the hypostatization of these heresies within the early Church. Notably he marks that “we must carefully
separate West from East” where heretical determination is concerned. The Church of Antioch “refused to
see in Jesus Christ anything but a man perfected by divine grace, and it rejected metaphysical combinations
of God and man,” p. 2. Arius thought Christ was wholly mortal even if he was prima inter pares in terms
of creation, p. 2. The Council of Trent was in part meant to resolve this issue, p. 3. St. Augustine himself
combated both Donatism and Pelagianism, see Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the
Development of Doctrine, Vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, p. 308:
Of the many “heresies” against which Augustine defended the catholic faith, the two most virulent
were Donatism and Pelagianism, both of which dealt with the doctrine of divine grace, and
specifically with the relation between grace and perfection. Donatism charged that the mediation
of grace through the church and the sacraments was vitiated when the administrator of the
sacraments had lost his Christian perfection through a serious fall into sin. Pelagianism maintained
that man still faced the same choice faced by Adam between sin and perfection, and that therefore
grace was helpful, but not necessary in the sense in which Augustine taught.
Bréhier provides a final detail, p. 3: “The Church in its role as an institution necessary for the dispensation
of divine grace was incompatible with both of these heresies. Today these struggles may appear to us as an
early scholastic or legalistic encounter between agelast austerity, but we ought also to see behind it a
political striving to unify a front against an exterior secular world that was often still hostile to Christians
and, ironically enough, as a political enterprise to overcome factionalism within them Empire. Most
academics rightly have reservations that anything productive can come from the conceptual traditions of the
Christian Church(es), but here too we ought to be careful to separate the dogmatic from the thematic. In no
form does the Christian Church encompass all of its own philosophical bases, which often begin before it
and continue after it. We cannot be committed materialists of the kind Bakhtin would endorse and ignore
the very real history of ideas which courses beneath the stones of the Christian Church; these ideas are
human ideas before they are Christian, and they are as equally double-voiced as are all other human ideas.
This is why I have attempted to frame my discussion in terms of the Byzantine and Kenotic traditions rather
than Christian vs. secular, or perhaps worse still Christological vs. philosophical. It is not enough to state
that we are anti-Christian or irreligious. We must determine what it is in Christian doctrine and religion
that we oppose. Short of this we are very much in danger of bringing these oppositions into our thought by
the back door, and surreptitiously repeating in the secular what we have thoughtlessly rejected in the
religious. Below I will attempt to show that it is the mystical, the austere, the dogmatic elements, as well as
the doctrine of original sin in Christianity to which Bakhtin was opposed; as a materialist interested in
building a bridge to the theological and the critical, he emphasized the here and now, flesh and blood,
compassionate, and concrete aspects of the Christian conception of the world and self-other relations.
Bakhtin’s relationship to Christian doctrine is not as transparent as some theorists have thought. To say
‘Bakhtin is a thinker of the social’ or a ‘materialist’ is not enough. Not only would this position dismiss
much of Bakhtin’s early writings, it would paint all Christian ideas with the same brush. We in the West
and especially from the vantage of 2000 years of atrocious crusading, marauding, and hierarchical
structures of power, have good reason to do so, but this ought not be taken as an excuse to look no further.
70
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 84, emphasis mine.
71
See White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed.
Gardiner, p. 211: “as ‘Bakhtin’ notes, ‘the word used in quotations marks, that is, felt and used as
something alien’ indicates how the word is distributed on various places and at various distances from the
plane of the authorial word. For the moment, ‘Bakhtin’ is more appropriate, more appropriated, than
Bakhtin. He will have to wait a while for his homecoming festival.”
72
For Cohen, see Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, pp. 59-62; for Buber and Manichaeism, p. 80.
Holquist is certainly aware of the differences that enter into the dialogue between Cohen and Buber, see his
introduction to Art and Answerability, p. xxxv: “Of course, the whole emphasis on architectonics and
aesthetics in these early Bakhtin essays is quite different in its implications from anything in Cohen or
Buber.” My concern is that Holquist tends to equate these three thinkers because of the religious
connection only to find that this supposed connection is actually quite differently orientated; this connection
seems to trump the other very real influences exhibited in Bakhtin’s particular stance on the I/Thou in
Buber or Cohen’s neo-Kantian monism. That said, Clark and Holquist’s account is relatively balanced, but
they are not explicit enough as to their motivation for making these connections or in showing how this
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equation benefits Bakhtin scholarship beyond providing interesting background information as to which
philosophical trends Bakhtin was in dialogue with. As we have already stated, the biographers do provide
cursory checks and balances regarding the Cohen-Bakhtin interface, see Clark and Holquist, MB, p. 60.
Regarding Meier: Meier was the founder of a religious sect known as Voskresenie. He was a
“mystical anarchist” and was a “very tough Marxist” in Bakhtin’s estimation, who sought to build bridges
between the two ideologies. He wanted to “link religion and revolution, communism and ‘Christ.’” See
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 128.
73
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 120.
74
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 122. Dialogism is Holquist’s term for Bakhtin’s Ürprinzip. I am
not entirely satisfied with this term, since it would seem to hypostatize what to my mind is not an
ontological assertion but a method or disposition toward thought and action—even though it is based on the
ontological divide between subjects.
75
See Lock, “Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed.
Gardiner, p. 286-7.
76
Raymond Geuss’ “Introduction”, in Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. xii. See also Plato’s account of
the Socrates’ recurring dream “in different shapes” in which he is told to “compose music,” Phaedo, 60r5ff.
See also Nietzsche’s commentary on this passage in the The Birth of Tragedy, §14, p. 71. James M. Curtis
also picks up on this theme in his “Michael Bakhtin, Nietzsche, and Russian Pre-Revolutionary Thought”,
Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 235-6:
For Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, it was Socrates who dissociated the Apollonian and the,
Dionysian by asking such abstract questions as, ‘What is the Good?’’ and ‘What is he Beautiful?’
Throughout the first third of twentieth century, intellectuals all over Europe found in this historical
scheme a way to analyze the malaise of their own times. The Birth of Tragedy served as a major
source for T. S. Eliot, for example, who found what what he called a ‘dissociation of sensibility’
had occurred in the seventeenth century after the death of John Donne, the last poet who could fuse
thinking and feeling.”
If he was the last metaphysical poet however, Donne was far from the last poet drawn to metaphysics; it
may be remembered that Eliot pursued post-graduate work in philosophy at Harvard where he studied under
non-other than George Santayana, and then studied Bergson and Maurras—“the reactionary Catholic
monarchist”— at the Sorbonne, cf. The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry, Vol. 1, ed.
Jahan Ramazani et al., p. 460.
77
See Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 15: “For Christianity the fact of suffering in life means
primarily that life is not just, that it is even essentially unjust, that it pays for an essential injustice by
suffering, it is blameworthy because it suffers. The result of this is that life must be justified, that is to say,
redeemed of its injustice or saved. ... Even when Christianity sings the praises of love and life what curses
there are in these songs, what hatred beneath this love! It loves life like a bird of prey loves the lamb;
tender, mutilated and dying.”
78
Cf. John Dillon’s “Introduction” to Plotinus’ The Enneads, p. lii. The reference is to The Republic, vi,
509b.
79
Cf. Jacques Derrida’s Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, p. 49.
80
For topos ouranios, cf. Derrida Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, p. 48.
81
On the Idea of Ideas, see section seven below.
82
For Plato’s discussion of this hierarchy, cf. The Republic, vi, 507a-511e.
83
For more on Kantian intuitions of time and space see section seven below.
84
I will return to this otherworldly character and to neo-Platonic thought, as well as Proclus’ place in it, the
last section of the present work, on Chronotopicity below.
85
Lock, “Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner,
p. 288-9. Lock’s understanding here is most perspicuous and accurately shows that there is no “virgule”
between Bakhtin’s orthodoxy and his philosophical concepts:
It is important here to insist that we are not talking about ‘theology in code’ or of an ‘encrypted’
Christianity. Such concepts imply a system and a stability of meaning which happen to be
provisionally or contingently obscured by exigency, wit or cunning. That would be a form of
Gnostic heresy such as Docetism, which sees the flesh as mere clothing or guise, or pedagogical
device for the Divine. Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia can be well expressed in anti-gnostic
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terms: context is not that which enables text to be manifest, but that which is integral to text if text
is to avoid the abuses of system and monologue.
86
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 84.
87
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 391.
88
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390.
89
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 391.
90
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 392.
91
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390. Notably, the idea that all ‘men’ are related in faith
tends to subvert both Byzantine hierarchical virtue and the neo-Platonic hierarchical virtue (supermundane)
: “All men are brothers not in a spiritual Christian sense, as having a common Father in heaven, but in an
earthly sense, of a common origin, or common blood.”
92
Again, see section seven below.
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White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 209.
94
White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 211.
95
What’s more, Holquist is responsible for co-editing Toward a Philosophy of the Act, Art and
Answerability, Speech Genres, and he helped Emerson translate The Dialogical Imagination.
96
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 167.
97
See also Michael Gardiner’s Critiques of Everyday Life, p. 44: “Voloshinov and Medvedev, were more
overtly Marxist. Medvedev even occupied several important government positions in education and culture
in the nascent Soviet regime.”
98
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 167. For more on Voloshinov’s writings as a propaedeutic, see
Section Five below.
99
On indirect and quasi-direct discourse, as well as reported speech, see Voloshinov, Marxism and the
Philosophy of Language, p. 116:
Reported speech is regard by the speaker as an utterance belonging to someone else, an
utterance that was originally totally independent, complete in its construction, and lying outside the
given context. Now, it is from this independent existence that reported speech is transposed into
an authorial context while retaining its own referential content and at least the rudiments of its own
linguistic integrity, its original constructional independence. The author’s utterance, in
incorporating the other utterance, brings into play syntactic, stylistic, and compositional norms for
its partial assimilation—that is, its adaptation to the syntactic, compositional, and stylistic design
of the author’s utterance, while preserving (if only in rudimentary form) the initial autonomy (in
syntactic, compositional, and stylistic terms) of the reported utterance, which otherwise could not
be grasped in full.
Certain modifications of indirect discourse and, in particular, quasi-direct discourse in
modern languages evince a disposition to transpose the reported utterance from the sphere of
speech construction to the thematic level—the sphere of content. However, even in these
instances, the dissolution of the reported utterance in the authorial context is not—nor can it be—
carried out to the end. Here, too, aside from indications of a semantic nature, the reported
utterance preserves as a construction—the body of the reported speech remains detectable as a
self-sufficient unit.
100
White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 225.
101
White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 218. See also Michael
Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 75:
Thus, as Allon White has recently argued, Bakhtin et al. remain ‘humanists’ in the sense that they
retain an interest in freedom, the fulfilment of human potentiality, and the cessation of oppression,
but also in the more technical sense that they continue to ascribe importance to the category of
‘agency’—that is, a belief in the creative or active role of collective human praxis vis-à-vis the
making of history. The conception of ‘history’ maintained by the individual members of the
Bakhtin Circle is not, however, teleologically inscribed or inexorable: it is ‘open’, a horizon of
unfulfilled possibilities which is ‘capable of death and renewal, transcending itself, that is,
exceeding its own boundaries”
102
White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 216.
103
White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 216.
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White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner,p. 217.
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White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 216:
In his essay on “Speech Genres” ‘Bakhtin’ makes it clear that speech is generic and conventional
to an astonishing degree and that there is no linguistic space in which the individual makes
utterance free from systematic cultural inflection. But ‘Bakhtin’ does allow individuals a reflexive
and creative relation to speech genres such that, to parody Marx, people make language but only
on the basis of what language has made of them.
106
Bakhtin, “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences”, Speech Genres, p. 170.
107
Hume’s thoroughgoing scepticism does not precisely preclude the force of sense-certainty. By analogy
White’s interpretation of the Bakhtinian subject as semantic personhood does not preclude the feeling of
being a subject, even though it would be impossible to point to where this subject has not first been
conditioned to from head to toe qua subject. The trouble I often have with post-structuralism, especially of
the Foucauldian brand, is that there the world seems devoid of people. On Hume’s ambivalence toward the
force of certainty granted in sensual existence, see Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 268-9:
But what have I here said, that reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have little or no
influence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my present
feeling and experience. The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in
human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and
reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probably or likely than another. Where am
I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return?
Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? And on
whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these
questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with
the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty.
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds,
nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium,
either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses,
which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am
merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I wou’d return to these
speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to
enter into them any farther.
Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin’d to live, and talk, and act
like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity,
and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general
maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all
my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the
sake of reasoning and philosophy.
108
See Alexei Bogdanov, “Ostranenie, Kenosis, and Dialogue: The Metaphysics of Formalism According
to Shklovsky”, The Slavic and East European Journal, p. 50:
As a theological term, kenosis originates in Philippians 2:5-8, where St. Paul speaks of
‘Christ’s’ ‘self-emptying’:
Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in ‘Christ’ Jesus, who, though he was
in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied
himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found
in human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on the
cross.
The issue remains controversial among the theologians, especially with regard to the degree of
‘Christ’s’ self-emptying. While the conservative tradition maintains that ‘Christ’, in his kenosis,
did not give up any of his divine attributes, the most radical interpretations suggests that not only
did ‘Christ’ cease to be God at that moment, but that God as such became incarnated and thus lost
all of his original attributes and died, which seems to justify Nietzsche’s infamous insight
concerning the death of God.
109
On degree see previous footnote.
110
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 78.
111
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 79.
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I owe the phrase “standing in someone else’s shoes” to a conversation with Michael Gardiner; the phrase
was his, not mine. On lack of chronological order, see Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”,
Art and Answerability, p. 27: “It should be kept in mind that the constitutive moments of projecting oneself
into the other and of consummating the other do not follow one another chronologically; we must
emphasise that the sense of each is different, although in living experience projection and consummation
are intimately intertwined and fuse with one another.”
113
Allon White has reservations about the appropriateness of Shukman’s own Bakhtinian appropriations, as
I mentioned briefly in this section. Nevertheless, Shukman’s commentary on Einfuhlung, at least, notes that
Bakhtin indeed rejects or partly rejects the idea as it is expounded in Dilthey and by the neo-Kantians. See
Shukman, “M. M. Bakhtin: Notes on his Philosophy of Man”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. II, ed. Gardiner, p.
357-8.
114
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 16:
pure empathising as such is impossible. If I actually lost myself in the other (instead of two
participants there would be one—an impoverishment of being), i.e., if I ceased to be unique, then
this moment of my not-being could never become a moment of my consciousness; non-being
cannot become a moment in the being of consciousness—it would simply not exist for me, i.e.,
being would not be accomplished through me at that moment. Passive empathising, beingpossessed, losing oneself—these have nothing in common with the answerable act/deed of selfabstracting or self-renunciation.
115
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 16: “In self-renunciation I actualise with utmost activeness
and in full the uniqueness of my place in being. The world in which I, from my own unique place,
renounce myself does not become a world in which I do not exist, a world which is indifferent, in its
meaning, to my existence: self-renunciation is a performance or accomplishment that encompasses beingas-event.”
116
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 16.
117
See J. O. Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary, p. 87-8.
118
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, C, CC, “Religion in the Form of art”, p. 439.
119
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, C, CC, “Religion in the Form of art”, p. 457:
The externalization {or kenosis} of substance, its growth into self-consciousness, expresses the
transition into the opposite, the unconscious transition of necessity; in other words, that substance
is in itself self-consciousness. Conversely, the externalization of self-consciousness expresses this,
that it is in itself the universal essence, or—since the Self is pure being-for-self which in its
opposite communes with itself—that is just because substance is self-consciousness for the elf, that
it is Spirit. Of this Spirit, which has abandoned the form of Substance and enters existence in the
shape of self-consciousness, it may therefore be said—if we wish to employ relationships derived
from natural generation—that it has an actual mother but an implicit father. For actuality or selfconsciousness, and the in-itself as substance, are its two moments through whose reciprocal
externalization, each becoming the other, Spirit comes into existence as their unity.
120
In reality, even a wholly aesthetic subject must admit of a unique life apart from the other. Again, no
absolute mergence is possible, and my consciousness will never appear within the consciousness of another.
121
Jacobs, “Bakhtin and the Hermeneutics of Love”, Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling of Faith, ed. Susan
M. Felch and Paul J. Contino, p. 40.
122
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 389.
123
For “alibi in being,” see Toward a Philosophy of the Act, passim. For example, p. 42:
An answerable act or deed is precisely that act which is performed on the basis of an
acknowledgement of my obligative (ought-to-be) uniqueness. It is this affirmation of my non-alibi
in being that constitutes the basis of my life being actually and compellently given as well as its
being actually and compellently projected as something-yet-to-be-achieved. It is only my nonalibi in being that transforms an empty possibility into an actual answerable act or deed (through
an emotional-volitional referral to myself as the one who is active). This is the living fact of a
primordial act or deed which produces for the first time the answerably performed act—produces
its actual heaviness, compellentness; it is the foundation of my life as a deed-performing
{postuplenie}, for to be in life, to be actually, is to act, is to be unindifferent toward the onceoccurrent whole.
124
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 389.
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Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 12.
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 18.
127
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 18.
128
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 17.
129
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 18.
130
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390-1.
131
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 390-1.
132
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 22.
133
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 24.
134
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25.
135
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25.
136
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25.
137
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 25.
138
That is, the answerable deed is not achieved through its simple rational justifiability, but this does not
make it irrational. This simply means that what counts as the ethically affirmative component in
answerability is the attention to the unique actuality of being in its everyday becoming. See Bakhtin,
Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 30:
The ongoing event can be clear and distinct, in all its constituent moments, to a participant in the
act or deed he himself performs. Does this mean that he understands it logically? That is, that
what is clear to him are only the universal moments and relations transcribed in the form of
concepts? Not at all: he sees clearly these individual, unique persons whom he loves, this sky and
this earth and these trees... and what is also given to him simultaneously is the value, the actually
and concretely affirmed value of these persons and these objects.
139
See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 468-73.
140
See Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, pp. 52-9.
141
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 53.
142
See Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 53: “The inward has
lost any authoritative outward form, but has not yet found a ‘form’ for the spirit (‘form’ in the strict sense
does not apply here, for it is no longer aesthetic: the spirit is not something given, but something present in
itself as a task to be accomplished”
143
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, pp. 53-4.
144
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 54.
145
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 54. We begin to see here
Martin Buber’s influence on Bakhtin’s thought, where there is an internal ‘thou’ category burped into
existence.
146
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 54.
147
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 55.
148
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 55.
149
Münchhausen is supposed to have been able to raise himself by his own hair.
150
See Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 7.
151
Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 56.
152
Cf. Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 57.
153
On love, particularly as it relates to the non-coincidence of subject and world or subject and object—and
these are not wholly the same phenomenal relation—see Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”,
Art and Answerability, p. 82:
Sympathetic co-experiencing of the hero’s life means to experience that life in a form completely
different from the form in which it was or could have been, experienced by the subiectum of that
life himself. Co-experiencing in this form does not in the least strive toward the ultimate point of
totally coinciding, merging with the co-experienced life, because such merging would be
equivalent to a falling away of the coefficient of sympathy, of love, and, consequently, of the form
they produced as well. A sympathetically co-experienced life is given form not in the category of
the I, but in the category of the other, as the life of another human being, another I. In other
words, a sympathetically co-experienced life is the life of another human being (his outer as well
as his inner life) that is essentially experienced from outside.
126
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See also Bakhtin’s analysis of love in Pushkin’s lyric “Parting”, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, pp. 65-75;
this analysis provides an excellent example of the non-coincidence of subject and other in the ethical
moment of sympathetic co-experiencing as it takes place in verbal art.
154
Bakhtin also takes up this theme of the other as reduced to pure objectivity in Problems in Dostoevsky’s
Poetics. See, for example, his commentary on the Romantic novel where the hero is reduced to mere
function of “implementer of authorial pathos,” p. 12.
155
Cf. Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p.128.
156
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p.129.
157
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 129.
158
Kristeva qtd. in Lock, “Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology”, MB Vol. I, ed Gardiner, p. 286.
159
Clark and Holquist, MB, p. 130.
160
On the witness and the judge, see Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137:
The witness and the judge. When consciousness appeared in the world (in existence) and, perhaps,
when biological life appeared (perhaps not only animals, but trees and grass and also witness and
judge [the Bergsonian image?]), the world (existence) changed radically. A stone is still stony and
the sun still sunny, but the event of existence as a whole (unfinalized) becomes completely
different because a new and major character in this event appears for the first time on the scene of
earthly existence—the witness and the judge. And the sun, while remaining physically the same,
has changed because it has begun to be cognized by the witness and the judge. It has stopped
simply begin and has started being in itself and for itself (these categories appear for the first time
here) as well as for the other, because if has been reflected in the consciousness of the other (the
witness and the judge): this has caused it to change radically, to be enriched and transformed.
(This has nothing to do with “other existence.”)
Note that while Bakhtin calls this the advent of consciousness I have called it the beginning of reflection.
Obviously there is a distinction being made here, but I do not believe by consciousness—in this section at
least—Bakhtin means nothing short of what Merleau-Ponty has termed “radical reflection.” This notion
emphasizes the incomplete and distinctly perspectival and essentially creative phenomenological,
participative, consciousness of something; the witness is not the transcendental ego, and the judge is not a
form of absolute reflection—nor is it a return to the rationalistic gnoseological subject. See Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 70-1:
If a universal constituting consciousness were possible, the opacity of the fact would disappear. If
then we want reflection to maintain, in the object on which it bears, its descriptive characteristics,
and thoroughly to understand that object, we must not consider it as a mere return to a universal
reason and see it as anticipated in unreflective experience, we must regard it as a creative operation
which itself participates in the facticity of that experience. That is why phenomenology, alone of
all philosophies, talks about a transcendental field. This word indicates that reflection never holds,
arrayed and objectified before its gaze, the whole world and the plurality of monads, and that its
view is never other than partial and of limited power. It is also why phenomenology is
phenomenology, that is, a study of the advent of being to consciousness, instead of presuming its
possibility as given in advance. It is striking how transcendental philosophies of the classical type
never question the possibility of effecting the complete disclosure which they always assume done
somewhere. It is enough for them that it should be necessary, and in this way they judge what is
by what ought to be, by what the idea of knowledge requires. [This is not the ought as it appears in
Bakhtin; it is the ought of the transcendental a priori ego.] In fact, the thinking ego can never
abolish its inherence in an individual subject, which knows all things in a particular perspective.
Reflection can never make me stop seeing the sun two hundred yards away on a misty day, [or by
perceptual constancy,] or seeing it ‘rise’ and ‘set,’ or thinking with the cultural apparatus with
which my education, my previous efforts, my personal history, have provided me.
161
Recently purchased by the British Library. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts17732310>, 08/07/2012. According to the unofficial history of St. Cuthbert’s Gospel, it had been buried
inside the coffin of St. Cuthbert’s. According to the British Library, there is a “13th century note added on
f. ii verso: ‘The Gospel of John which was found at the head of our blessed father Cuthbert lying in his
tomb in the year of his translation.’ The codex was purchased for £9 million, 08/07/2012. See images of
the text at the British Library website:
<http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=add_ms_89000_fs001r>, 08/07/2012.
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See OED “word,”
<http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/view/Entry/230192?rskey=X3ExQNandresult=1&isAdvance
d=false#eid>:
Cognate with Old Frisian word (West Frisian wurd), Old Dutch wort (Middle Dutch wort, word,
Dutch woord), Old Saxon word (Middle Low German wort), Old High German wort (Middle High
German wort, German Wort), Old Icelandic orð, Old Swedish orþ (Swedish ord), Old
Danish orth (Danish ord), Gothic waurd, all denoting both ‘an utterance’ and ‘an element or unit
of speech, a word’ < the same Indo-European base as Lithuanian vardas name, forename, title,
Latvian vārds word, forename, promise, classical Latin verbum word, showing an extended form
of the Indo-European base of ancient Greek ῥήτωρ (earlier ϝρήτωρ) speaker, (Epic and Ionic)
ἐρέω (earlier ϝερέω; Attic ἐρῶ) I shall say, and perhaps also Sanskrit vrata behest, command.
163
Cf. Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 65.
164
Cf. Bakhtin, “Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences”, Speech Genres, p. 170.
165
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 56.
166
Qtd. in Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 254.
167
Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of modernism and the Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism”, in The
Crisis in Modernism, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, p. 52. See also Clark and Holquist,
Mikhail Bakhtin¸ pp. 100-102. Clark and Holquist name Kanaëv “the most important new member of the
group for Bakhtin”, p. 102.
168
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 174.
169
The occasion, that is, according to Clark and Holquist, but Nina Perlina reminds us that before Nikolai
Lossky was forced to leave Russia in 1922 he had written a brochure titled Sovremennyj vitalizm
(contemporary vitalism). Kanaëv and Bakhtin’s article not only takes this title, it “is a studied copy of
several chunks cut from the first part of Lossky’s work. It seems clear that inspiration for this article cannot
be granted exclusively to Ukhtomsky. Kanaëv and Bakhtin’s paper appeared in 1926. See Perlina, Funny
Things are Happening on the Way to the Bakhtin Forum, p. 13.
170
Cf. Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin “The Leningrad Circle”, Mikhail Bakhtin, f.n. 13, p. 367:
Baxtin, ‘Sovremennyj vitalizm,’ Čelovek i priroda, no. 1 (1926): 33-42; no. 2 (1926): 9-22. Nos. 2
and 3 of this periodical announced another ‘Kanaëv’ article in the next issue, but none appeared.
Kanaëv concentrated on the topic of Goethe as a naturalist but also wrote on morphological
questions and the history of evolutionary theory, multiple births, hydras, and Leclerc de Buffon.
In providing his concise history of vitalism, one which Rousseau fears that “no single chapter, no matter
how well researched or well written, can hope to do justice to,” p. 17, Rousseau’s scholarly achievement is
actually quite stunning. Moreover, he remembers to address all the right questions regarding historicalcritical aspects of his survey; regarding the term ‘science’ for example—“Whose science? Which science?
Where? When? Under what conditions?, p. 21.” He also provides the right interface between the political
motivations of various currents in the vitalist and mechanist controversies of the 17th through the 19th
centuries—and his position seems on face value to itself be informed by Bakhtin’s own commitment to a
loosely Marxist historical materialism: “one cannot generalize that a vitalist’s politics, religion, science, and
so forth, ought to be of a piece: uniform, homogenous, isomorphic. Yet one is persuaded that there was
something then approximating a ‘vitalistic mind-set’ as distinguished from the previous mechanistic one,
and that it extended from scientific method to ideological mind-set and personal politics”, p. 44—i.e., from
life to consciousness.
171
Indeed, Bakhtin seems to follow Marx in his supposition that the path to science is not straight and
narrow, but evolves in fits and starts, contractions and false starts. See the 1872 preface to the French
edition of Capital, Vol. 1, p. 104: “There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the
fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.”
172
Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of modernism and the Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism”, in The
Crisis in Modernism, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, p. 53. Rousseau commits a pretty glaring
gaffe here, however, stating that Hermann Cohen was one of the more noteworthy members of the
Leningrad Circle professing themselves to be neo-Kantians. Given that Cohen was the leading proponent
of neo-Kantianism up until his death in 1918 and worked out of Marburg, and that to the best of my
knowledge never set his foot in Leningrad or even on Russian soil, I cannot see how this was possible,
unless of course some of the members had learned the art of resurrecting the dead from their affiliation with
Voskresenie, whose name means ‘Sunday’ or ‘resurrection,’ see Clark and Holquist, p. 141. Rousseau
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himself is an accomplished cultural theorist working at or affiliated with various prestigious schools in the
United States and Britain, it is hard for me to believe that this is anything more than a simple parapraxis.
Nevertheless, the obviousness of the slip does not bolster one’s confidence that Rousseau has read Clark
and Holquist carefully. This could be problematic, since they remain the cornerstone source on which he is
building his case for Bakhtin’s critical assessment of vitalism. Since Clark and Holquist are also one of my
own touchstones of reference, I have everywhere endeavoured not only to read them closely, but critically.
173
Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of modernism and the Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism”, in The
Crisis in Modernism, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, p. 54.
174
Gardiner, “‘The Incomparable Monster of Solipsism’: Bakhtin and Merleau-Ponty”, p. 136. See also
Clark and Holquist, p. 102: “This interest [in biological science] led Bakhtin to write the review article
‘Contemporary Vitalism,’ which appeared in 1926 in the popular scientific journal Man and Nature... under
Kanaëv’s name, the first of Bakhtin’s articles to be published under a friend’s name.”
175
We have already seen how the shift from the purely external physical body to the internalization of
consciousness of the world as a task of seeking redemption informed Bakhtin’s work anthologized in Art
and Answerability. Thus the external world of the ancients was likewise the origin of the movement of
consciousness for the Greeks—although it was not yet material in the modern sense. A similar notation is
expressed in “Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences”, p. 165: “The influence of extra-textual
reality in the shaping of the writer’s artistic vision and the artistic thought (and the vision of thought of
others who create culture).” It is certainly arguable that Bakhtin did not follow Marx and Engels in all
things, but one cannot help imagining Bakhtin sipping black tea and nodding his head in agreement while
reading The German Ideology, and specifically this passage worthy of An Introduction to Marx 101, p. 47:
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, active men, as they are conditioned
by a definite development of their productive forces and of their intercourse corresponding to
these, up to its fullest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else then conscious existence,
and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances
appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
Again, cf. “Toward a Methodology”, p. 164: “True understanding in literature and literary scholarship is
always historical and personified.”
176
Perlina takes this undecidable approach. See Perlina, Funny Things are Happening on the Way to the
Bakhtin Forum, p. 15: “Without denying the validity of Kanaëv’s statement that Bakhtin had published at
least one text under his name, we are still not sure whether Bakhtin actually wrote the article… What we
can now clearly see is that in 1926, Bakhtin had copied several parts of Lossky’s brochure on vitalism for
his friend Kanaëv.”
177
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, The Crisis of Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy, ed.
Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass, p. 76. For Hypotheses non fingo (“I do not make hypotheses”) see
also Joseph Henry Green’s “Recapitulatory Lecture”, Vital Dynamism, p. 100, where Green attempts to
save the reputation of John Hunter from the “charge of ill founded and visionary opinions... [by] banishing
hypotheses, fictions, and arbitrary assumptions, and by considering Life as a Law.”
178
Cf. Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 78.
179
For the original formulation of these tidy distinctions at the heart of Kant’s critical philosophy, cf. “On
the ideal of the highest good”, Critique of Pure Reason, A805/B833, p. 677: “All interest of my reason (the
speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What should I do?
3. What may I hope?”
For the “participative thinking” (uchastnoe myshlenie) performed by participative consciousness see
Toward a Philosophy of the Act, passim, and esp. p. 8:
Participative thinking predominates in all great systems of philosophy, either consciously and
distinctly (especially in the Middle Ages) or in an unconscious and masked form (in the systems of
the 19th and 20th centuries). One can observe a peculiar lightening of the very term ‘being’ or
‘reality.’ Kant’s classical example against the ontological proof, that a hundred real thalers are not
equal to a hundred thinkable thalers, has ceased to be convincing.
Bakhtin here refers to Kant’s logical exposition against the ontological proof for God’s existence, Critique
of Pure Reason A596/B624-A600/B628, pp. 566-68. The ontological proof is excellently summarized by
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Schopenhauer in his On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, II, § 7, pp. 16-7: “According to Descartes, the
existence of God is contained in the conception of God, therefore it becomes an argument for his actual
being.” With his heel, Schopenhauer strikes at the head of the viperous precision of rationality: “Wär’ der
Gedank’ nicht so verwünscht gescheut, Man wär’ versucht ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen” (“Were not the
thought so cursedly acute, One might be tempted to declare it silly”), p. 12. Kant’s refutation of the
ontological proof simply arrives at the conclusion that simply thinking a thing adds nothing to its existence,
and if this were not the case the conception of the thing would not be the conception of the thing since
something has been added to the predicate—namely being, which Kant understands as relegated to the
copula alone. Therefore, in Kant’s example, “a hundred actual dollars do contain the least bit more than the
merely possible”, A599/B627, p. 567. The reason why we think a hundred actually dollars greater in sum
to the conception of them is because the two are joined synthetically, and so further conceptions follow
such as ‘I am rich.’ But the concept of a hundred thalers is not changed by the actual existence of the
money.
Bakhtin no longer finds this argument convincing since the argument is ordained merely in the
theoretical sphere and does not actually participate in being. For him once-occurrent being-as-event does
add a valuative accent to the concept in participative consciousness; he continues:
What is historically on hand once and only once in the reality that was determined by me in an
once-occurrent manner is, indeed, incomparably heavier. But when it is weighed on theoretical
scales (even with the addition of a theoretical constatation of its empirical existence) in detachment
from its historically valuative uniqueness, it is highly unlikely that it will prove to be heavier than
what is merely thinkable. Historically actual once-occurrent being is greater and heavier than the
unitary being of theoretical science, but this difference in weight, which is self-evident for a living
and experiencing consciousness, cannot be determined in theoretical categories.
As an aside, Vadim Liapunov conjectures that Bakhtin’s “participative thinking” could be related to interest
in Kierkegaard and more generally the German das seinsverbundene Denken, or “thinking that derives or
relates to ‘eine reale Existenz’ (an actually existing human being),” and which is contrary to Bewußtsein
überhaupt, or “pure cognizing,” Toward a Philosophy of the Act, f.n. 29, p. 86. I am in full agreement with
the spirit if not the letter of Liapunov’s observation.
180
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 79.
181
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 79.
182
Cf. Hegel’s Phenomenology, C, (DD), p. 492. There Hegel compares the movement of history, which he
sees as the negative aspect or reflection of ‘Spirit,’ to a “gallery of images.” In the process of revealing
itself to itself through the movement of history, Spirit takes on a succession of forms each of which is,
according to Hegel, internalized and preserved in the inward being of Spirit. The process is supposed to
continue through this internalization of the forms of Spirit achieved in their external extensive historical
aspect until absolute knowing is achieved, at which time history ceases to unfold, or so it is typically held
that Hegel believed this to be the case, especially by apologists for capitalism such as Fukuyama, although
the very idea of such an eschatological achievement was detestable to Bakhtin and I am inclined to agree
with him. The difference between Hegel’s use of the phrase “succession of Spirits” and my own,
“succession of forms” is therefore meant to call attention simply to the analogous and often inherited
continuity of concepts from one age of vitalism to another, and in no way is to be understood as an attempt
to rejuvenate Hegel’s idea of Spirit, or “the absolute notion.” Another example lies in the work of TranDuc-Thao, who attempted to wed Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity, as described in The Crisis, with
dialectical materialism via this type of Hegelian historical-spiritual synthesis, and who could be said to be
an adherent to the positivist camp in the philosophy of science; see for example Leonard Lawlor’s Derrida
and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, pp. 55-6 :
Dialectical materialism... ‘defines the truth of scientific concepts insofar as it reproduces in
consciousness the real processes by which life constitutes itself in the general movement of
material structures. Even consciousness, a region apparently heterogeneous to the physicochemical, presents no great difficulty for ‘the very movement of positive explanation’; as TranDuc-Thao says, ‘the act of consciousness in its lived meaning is defined exhaustively by the
dialectic of behavior.’ Transcendental structures such as temporalization ‘coincide in a strict
manner’ with real structures which merely preceded them in real time; real time is the only type of
priority for Tran-Duc-Thao. Dialectical materialism’s subject matter, therefore would be the
‘evolution of life leading to humanity’
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Far from deconstructing Tran-Duc-Thao’s line of argument, the young Derrida destroys Tran-Duc-Thao’s
account in the latter’s thesis The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology. According to Lawlor,
Derrida’s account leaves Tran-Duc-Thao either entirely on the side of dogmatism or without having
grounded the sciences: “It is hard to know how [Tran-Duc-Thao] can account for objective knowledge... by
rejecting phenomenology’s subjectivism, Tran-Duc-Thao seems to appeal again to some sort of thing-initself. If this interpretation is correct, then Tran-Duc-Thao relapses into dogmatism. But, on the other hand,
if Tran-Duc-Thao is not presupposing some sort of materialist metaphysics, then it must be the case that the
natural sciences remain entirely ungrounded for him. Basing their priority entirely on real time, he does not
provide the conditions for the possibility of the sciences,” Lawlor, p. 56. Husserl had initiated his project
explicitly to account for this ground by way of intentionality, and specifically meaning-intention and
meaning-fulfilment, see Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, “Investigation I”, “Chapter 1”, §§ 9-12, pp.
191-8.
183
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 80.
184
See for example, Husserl’s direction on this point, regarding what he calls the mathematization of nature
in which “nature itself is idealized under the guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes—to
express it in a modern way—a mathematical manifold (Mannigfaltigkeit),” Crisis, II, § 9, p. 23. Against
the Husserlian culture of idealism we may read Heisenberg’s commitment to empirical verification as the
ground of the sciences, Physics and Philosophy, p. 83:
Descartes considered [cogito ergo sum] as the solid ground on which he could build his system. It
is in fact true that this statement has the certainty of a mathematical conclusion, if the words
‘cogito’ and ‘sum’ are defined in the usual way or, to put it more cautiously and at the same time
more critically, if the words are so defined that the statement follows. But this does not tell us
anything about how far we can use the concepts of “thinking” and “being” in finding our way. It is
finally in a very general sense always an empirical question how far our concepts can be applied.
For Arendt, Galileo’s remarkable discovery of the universal application of math to nature—Husserl’s socalled “Mannigfaltigkeit” had colonized the lifeworld and corroded the active life of man, sic., The Human
Condition, p. 261:
The modern astrophysical world view, which began with Galileo, and its challenge to the adequacy
of the senses to reveal reality, have left us a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the
way they affect our measuring instruments, and—in the words of Eddington—‘the former have as
much resemblance to the latter as a telephone number has to a subscriber.’ Instead of objective
qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature or the universe—in the words
of Heisenberg—man encounters only himself.
185
See Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of Modernism”, p. 39, where we are reminded that Geoffrey
Cantor had recognized and written a dissertation on Newton’s vitalism as early as 1743.
186
Eichner, “The Rise of Modern Science and the Genesis of Romanticism”, p. 9. To hear David Abram
speak, who is a self described eco-phenomenologist rather than a vitalist, one might think that d’Holbauch
supposition that an invisible hand guided gravity was still very much alive. See David Abram, “How to
Think about Science”, Ideas, CBC Radio, <http://www.cbc.ca/ideas/episodes/2009/01/02/how-to-thinkabout-science-part-1---24-listen/#episode12> 17/07/2012:
...gravity was an uncanny mystery to our brothers and sisters at the dawn of the scientific age, but
once it began to be spoken of as a law—the law of gravity—as soon as we speak of it as a law we
stop noticing it, because it’s just happening automatically and so there’s nothing very mysterious
there. But what is this mystery? We define it even today as ‘mutual attraction of bodies at a
distance,’ which is as good a definition for Eros as I know. The attraction of my body to the body
of the earth and the earth’s flesh for my flesh, that I am in a kind of ongoing erotic relationship to
the earth at every moment as is each stone that I toss up into the air and finds its way right back to
contact with the ground. But how different our experience would be if we find out that gravity is
Eros. So it seems to me that, with a bit of attention and a careful attentiveness to how we speak,
we can begin to notice and make evident once again how wild and quite outrageous everything still
is. This interaction or reciprocity between our organism and a larger world that we did not create
or invent—a world that created us.
187
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 81: “We term contemporary vitalism critical in the subjective
sense, that is, we mark only the fact that its representatives strive to be critically-minded, whether they
succeed or not.”
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See Rousseau, “The Perpetual Crises of Modernism”, pp. 29-37. For Robinet, see Lovejoy, p. 281:
“Robinet was one of the earlier prophets of the élan vital.” See also, p. 277, where he points to what he
calls Robinet’s “‘retrotensive method’... the result... was the establishment, by a single stroke of logic, of a
whole group of important philosophical conclusions—among them, hylozoism, panpsychism, and a peculiar
sort of panlogism, a doctrine of the ubiquity of the rudiments of rationality in all natural things.” See also,
p. 282: [h]ere, manifestly, is a philosophy of l’evolution créatrice in outline; and its resemblance to its
twentieth-century counterpart is heightened by the fact that it too is, in the end, puzzlingly combined with a
species of phenomenalism; the matter which hampers the active principle is nevertheless its product and
exists only as an appearance, while the active principle is in itself non-spatial.” Also, for Nisus Formativus,
see Blumenbach, An Essay on Generation, p. 68; also “On the Natural Varieties of Mankind”, On the
Natural Varieties of Mankind, p. 194. Kant is one of the first to present the purported purposiveness of
nature as a merely “regulative principle,” and is by far the most thorough in attempting to expand and
ground this purposiveness (Zweckmässige) in epistemology—specifically in reflective judgement. See
Critique of the Power of Judgement, II, § 61, 5:359-5:361, p. 233-4.
189
Cf. Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation, p. 58: “In organic beings, Kant argues, ‘normal’ causality {nexus
effectivus} is conjoined with a causality of final causes {nexus finalis}....” See also, The Critique of the
Power of Judgement, § 61 “On the objective purposiveness of nature”, 5:360, p. 233.
190
The Critique of the Power of Judgement, § 61 “On the objective purposiveness of nature”, 5:387, p. 259.
191
An explanation of the third antinomy, or “Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas,” Beginning from
the thesis that there is more than one type of causality, i.e., more than just natural—or efficient—cause,
Kant deduces an “absolute causal spontaneity” that is self-caused. A wholly efficient account of causation
amounts only to an infinite succession of causes. We also must presume a first cause. Nevertheless, an
infinite regress of causes is assured a priori, since this first cause, being efficient, would necessarily rely on
an antecedent external cause. Therefore, we must assume a second type and one which is self-generating
and does not itself rely on a prior external cause.
The antithesis account that Kant provides begins from the assumption that there is only efficient
cause. The proof runs like this: if one assumes a free cause at the beginning of a successive chain, and
thereby claims to have done away with the necessity of an exterior cause for this original cause, then one
can no longer provide a basis for efficient cause at all. By assuming an original freedom and spontaneity
that any self-caused event implies, one cannot at the same time hold that this free cause will then follow
according to the necessity that efficient cause implies: “one cannot say that in place of the laws of nature,
laws of freedom enter into the sources of the world, because if freedom were determined according to laws,
it would not be freedom, but nothing other than nature.”
The third antinomy does not resolve itself into the univocal thesis of efficient cause or the equally
univocal antithesis of free cause, since their seeming mutual exclusion is illusory. Kant places the
presumption of an originary free-cause that initiates the succession of causes entirely on the side of the
transcendental a priori side of cognition. The understanding does not derive the idea of a first cause from
experience, but provides it as a necessary presupposition. Likewise, the antithesis statement, that there is
only efficient cause, relies on the fact that nowhere in experience are we presented with direct evidence for
spontaneous self-generated causes. Furthermore, it is only from experience that we come to understand a
priori that there must have been a beginning, since it is only through experience that we witness change. In
the example Kant provides, I can think the possibility of my free decision to get up out of the chair I am
sitting in without contradicting the determinism of efficient cause. On the one side there is an absolute
beginning—i.e., my decision which causes me to purposively get up out of the chair. This spontaneity is to
be viewed as a truly self-caused beginning to a succession of causes and does not require a reference to any
prior external cause. On the other side mechanical cause continues according to its laws. There is no
conflict, since any mechanical account of causation will be wholly on the side of temporal succession, and
therefore must always presuppose an antecedent cause. On the one side reason insinuates a first mover. On
the other side experience provides us with the idea of succession, change, and efficient cause. Finally, we
can only think the possibility of freedom as existing outside of the world, since it cannot admit antecedent
causes, and since we must think of nature according to efficient cause, without which it could only be
thought of as “confused and disconnected.” See Critique of Reason, A444-51/B472-79, pp. 484-89.
192
Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation, p. 44.
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The Critique of the Power of Judgement, §71, “Preparation for the resolution of the above antinomy”,
5:389, p. 260-1. See also Steigerwald’s Kant’s Concept of Natural Purpose and the Reflecting Power of
Judgement”, p. 729:
[Kant] argued that if the tow maxims are converted into constitutive principles for determinative
judgement, the antinomy is transformed into ‘a conflict within the legislation of reason.’ If the
principles of the reflecting power of judgement are taken as having objective reality, and an idea of
reason regarding the final cause of nature as either intentional or unintentional is used for
determinative judgements, the dispute between them becomes dogmatic, similar to the antinomy of
the first Critique. And as in the first Critique, Kant’s solution was to expose this conflict as
illusory by critically examining the principles in relation to our cognitive powers and their
limitations. Reason’s demand for principles aims at the unconditioned, at the supersensible basis
that makes things possible and that makes nature itself possible. But for human cognition not all
possible ideas have actuality, for our ideas to have an objective basis, they require the
understanding to be conditioned by given sensible intuitions.
194
Cf. The Critique of the Power of Judgement, §. 71, “Preparation for the resolution of the above
antinomy”, 5:389, p. 260-1:
All appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of that kind of explanation which is genuinely
physical (mechanical) and that which is teleological (technical) therefore rests on confusing a
fundamental principle of the reflecting with that of the determining power of judgement, and on
confusing the autonomy of the former (which is valid merely subjectively for the use of our reason
in regard to the particular laws of experience) with the heteronomy of the latter, which has to
conform to the laws given by the understanding (whether general or particular).
195
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 81. He names the usual suspects of this brand of ‘neo-vitalism’ as
follows: Hans Driesch, Johannes Reinke, William Stern, and E. von Hartmann, although these do not
“comprise a single school of thought.” Reinke is spelled Rainke in the translated paper, though I take it that
this is a typographical error.
196
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 82.
197
The fantastic regenerative properties of the polyp, or hydra, plays an important role here in convincing
Driesch and provides a powerful visual image of the regulative powers of the purported life force as it did
for Blumenbach before him. For Leeuwenhoek, who discovered the polyp’s regenerative powers, and for
Trembley who rediscovered them, the polyp did not represent the regenerative nisus so much as the
“missing link” between plants and animals, see Lovejoy, p. 233. Blumenbach had made experiments with
cutting individual polyps to watch the process of regeneration and even succeeded in more radical attempts
at splicing halves of green and brown armed polyps together. When he cut the polyp, he found that the
“little mutilated animal” regenerated the excised part of its body, but did so such that the new growth was
“always diminished in bulk,” Blumenbach, On Generation, p. 69. The new growth did not show any
marked change in form, however, and Blumenbach became convinced that there must be some Lebenskräft,
and of a “material basis” (Lenoir, “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism”, p. 84), which both
stimulated and guided its generation, nutrition, and production, see Richards, “Kant & Blumenbach on the
Bildungstrieb”, p. 18. It was essential, however, that this force not be taken as something somehow
external to the matter of which the organism was composed—as for example in Robinet’s active principle
which impresses itself on matter from the outside.
Cf. also Lovejoy, p. 281, where he explains that for Robinet, in the beginning, brute matter is dominant
where matter is actually a ‘clogging’ of spontaneous action, which the puissance active must struggle to
overcome. Gradually that “matter becomes less an obstacle than the instrument whereby the force achieves
its end.” Lovejoy also notes that Robinet seems to have discarded the principle of continuity that had
guided him to his theory of individual gradations in the principle of plenitude.
Lenoir draws our attention to this point, Lenoir, “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism”, p. 84 :
Two features of Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb are extremely important to bear in mind. The first is
that it could not be reduced to the chemical constituents of the generative fluid. Blumenbach
repeatedly emphasized the immanent teleological character of his conception of the Lebenskräft.
The formative force existed in the organization of the Zeugungssaft [i.e., the procreative fluid] as a
whole: change any of its constituent elements and the organization of the whole was not just
altered; it was completely destroyed. On the other hand, it is to be emphasized that this
teleological agent was not to be considered a kind of soul superimposed on matter. This form of
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vitalism he found objectionable in Buffon’s concept of the moule interieur and in Wolff’s
conception of the vis essentialis. For Blumenbach the Bildungstrieb did not exist apart from
matter, but is could not be explained in terms of its constitutive elements.
See also Zammito on the Nisus formativus/Bildungstrieb in Blumenbach, p. 80:
In the terminology of Blumenbach, Kant discriminated between a Bildungskraft—‘the vis plastic
of the ancients, which works merely via mechanism’ and a Bildungstrieb which Blumenbach
conceived as a ‘nisus formativus’ that worked organically’. Girtanner was clear that
Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb was a Lebenskraft, namely ‘that force by virtue of which the chemical
and physical laws are subordinated under the laws of organization’. Because life forms showed
characteristics reproduction, growth through nourishment and assimilation, regeneration of lost
organs and self-healing generally—which could not be assimilated to the mechanistic model of
natural science, they represented anomalies requiring recourse to teleological judgement, the
analogy of ‘purposiveness.’
Lenoir also reminds us that the holy grail of organic science in this early stage of its development was the
unification of the forces of “reproduction, generation, and nutrition under a general law,” Lenoir, “Kant,
Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism”, p. 84.
198
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 84.
199
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 84.
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Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 84-5.
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Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 85.
202
These experiments are recorded in Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 85..
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Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 86.
204
On “prospective potential” and “prospective significance” see Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 86.
205
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 86.
206
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 87.
207
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 88, and f.n. 13, p. 97.
208
See also, The Critique of the Power of Judgement, § 61 “On the objective purposiveness of nature”,
5:360, p. 233, and Müller-Sievers, p. 58: “In organic beings, Kant argues, ‘normal’ causality {nexus
effectivus} is conjoined with a causality of final causes {nexus finalis}....”
209
Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, p. 141. Emphasis Driesch’s.
210
Cf. Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 91.
211
Cf. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, p. 94:
Furthermore, it is not that the eye has to be photo-sensitive—we know this. The whole
surface of the tegument—no doubt for various reasons that are not visual—may be photosensitive,
and this dimension can in no way be reduced to the functioning of vision. There is a certain
adumbration of photo-sensitive organs in the pigmentary spots. In the eye, the pigment functions
fully, in a way, of course, that the phenomenon shows to be infinitely complex. It functions within
the cones, for example, in the form of a rhodopsin. It also functions inside the various layers of the
retina. This pigment comes and goes in functions that are not all, or always immediately
discoverable and clear, but which suggests the depth, the complexity and, at the same time, the
unity of the mechanisms concerned with light.
I would add the example of photosynthesis too, perhaps, unless we would like to wax poetical and speak of
photosynthesis in terms of the plant seeing the sun through its own visual organ. This would be the
inverse—as opposed to the obverse reading of photosynthesis as vision. Lacan would, however, reject this
reading as leaving out the internalization and projection of the name-of-the-father, or the function of the law
of the phallus in the scopic drive.
212
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 94. Bakhtin waxes poetic here: “Harmony is a subjectivist
construct, like the beauty of crystal or the grace of the fallow deer.”
213
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 94.
214
Bakhtin, “Contemporary Vitalism”, p. 94. In other words looking back from the end to the beginning...
we term this series of causes teleological and purposive. Thus the teleological series reveals itself to be
simply a causality posited retrospectively, the wished-for end, a telos (goal), and all that is necessary for its
realization, the means.”
215
Interestingly Voloshinov uses the suffix –izm in his 1927 title Frejdizm, rather than the more
“derogatory” ‘-shchina’, which, “when attached to a proper name... means the excesses or bad times
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associated with that personality” as in Dostoevshchina as used in Lunacharsky. See Problems of
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, f.n. f, p. 35. Voloshinov’s choice, assuming it is self-conscious, betrays his
ambivalence toward Freud’s psychoanalysis.
216
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 2.
217
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 284.
218
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 284.
219
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 285.
220
Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, p. 72.
221
Bakhtin, “Art and Answerability”, Art and Answerability, p. 1.
222
White, “The Struggle Over Bakhtin”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. 1, ed. Gardiner, p. 219.
223
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, pp. 19-20.
224
This misdiagnosis of the event is similarly described in Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, pp. 4-5:
all bodies are causes in relation to each other, and causes for each other—but causes of what?
They are causes of certain things of an entirely different nature. These effects are not bodies, but,
properly speaking, ‘incorporeal’ entities. They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather
logical or dialectical attributes. They are not things or facts, but events. We cannot say that they
really exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere.... They are not substantives or adjectives but
verbs.
See also “Of the Event”, Logic of Sense, pp. 148-53.
225
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, p. 20.
226
Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 136.
227
Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137.
228
Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137.
229
Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 137.
230
Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 138.
231
Bakhtin, “From Notes Made in 1970-71”, Speech Genres, p. 139:
Even in antiquity we single out what is ready-made and finalized, and not what has originated and
is developing. We do not study literature’s preliterary embryos (in language and ritual). The
narrow (‘specialists’’) understanding of specifics. Possibility and necessity. It is hardly possible
to speak about necessity in the human sciences. Here it is scientifically possible only to disclose
possibilities and the realization of one of them. The repeatability and unrepeatability.
In other words, the work of the humanities is to be judged from the point of view of the supra-I. Does it
speak to objective existence? Does it artfully answer one of the big questions in life through a personal,
i.e., embodied form? Does it itself have a rotund semantic personality? Can you engage it in conversation?
232
For “germ-plasm” and Freud’s ontogenetic account of the organism, cf. for example, Freud’s “Beyond
the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, §. VI, pp. 316-35, and esp. p. 318:
What Strikes us in this is the unexpected analogy with our own view, which was arrived at along
such a different path. Weismann, regarding living substance morphologically, sees in it one
portion which is destined to die—the soma, the body apart from the substance concerned with sex
and inheritance—and an immortal portion—the germ-plasm, which is concerned with the survival
of the species, with reproduction. We, on the other hand, dealing not with the living substance but
with the forces operating in it, have been led to distinguish two kinds of instincts: those which seek
to lead what is living to death, and others, the sexual instincts, which are perpetually attempting
and achieving a renewal of life.
Later Freud questions whether or not there is, after all, only one instinct, p. 325:
But it is all the more necessary for us to lay stress upon the libidinal character of the selfpreservative instincts now that we are venturing upon the further step of recognizing the sexual
instinct as Eros, the preserver of all things, and of deriving the narcissistic libido of the ego from
the stores of libido by means of which the cells of the soma are attached to one another. But we
now find ourselves suddenly faced by another question. If the self-preservative instincts too are of
a libidinal nature, are there perhaps no other instincts whatever but the libidinal ones? At all
events there are none other visible.
233
For example, in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, Freud speculates that even death has come down to
multicellular organisms as “a matter of expediency” and not, as Anaximander held, of necessity. Here
Freud tries to show his own theory of “Eros” or the “sexual instincts” and Thanatos—here “the death drive”
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or the “ego-instincts”—can be found also independently through the study of morphology. Like the
“‘slipper-animalcule’” (a.k.a. ciliate infusorians—p. 320), which dies as a result of “its incomplete voidance
of the products of its own metabolism” (p. 321), Freud’s entire theory of the instincts moving from
pulsation or agitation in the somatic to the release through their sublimation in objects depends on an
assumption of pressure building from within that seeks release by expulsion from the organism—i.e.,
exteriorization. We will see how, in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes”, Freud complicates this theory and
shows it to be a highly dynamic and ambiguous process.
The Anaximander fragment to which I am referring, is that which is the subject of Heidegger’s infamous
paper “The Anaximander Fragment”. David Farrell Krell’s translation reads as follows:
Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away according to necessity; for they
must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.
Heidegger, “The Anaximander Fragment”, Arion, p. 576.
234
Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 113.
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Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 113.
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Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 113-4.
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Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116.
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Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116.
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Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116-7.
240
Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 117.
241
Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 118.
242
Cf. for example, Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 134: “At the very
beginning, it seems, the external world, objects, and what is hated are identical. If later on an object turns
out to be a source of pleasure, it is loved, but it is also incorporated into the ego; so that for the purified
pleasure-ego once again objects coincide with what is extraneous and hated.” The radical reading of Freud,
I suggest, would then be that love—or Eros—is always a positive force that expresses itself by affirming
that which it loves by incorporating it into one’s own identity, which can include consuming it, etc., but also
simply working to ameliorate a project, fix a table, mend a jacket, etc. I think Freud wants a radical
separation of what is loved as an extension of one’s own identity and that which is hated as an object that is
always-already other. It is clear that while this synonymy of love/interiority/subject may not be absolute,
for Freud they do stand in polar distinction to hate/exteriority/object and certainly become absolutely
synonymous by the instantiation of the pleasure-ego.
243
Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 118.
244
Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § i, p. 277. For more on Freud’s principle
of constancy of pressure see Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, f.n. 1, p. 117.
For afflux see ibid., bottom of p. 116. See also “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”, On Metapsychology, § i.,
f.n. 2, p. 277: “The ‘principle of constancy’ dates back to the very beginning of Freud’s psychological
studies. The first published discussion of it of any length was by Breuer (in semi-physiological terms)
towards the end of Section 2(A) of his theoretical part of the Studies on Hysteria.”
245
Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 116: “Above all, [the instincts]
oblige the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli, for they maintain an
incessant and unavoidable afflux of stimulation.”
246
Again see Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 127.
247
“Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 123. For the reversal of scopophilia into
exhibitionism, cf. pp. 126-7.
248
Cf. Freud, “Instincts”, p. 127.
249
Cf. Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, On Metapsychology, p. 127: “For at the beginning of its
activity the scopophilic instinct is auto-erotic: it has indeed an object, but that object is part of the subject’s
own body. It is only later that the instinct is led, by a process of comparison, to exchange this object for an
analogous part of someone else’s body.”
250
I will not deal with repression and sublimation here. “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” was followed by a
paper on “Narcissism” and, it is thought, one on sublimation “formed the subject of one of [Freud’s] lost
metaphysical papers, Freud, “Instincts”, Metapsychology, f.n. 4, p. 123. To deal with all four vicissitudes
would be beyond the purpose of touching upon them here. In any case, Freud’s own feelings on the
repression of the scopic drive would have to be worked out according to his paper on “Repression” and his
definition of sublimation in his paper “On Narcissism”, Metapsychology, p. 88: “Sublimation is a process
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that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct’s directing itself toward an aim other than, and
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essential characteristics, namely its association with and negative differential from other signs. Cf.
“Concrete Entities of a Language”, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 101-2:
1. Any linguistic entity exists only in virtue of the association between signal and signification.
...
2. A linguistic entity is not ultimately defined until it is delimited, i.e., separated from whatever
there may be on either side of it in a sequence of sounds. It is these delimited entities or units
which contrast with one another in the mechanism of the language.
383
Cf. Émile Bréhier’s The History of Philosophy: The Middle Ages and the Renaissance, p. 30:
The sharp distinction between the essential and accidental [species and genera] attributes makes
possible a clear statement of the problem of universals. For universals, whose reality was the
subject of speculation, are nothing but the genera and species—for example, ‘animal’ and ‘man’—
which are essential attributes of the individual like Socrates. On this point Boethius’
commentators, such as Pseudo-Hrabanus Maurus (whose Super Porphyrium is generally assigned
to the first half of the eleventh century), followed the hints that appeared in the writings of their
master and that had their source in Aristotle. They repeated what had been said by Boethius and
also by Simplicius: that the Categories, the study of attributes, cannot refer things (since res non
praedicatur) but only to words as signifiers of things. Hence the solution, imbued with the spirit
of Aristotle, the problem of universals: genus and species exist only by virtue of predicates
essential to the individual. “Individuals, species, and genus are one and the same reality (eadem
res), and universals are not, as is sometimes stated, something different from individuals.
Here is not the place to enter into the scholastic debate between realists and nominalists. What we may
want to get at here, is the profoundly idiosyncratic differentiation between the primary and secondary, the
essential and accidental parts to wholes and the confusion that can occur through time. We are not referring
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to the conception of species in biology that has tended to change throughout the history of Linnaean
science; although there is evidence for this, it can be usually accounted for by simple error of classification
and stays within the same tired game whose rules have ossified and are beginning to crack. What we are
referring to has more to do with an idea of becoming, where I may treat myself or others as the genera
“animal” at times and all that that term may connote, and at other times I might treat myself as the species
of animal “human” and sometimes a species of human on down to “Jim.” Still this model appears to remain
arborescent. It does not have to be regarded as such, however, for the determination does not have to be
made from outside, as if a topography is always primarily responsible for the determination of properties.
We can also begin from within the “organism” taking it immanently and affirming the value it itself
expresses dynamically; the same can apply the play of signs, but it is really premature to introduce the idea
here, so we append it as a footnote to a footnote. Sufficed to say, in becoming categories shift and have not
the holding power they do in that long used tree like model of Aristotelian categorization. This discussion
will be more essential and less accidental to our own when we have occasion to critique universal logic
according to the possible play of differences.
384
For Saussure’s theory of linguistic value there are two main categories of such association: the
syntagmatic—or value by proximity in the constructed sentence, and the associative value—or value
weighed by family or species association. See his students’ lecture notes from “Syntagmatic Relations and
Associative Relations”, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 121-5.
385
By static we are implying Saussure’s idea of a state, and we shall return to this conception of the
historical non-movement of what Saussure calls the synchronic aspect of language below.
386
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, passim, esp. pp. 99-100.
387
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, passim, esp. p. 99.
388
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 51.
389
For more the difficulties surrounding the problem of the historical utterance, diachrony v. synchrony,
etc., cf. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, “Static Linguistics and Evolutionary Linguistics”, esp. § 9
“Conclusions”, pp. 96-8.
390
Saussure, See Course in General Linguistics, “General Observations”, p. 100. Here we may also
consider Deleuze’s attempt to show that the difference in linguistics is itself relative and not absolute, as
Saussure purports it to be, p. 118:
Everything we have said so far comes down to this. In Language itself, there are only differences.
Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes
positive terms between which the difference holds [i.e., associative differences which imply
positive significations and thus family resemblances], in a language there are only differences, and
no positive terms. ... The proof of this lies in the fact that the value of a sign may change without
affecting either meaning or sound, simply because some neighbouring sign has undergone a
change.
For Deleuze, Saussure actually translates difference for-itself into a difference of opposition, and therefore
the linguistic idea (of difference) is not difference as the active play of the speaker of language, but is the
reactive passivity of the listener—of the scholiast one might say as ‘opposed’ to the philosopher, Difference
and Repetition, pp. 204-05:
To return to the linguistic Idea: why does Saussure, at the very moment when he discovers that ‘in
language there are only differences,’ add that these differences are ‘without positive terms’ and
‘eternally negative’? Why does Trubetzkoy maintain as sacred the principle that ‘the idea of
difference’ which is constitutive of language ‘presupposes the idea of opposition’? Everything
points to the contrary. Is this not a way of introducing he point of view of consciousness and
actual representations into what should be the transcendent exploration of the Idea of the linguistic
unconscious—in other words, the highest exercise of speech in relation to the point zero of
language? When we interpret differences under the category of opposition and as negatives, are
we not already on the side of the listener, even that of the bad listener who hesitates between
several possible version of what was actually said and tries to find himself by establishing
oppositions? In other words, are we not on the lesser side of language rather than the side of the
one who speaks and assigns meaning? Have we not already betrayed the nature of the play of
language—in other words, the sense of that combinatory, of those imperatives or linguistic throws
of the dice which, like Artaud’s cries, can be understood only by the one who speaks in the
transcendent exercise of language? In short, the translation of difference into opposition seems to
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us to concern not a simple question of terminology or convention, but rather the essence of
language and the linguistic Idea. When difference is read as opposition, it is deprived of the
peculiar thickness in which its positivity is affirmed. Modern phonology lacks a dimension which
would prevent it from playing with shadows on a single plane.
What we have in the linguistic idea then is a conflation of difference and opposition that is typical of the
listening subject rather than the speaking other; Saussure’s account has not left the ontology of
representation and does not touch upon presentation and active creation. In this situation the listener, an a
fortiori the linguist—is passive and not active; we might think here of the aforementioned notion of the
understanding as answerable in Bakhtin’s account (see previous section). This type of listening and this
type of difference as opposition is indeed ‘ready-made.’ It does not sponsor or understand—i.e., answer—
the active speech event.
391
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 51.
392
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52.
393
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52.
394
Cf. for example Jespersen’s Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin, p. 420:
Now, it is a consequence of advancing civilization that passion, or, at least, the expression of
passion, is moderated, and we must therefore conclude that the speech of uncivilized and primitive
men was more passionately agitated than ours, more like music or song. This conclusion is borne
out by what we hear about the speech of many savages in our own days. European travellers very
often record their impression of the speech of different tribes in expressions like these:
‘pronouncing whatever they spoke in a very singing manner,’ ‘the singing tone of voice, in
common conversation, was frequent’....
These facts and considerations all point to the conclusion that there once was a time when
all speech was song, or rather when these two actions were not yet differentiated; but perhaps this
inference cannot be established inductively at the present stage of linguistic science with the same
amount of certainty as the statements I am now going to make as to the nature of primitive speech.
This would be precisely the legacy in which David Abram makes his attempt to show that language is
indeed connected primordially to the world in out of which it comes into being by its sonorous affect. We
shall have more to say on this later. In any event, he has been much criticised for this position; Ted
Toadvine accuses him of a return to animism:
things are not inert and passive in Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions but alive, suggesting to Abram a
kind of phenomenological animism that would demand from us the revision of an entire series of
traditional dualisms... but it is precisely this “subjectivization of nature” [Rudolf Bernet’s , which
Toadvine compares to Abram’s own view] that reveals the limits of the dialogical view of
perception, as Merleau-Ponty himself brings out. I the course of his descriptions of the correlation
between the body and the world, he already calls attention to its anthropomorphizing teleology...
Merleau-Ponty is explicit... that defining the thing as a correlate of the body and our life does not
exhaust its meaning, since it does not disclose the ‘non-human element’ that it harbours
(Phenomenology of Perception, 375)”, Toadvine, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature, p. 57.
The validity of Toadvine’s critique of Abram’s, to my mind, correctly diagnosis a spirit in Abram’s work
that betrays a seeing that shows up the connectedness in all things, but the ambiguity in Merleau-Ponty’s
own position rests upon the difference between naive-consciousness’ view of the world as that which is as it
is experienced and radical reflection which must have a respect for the fundamental alterity in all things:
“This [alterity and self-standing]will become clear if we suspend our ordinary preoccupations and pay a
metaphysical and disinterested attention to it. It is then hostile and alien, no longer an interlocutor, but a
resolutely silent Other, a Self which evades us no less than does intimacy with an outside consciousness.”
Toadvine understands this distinction and mentions it, but I have trouble damning Abram’s approach since
it is implicitly marked by a concern for finding new or forgotten modes of our connectedness with the
world, and can be equally found in Merleau-Ponty’s work... and there is a distinctly dialectical action
happening here where I am a part of an earth that is nonetheless an Other. See also “Sense Experience”,
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 249:
The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took from it in the first place
. As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an a cosmic idea of blue such
as might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it ‘thinks itself
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in me,’* I am the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself...
but....”
...and we could go on dialectically attempting to think this relation, as we shall have occasion to. For now
let us just make a note for ourselves of that which we have left to think... this dialectic between myself and
the object I “consummate” as Bakhtin has put it in Art and Answerability. We have not yet even begun to
think the problem of the Other inside ourselves... that which the Greeks knew as the daimonion [Birth of
Tragedy, p. 66 and Arendt’s Human Condition, pp. 179 and 182], and which we require Other’s outside of
ourselves to consummate through an exotopic excess of seeing “which provides the foundation for a certain
sphere of my own exclusive self-activity... all those actions, that is, which render the other complete
precisely in those respects in which he cannot complete himself by himself,” Bakhtin, Art and
Answerability, p. 24.
*[<<En soi se pense et convient à soi-même>> qt. fr. Valéry, Le Cimetière marin]
395
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52.
396
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, “Apparatus of Capture”, p. 430.
397
As was the case according to Hobbes. Cf. Leviathan, I, iv, p. 101:
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower
of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of
his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the
world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from
them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew
every where more copious.
398
On the aporetic nature of community, see Caputo’s Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pp. 107-9.
399
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52
400
Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 52, “the appearance of articulated language is like an
‘Ursprung’ (a springing forth).”
401
The “speech circuit” is depicted on p. 11 of Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics.
402
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 80.
403
By comparison, the two ameliorations of language study which are usually evoked the
conventional/arbitrary nature of the sign and the negative differential apply specifically to langue and are
more obvious and less suggestive in producing a method for linguistic study. They are not the primary
distinction which must first be made, but are secondary and follow from this first set of distinctions between
synchrony and diachrony and langue and parole.
404
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 53.
405
Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology, p. 57.
406
Usually we say that there are eight parts of speech, and these are nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs,
pronouns, prepositions, interjections and conjunctions.
407
Merleau-Ponty, “The Intertwining—The Chiasm”, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 147.
408
See for example, “The Object of Study”, Course in General Linguistics, p. 9. Bühler makes this claim
on p. 8 of his Theory of Language. In his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Voloshinov also
touches upon these conflicting/complementary streams in language, where he describes the “four basic
trends” of what he calls the “individualistic subjectivism” experience of language—a trend he criticises as
unsupportable, since it misses the fundamentally social network in which the utterance maintains its
existence. He follows Humboldt’s definitions of ergon and energeia, where the former is a “ready-made
product... as a stable system,” and the latter “an unceasing process of creation.” The other two trends are as
follows: “the laws of language creation are the laws of individual psychology” and “creativity of language
is meaningful creativity, analogous to creative art.” According to Voloshinov “Hamann and Herder were
Humboldt’s predecessors so far as this trend is concerned. See Voloshinov p. 48. More on Voloshinov’s
critique of the Russian Formalists and his propaedeutic to any future Marxist philosophy of language to
follow, esp. regarding the four opposed trends in abstract objectivist linguistics of which Saussure is a
proponent, according to Voloshinov.
409
Saussure, “The Object of Study”, Course in General Linguistics, p. 9. Cf. also Husserl’s Logical
Investigations, Vol. II, p. 73, which takes a similar tack but with pure logic or the a priori as its own object
of inquiry which is to be kept separate from normative reasoning:
here, as elsewhere where philosophical interests are concerned, it is important to separate the a
priori sharply from the empirical, and to recognize that, within this widely conceive discipline, the
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findings of formal semantics relevant for grammarians have a peculiar character: they belong to an
a priori discipline that should be kept apart in its purity. Here as elsewhere, one must subscribe to
a great Kantian insight, and steep oneself in its sense: that one does not enrich, but rather subverts,
the sciences if one blurs their boundaries. One must realize that a universal grammar in this widest
sense is a concrete science which, like all concrete sciences, frequestnly brings together for
explanatory purposes findings whose theoretical place lies in hand, and in a priori sciences,
frequently brings together for explanatory purposes findings whose theoretical place lies in
essentially different theoretical sciences, in empirical sciences, on the one hand, and in a priori
sciences, on the other. Our age, orientated towards natural science, sees to it that generalizing,
empirical investigations are not neglected in the grammatical field, nor in any other. What is a
priori is not so favoured; even though all basic insights lead back to the a priori, our age’s sense
for it almost threatens to wither away. I therefore fairly take up the cudgels for the old doctrine of
a grammaire générale et raisonnée, a philosophical grammar, for its obscure, undeveloped
intention aiming at the ‘rational’ in speech, in the true sense of the word, and in particular at the
‘logic’ of speech or its semantic a priori.
We may compare this nomological priority to Kant’s own programmatic in the first Critique, “The
Architectonic of Pure Reason”, A842/B870-A843/B871, pp. A696-7:
It is of the utmost importance to isolate cognitions that differ from one another in their species and
origin, and carefully to avoid mixing them together with others with which they are usually
connected in their use. What chemists do in analysing materials, what mathematicians do in their
pure theory of magnitude, the philosopher is even more obliged to do, so that he can securely
determine the proper value and influence of the advantage that a special kind of cognition has over
the aimless use of the understanding. Hence human reason has never been able to dispense with a
metaphysics as long as it has thought, or rather reflected, though it has never been able to present it
in a manner sufficiently purified of everything foreign to it. The idea of such a science is just as
old as speculative human reason; and what reason does not speculate, whether in a scholastic or a
popular manner? [The scholastic and popular manners Kant refers to are two contemporary
schools of thought against which Kant opposed his architectonic of pure reason, the former being
much more canonical and the later much too loosey-goosey for Kant’s liking and of which his
student Herder was a proponent.] One must nevertheless admit that the distinction of the two
elements in our cognition, one of which is in our power completely a priori but the other of which
can be derived only from experience a posteriori, has remained very indistinct, even among
professional thinkers, and hence the determination of the bounds of a special kind of cognition, and
thus the genuine idea of a science with which human reason has so long and so intensively
occupied itself, has never been accomplished. For the scholastic, or academic, vs. the popular
approaches to philosophy in Prussia which were contemporary in Kant’s day, see the
“Introduction” to Kant’s Logic, p. 22.
410
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language: for trends see p. 47; for “arteries” p. 61; for
“individual subjectivism” and “abstract objectivism” see p. 48.
411
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 48.
412
See Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, pp. 48 and 57:
The fundamental outlook on language of [individual subjectivism] amounts... to these four basic
principles:
1. Language is activity, an unceasing process of creation (energeia) realized in individual speech
acts;
2. The laws of language creativity are the laws of individual psychology;
3. Creativity of language is meaningful creativity, analogous to creative art;
4. Language as a ready-made product (ergon), as a stable system (lexicon, grammar, phonetics),
is, so to speak, the inert crust, the hardened lava of language creativity, of which linguistics
makes an abstract construct in the interests of the practical teaching of language as a readymade instrument.
....
The outlook of the second trend can, on the whole, be summarized in the following basic
principles:
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1.

Language is a stable, immutable system of normatively identical linguistic forms which the
individual consciousness finds ready-made and which is incontestable for that consciousness
2. The laws of language are the specifically linguistic laws of connection between linguistic
signs within a given, closed linguistic system. These laws are objective with respect to any
subjective consciousness.
3. Specifically linguistic connections have nothing in common with ideological values (artistic,
cognitive, or other). Language phenomena are not grounded in ideological motives. No
connection of a kind natural and comprehensible to the consciousness or of an artistic kind
obtains between the word and its meaning.
4. Individual acts of speaking are, from the viewpoint of language, merely fortuitous refractions
and variations or plain and simple distortions of normatively identical forms; but precisely
these acts of individual discourse explain the historical changeability of linguistic forms, a
changeability that in itself, from the standpoint of the language system, is irrational and
senseless. There is no connection, no sharing of motives, between the system of language and
its history. They are alien to one another.
413
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 64.
414
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 64.
415
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 64.
416
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 66: “if we were to look at language in a truly
objective way—from the side, so to speak, or more accurately, from above it, we would discover no inert
system of self-identical norms. Instead, we would find ourselves witnessing the ceaseless generation of
language norms.”
417
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 66.
418
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 67: “Whether or not the fact itself is correctly
constituted, whether language actually does appear only as a fixed and inert system of norms to the
speaker’s consciousness—that is another question. For the time being we shall leave that question open.
But the point, in any case, is that a certain kind of objective relationship can be established.”
419
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 67.
420
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 67.
421
Cf. Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 58: as was the case with the rationalist
theory of the understanding, abstract objectivism is
interested only in the inner logic of the system of signs itself, taken, as in algebra, completely
independently of the ideological meanings that give the signs their content. Rationalists [and a
fortiori synchronic abstract objectivists] are not averse to taking the understander’s viewpoint into
account, but are least of all inclined to consider that of the speaker, as the subject expressing his
own inner life. For the fact is that the mathematical sign is least amenable to interpretation as an
expression of the individual psyche—and it is the mathematical sign, after all, that the rationalists
hold to be the ideal of any sign, including the verbal sign. This is exactly what found graphic
expression in Leibniz’s idea of universal grammar.
422
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 68.
423
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 69.
424
Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 70.
425
Bühler, Theory of Language, p. 20. Voloshinov also cites Bühler’s distinction between signal and sign.
See Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 68.
426
Bühler, Theory of Language, p. 20.
427
Parrington, “Valentin Voloshinov”, Mikhail Bakhtin, Vol. I, ed. Gardiner, p. 59.
428
Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 21.
429
Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 22.
430
Engels, “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man”, Dialectics of Nature, p. 175.
431
Again, see Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 58.
432
See Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 24:
Freud’s strength lies in his having brought these issues pointedly to the fore and in having gathered
the material for their investigation. His weakness lies in his having failed to understand the
sociological essence of all these phenomena and in having attempted, instead, to force them into
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the narrow confines of the individual organism and its psyche. Processes that are in fact social
are treated by Freud form the point of view of individual psychology.
With this disregard of sociology is coupled another basic deficiency in Freud—the
subjectivity of his method (granted, a subjectivity somewhat disguised, for which reason it has been
a debatable feature).
433
Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 24.
434
Voloshinov, Freudianism, p. 9
435
Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, p. 67.
436
Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, p. 69.
437
Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, p. 70.
438
Voloshinov, “Indirect and Direct Discourse”, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 137.
439
Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres”, Speech Genres, p. 66.
440
Again, see Bakhtin, “Speech Genres”, Speech Genres, p. 65.
441
Bakhtin, “Speech Genres”, Speech Genres, p. 67.
442
Italian for ‘face to face.’
443
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 103-4.
444
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 105.
445
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 104.
446
On the apostrophe-like character of the hero, see Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”,
Freudianism, p. 103-4. See also Dostoevsky and Bakhtin’s contemplation of the role of the “stenographer”
in Dostoevsky, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, pp. 55-6. A The fact that Dostoevsky married his
stenographer after dictating The Gambler to the future Dostoevskaya, tempts us to see parallels between the
pursuit of the hero by the author in Bakhtin’s writings and the amorous relationship between Dostoevsky
and his real life heroine. See Jacques Catteau, Dostoevsky and the Process of Literary Creation, p. 144,
where he quotes the Russian novelist:
My stenographer, Anna Grigoryevna Snitkina, was a young girl of twenty, quite appealing, of
good family, excellent secondary education, endowed with an extremely good and pure character...
At the end of the novel, I noticed that my stenographer truly loved me, although she had never said
a word about it, and I found her more and more attractive. As, since the death of my brother, I find
life dreadfully boring and wearisome, I asked her to marry me. She accepted, so we are now
married.
One is also tempted to parallel Bakhtin’s marriage to Aleksandrovna, who played no small part in keeping
the couple in her husband’s ill health and exile. The lack of attention to the importance granted to this
relationship has been noted by Caryl Emerson and others. I must also admit culpability in this area. See
Caryl Emerson’s “Bakhtin and Women: A Nontopic with Immense Implications”, f.n. 2, in Mikhail
Bakhtin, Vol. III, ed. Gardiner, p. 67: “The absolute solidarity and silence of Bakhtin’s marriage has not
gone unnoticed. Hajdukowski-Ahmed, for one, has criticized the Clark/Holquist biography for its
insufficient, merely derivative attention to Elena Aleksandrovna’s contribution to her husband’s writing
style, themes and very survival.”
447
Salinger, Franny and Zooey, p. 111.
448
Mysticism did not begin as a trend in Russian religious thought until about the 14th century. See
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 388.
449
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 388.
450
Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind, Vol. I., p. 388.
451
Thomas King’s Green Grass Running Water makes great use of this phrase.
452
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 103.
453
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 104.
454
Cf. O.E.D. Online: “metaphor,”
<http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/view/Entry/117328?redirectedFrom=metaphor#eid>,
08/07/2012:
Middle French metaphore (c1275 in Old French as metafore ; French métaphore ) and its etymon
classical Latin metaphora < ancient Greek µεταϝορά <µετα- META- prefix + ϝορά carrying ( <
the o -grade of the stem of ϝέρειν to bear, carry: see BEAR v.1), after µεταϝέρειν to transfer.
Compare Italian metafora (a1375), Spanish metáfora (1st half of the 15th cent.),
Portuguese metáfora (15th cent.).
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See also “meta-,” <http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/view/Entry/117150#eid37412815>,
08/07/2012:
ancient Greek µετα- (before a vowel µετ- , µεθ- ), use as combining form of the
preposition µετά ‘with’, ‘after’, ‘between’, probably ultimately < the same Indo-European base
as MID prep.1 Compare Mycenaean Greek me-ta ‘together with’, which is perhaps the original
sense in Greek. In ancient Greek and Hellenistic Greek µετα- is combined chiefly with verbs and
verbal derivatives principally to express notions of sharing, action in common, pursuit, quest, and,
above all, change (of place, order, condition, or nature), in the last sense frequently corresponding
to classical Latin words in trans- TRANS- prefix. Occasionally µετα- represents the
preposition µετά in syntactical combination, with the sense ‘after or behind’, as
in µετάϝρενον (see METAPHRENUM n.).
455
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 106.
456
For “Enthymeme,” see O.E.D Online entry,
<http://www.oed.com.proxy2.lib.uwo.ca/view/Entry/62886?redirectedFrom=enthymeme#eid>, 21/07/2012
: “Rhetoric. After Aristotle's use: An argument based on merely probable grounds; a rhetorical argument as
distinguished from a demonstrative one. Obs.” Voloshinov’s usage is slightly different but implied by that
found in the O.E.D. The editor’s note to “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art” is closer to this usage,
f.n. 5, p. 100: “The enthymeme is a form of syllogism one of whose premises is not expressed but assumed.
For example: ‘Socrates is a man, therefore he is mortal.’ The assumed premise: ‘All men are mortal.’”
457
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 103. See also, “Author and Hero
in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, p. 121, where Bakhtin suggests that one looses oneself in the
choral support of the other, becomes subjectively disinterested, and is enveloped entirely by the social
sphere—notably this is the case in both aesthetic creation (production) and in labour:
Sometimes I become justifiably alienated from myself axiologically—I live in the other and for
the other. And in that case I may become a participant in rhythm, although, for myself, I remain
ethically passive in rhythm. In my lived life, I participate in a communal mode of existence, in an
established social order, in a nation, in a state, in mankind, in God’s world. In all these cases, I
live my life, axiologically, in the other and for others, i.e., I am clothed in the axiological flesh of
the other. In all these cases, my life can submit rightfully to the sway of rhythm (although the very
moment of submission or subordination is characterized by sobriety); I experience, strive, and
speak here in the chorus of others. But in a chorus I do not sing for myself; I am active only in
relation to the other and I am passive in the other’s relationship to me; I exchange gifts, but I do so
disinterestedly; I feel in myself the body and the soul of another. (Whenever the purpose of a
movement or an action is incarnated into the other or is coordinated with the action of the other—
as in the case of joint labour—my own action enters into rhythm as well. But I do not create
rhythm of myself: I join in it for the sake of the other).
Without taking upon oneself the provisional role of the choral support, therefore, one cannot join with the
other—a necessary step in the phenomenologically complex process of consummation.
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Voloshinov does not directly invoke space in this way. We will have more to say about space when we
come to Bakhtin’s work on chronotopicity below.
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Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 105.
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Cf. Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, 107-108.
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See Bakhtin, “Content, Material, and Form in Verbal Art”, Art and Answerability, p. 283.
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Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 111.
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See Bakhtin, “Content, Material, and Form in Verbal Art”, Art and Answerability, p. 284.
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Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 108. See also Bakhtin, “Content,
Material, and Form in Verbal Art”, Art and Answerability, p. 284: the artist “must immediately assume an
aesthetic position with regard to the extra-aesthetic reality of action and cognition.”
465
Cf. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 90:
As an artist, Dostoevsky did not create his ideas in the same way philosophers or scholars create
theirs—he created images of ideas found, heard, sometimes divined by him in reality itself [—i.e.,
in the discourse of life], that is, ideas already living or entering life as idea-forces. Dostoevsky
possessed an extraordinary gift for hearing the dialogue of his epoch, or, more precisely, for
hearing his epoch as a great dialogue, for detecting in it not only individual voices, but precisely
and predominantly the dialogic relationship among voices, their dialogic interaction. He heard
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both the loud, recognized, reining voices of the epoch, that is, the reigning dominant ideas (official
and unofficial), as well as voices still weak, ideas not yet fully emerged, latent ideas heard as yet
by no one but himself, and ideas that were just beginning to ripen, embryos of future worldviews.
‘Reality in its entirety,’ Dostoevsky himself wrote, ‘is not to be exhausted by what is immediately
at hand, for an overwhelming part of this reality is contained in the form of a still latent, unuttered
future world.’
See also Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 114: “The poet acquires his
words and learns to intone them over the course of his entire life in the process of his every-sided contact
with his environment.”
466
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 109.
467
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 110: “Let us stress once again
that we have in mind here not those ideological evaluations that are incorporated into the content of a work
in the form of judgements or conclusions but that deeper, more ingrained kind of evaluation via form that
finds expression in the very manner in which the artistic material is viewed and deployed.”
468
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 110.
469
Othello would not fall, that is, because the hero’s breadth of character must not be lowered beneath the
status of Iago. Even if one believes that Othello is brought morally lower than Iago by the end of the text,
this breadth must remain greater than Iago’s. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that Shakespeare
subordinates their world to his authorial intent. Consider, for example, N. G. Chernyshevsky’s utterance
on the relation of Shakespeare to his heroes: “the most difficult thing would be to write as Shakespeare
wrote: he portrays people and life without saying what he himself thinks on the questions that are resolved
by his characters in a way appropriate for each. Othello says ‘yes,’ Iago says ‘no,’ Shakespeare says
nothing, he has no desire to state his love or lack of love for a ‘yes’ or a ‘no,’” qtd. in Bakhtin, Problems of
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 66. Yet even if he does not subordinate their world to his own, the dramatic genre
itself does not support the polyphony that one finds in the novel and almost exclusively, for Bakhtin, in
Dostoevsky. Apparently following up on the original publication of Problems, Lunacharsky believes that
Shakespeare exhibits the same ability to create a multitude of worlds and, thus, polyphony within his works
as does Dostoevsky. For Bakhtin, Shakespeare was certainly one of the greatest talents in literature, but the
dramatic form does not lend itself to the co-existence of multiple worlds, since “drama is by its very nature
alien to genuine polyphony; drama may be multi-levelled, but it cannot contain multiple worlds; it permits
only one, and not several, systems of measurement.” Thus, while Shakespeare may not subordinate Iago
and Othello’s world to his own, they themselves belong to one monological world and not to two
monological worlds in dialogue with one another. “In our opinion Dostoevsky alone can be considered the
creator of genuine polyphony.” See Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 33-4.
470
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 110-12.
471
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 112.
472
Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art”, Freudianism, p. 112.
473
Byronic, at least, in my best estimation, since Voloshinov simply says “Romantic.” Surely this is the
form of listener found in part, however, in embryo in “Childe Herald’s Pilgrimage” and more fully fleshed
out in the bathetic Don Juan, since the listener is by turns derided and neither the hero nor the author seem
to care one speck for what she makes of their discourse. See Voloshinov, “Discourse in Life and Discourse
in Art”, Freudianism, p. 112. It may be the case, however, that Voloshinov à la Bakhtin means to imply the
Romantic hero more generally, as certainly this is how Bakhtin describes the lyric in Romantic poetry in
“Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”. Cf. also See Art and Answerability, p. 180:
It is inevitable that lyrical moments occupy a prominent place in the Romantic hero (the love of
woman, just as in lyric). The attitude or position with respect to meaning that is deposited in the
Romantic character has ceased to be authoritative and is only re-experienced, lyrically reexperienced. The author’s position outside the Romantic hero is undoubtedly less stable than it
was in the case of the Classical type of hero. The weakening of this position leads to the
disintegration of character; the boundaries begin to be effaced, the centre of value is transposed
from the boundaries into the very life of the hero (into his cognitive-ethical directedness from
within himself). Romanticism is a form of the infinite hero: the author’s reflection upon the hero
is introduced inside the hero and restructures him; the hero takes away from the author all of his
transgredient determinations and uses them in his own self-development and self-determination,
with the result that his self-determination becomes infinite. Parallel to this occurs a destruction of
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the boundaries that demarcate cultural domains (the idea of the whole or integral human being). In
this context, we find seeds of irony and of “playing a fool.” The unity of a work often coincides
here with the unity of the hero; the transgredient moments become fortuitous and dispersed, losing
their unity. Or the unity of the author becomes emphatically conventional, stylized. The author
begins to expect revelations from the hero. There is an attempt to force an admission from within
self-consciousness, which is possible only through the other; an attempt to do without God,
without listeners, without an author.
Note that the author’s responsibility not to imbue the work with his own personal cognitive-ethical
ideological intonations begins to collapse here; this taboo is transgressed precisely to the extent to which the
author collapses into the hero; the discourse of life breaks through into art rather than supporting it, which is
precisely the opposite of the architectonic role of answering for the hero (from outside) that the author is
meant to play in heroic composition. The result is a destruction of the unity of the work, which itself
fragments into merely mechanical relations. The same mechanical relations we are warned in “Art and
Answerability” cannot ethically answer the event, p. 2, for example: “Nor will it do to invoke ‘inspiration’
in order to justify want of answerability. Inspiration that ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not
inspiration but a state of possession.” No doubt Wordsworth’s “Intimations of Immortality” would suffice
as an example of this kind of possession.
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Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, p. 73.
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For excess of seeing, unfinalizability, transgredience, subiectum, consummation, etc. See especially
“Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, Art and Answerability, pp. 24-7.
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Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 93.
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I am here tacitly referring to Hegel’s “Sense Certainty”, § 95, p. 60: Phenomenology of Spirit:
“To the question: ‘What is now?’, let us answer, e.g. ‘Now is Night.’ In order to test the truth of
this sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose
anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything through our preserving it. If
now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale.”
If pressed on the issue, however, I will deny that I am partial to the simple sophistry involved in this
assertion, but one is always of two minds on the issue. Ultimately I believe Hegel could do well with a
distinction between truth (as limited to the tautological) and mere correctness.
490
Again, see Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 90.
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not a character, nor a type, nor a temperament, in fact he constructs no objectified image of the hero at all,
but rather the hero’s discourse about himself and his world.
“Dostoevsky’s hero is not an objectified image but an autonomous discourse, pure voice; we do
not see him, we hear him.”
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Forgacs, p. 333:
The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of
his practical activity, which nonetheless is an understanding of the world in so far as it transforms
it. His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One
might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness):
one which is implicit in his activity and which reality unites him with all his fellow-workers in the
practical transformation of the real world [not wholly unlike the unofficial consciousness in
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Here we find the source of Kristeva’s accusation that Bakhtin’s Problems is problematic for its
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determines that it is monological and does not respect the personal inflection that ideas take on as they are
liberated from the virtual realm and brought into a participatory struggle between consciousnesses.
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See Section Two.
557
See Morson and Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 367:
Kant, of course, argued long ago that time and space are indispensable forms of cognition, and
Bakhtin explicitly endorses this view. But he differs from Kant by stressing that in Chronotopic
analysis, time and space are regarded “not as ‘transcendental’ but as forms of the most immediate
reality.” Bakhtin’s crucial point is that time and space vary in qualities; different social activities
and representations of those activities presume different kinds of time and space. Time and space
are therefore not just neutral ‘mathematical abstractions. Or, to be more precise, the concept of
time and space as mathematical abstractions itself defines a specific chronotope that differs from
other chronotopes.
See also Bernhard F. Scholz’s “Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Chronotope’: The Kantian Connection”, MB Vol. II,
ed. Gardiner, p. 151:
time and space were for Kant forms of perception rather than of thought. How, then, can Bakhtin
speak of the chronotope as a ‘formally constitutive category of literature,’ and of the ‘image of
man in literature,’ and support this claim with a reference to a passage in Kant which deals with
forms of perception rather than with categories of thought? The phrase “not as ‘transcendental’
but as forms of the most immediate reality,” which, as we shall see later on, stands most in need of
commentary.
558
Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 102.
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Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A39/B56, p. 183:
Time and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic
cognitions can be drawn a priori, of which especially pure mathematics in regard to the cognitions
of space and its relations provides a splendid example. Both taken together are, namely, the pure
forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make possible synthetic a priori propositions. But
these a priori sources of cognition determine their own boundaries by the very fact (that they are
merely conditions of sensibility), namely that they apply to objects only in so far as they are
considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves.
560
See Michael Holquist’s “Introduction” to Art and Answerability, pp. xxi-xxiii. See also Problems of
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 115, where the gnoseological is characteristic of the ‘academic’ or Socratic
dialectic.
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This much discussed statement is left unexplained. See Emerson and Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation
of a Prosaics, p. 367: “By this cryptic comment Bakhtin appears to mean that the relation of ‘chronotope’ to
Einsteinian ‘time-space’ is something weaker than identity, but stronger than mere metaphor or analogy.”
562
Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368.
563
Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368.
564
Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368.
565
Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368.
566
Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 327.
567
Morson and Emerson, and Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 368:
Bodies must organize their own external activities and internal processes in time and space.
Organisms operate by means of, and must coordinate, a variety of rhythms differing from each
other and from those of other organisms. Furthermore, different social activities are also defined
by various kinds of fused time and space: the rhythms and special organization of the assembly
line, agricultural labour, sexual intercourse, and parlour conversation differ markedly.
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Scholz, “Bakhtin’s Concept of ‘Chronotope’”, MB Vol. II., ed. Gardiner, p. 154.
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Morson and Emerson, and Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 369: “for Bakhtin all
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Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 85: “The
chronotope as a formally constitutive category determines to a significant degree the image of man in
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Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, p. 372-3:
In effect, the discourse and chronotope theories of the novel are two aspects of the same theory.
The form-shaping ideology of the novel includes both a view of languages of heteroglossia and a
way of understanding time and space. ... Whereas the discourse and chronotope theories are almost
fully complementary, the carnival theory is only occasionally complementary with, and more often
contradictory to, the other two.
As we already know, “Contemporary Vitalism” was published in 1926. Rabelais and his World was
completed in 1940 at which time it was “submitted as a doctoral dissertation” and subsequently rejected.
See Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 45.
574
See for example, Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 412:
It is the world passing through the phase of death on the way to birth. This is not to understand by
those who see in such images a bare, purely negative satire of definite, strictly limited
contemporary manifestation. It would be more correct (though not quite accurate to say that these
images are oriented toward the entire scope of the contemporary world, toward the present as such,
and that they represent this present in the sequence of the past giving birth to the future, or in the
past’s pregnant death.
Of course here Bakhtin is referring to the grotesque image of the dying body; however, insomuch as
carnival makes light of individual death through the medium of cosmic laughter, the carnivalesque does not
contradict the theory of chronotopicity so much as it infuses the Rabelaisian chronotope with a particular
space-time that contradicts other chronotopes—especially chronotopes such as the Newtonian, Kantian or
the neo-Platonic chronotope, all of which abstract from the present materially grounded time-space. See
also Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel,” The Dialogic Imagination, p. 198:
The nature of Rabelaisian laughter is revealed in its full vividness in the death series, at the points
of intersection of this series with the eating, drinking and sexual series [, also found in the
carnivalesque,] and in its direct association of death with the birth of new life. Here are revealed
the authentic sources and traditions of this laughter; the application of this laughter to the whole
wide world of sociohistorical life (“the epic of laughter”), to an epoch, or more precisely to the
boundary line between two epochs, exposing its perspectives and its subsequent historical
generative force.
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For Raskolnikov’s coffin-esque room, see Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 170.
Cf. Benjamin, “The Work of Art…”, The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility, § xi,
p. 31. Strictly speaking, Gardiner link’s the process of significant contextualization with the artistic device
of defamiliarization in Bakhtin to the Benjaminian auratic character of the work of art—recontextualization of this sort was the bread and butter of the Dadaist movement. See The Dialogics of
Critique, p. 92. Nevertheless, there is nothing to restrict us from expanding the defamiliarising power of
the sign with the invocation of an auratic aspect of the chronotopic motif in the work of art, since the
motif—and the word—invokes not only the genre to which it belongs but is also the particular expression
of the type of perceptual time-space to which it belongs—i.e., chronotopicity is also invoked by the auratic
character of the word.
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discussion of the media of film and its transparent use of the apparatus to convey the preservation of one’s
humanity in the face of the apparatus, cf. Benjamin, “The Work of Art…”, The Work of Art in the Age of
Technological Reproducibility, § X, p. 29-31. Film is not all bad for Benjamin. Film tends to open up the
room for play. See Benjamin, “The Work of Art…”, The Work of Art in the Age of Technological
Reproducibility, § xi, f.n. 23, pp. 48-9: “what is lost in the withering of semblance and the decay of the
aura in works of art is matched by a huge gain in the scope for play [Spiel-Raum]. This space for play is
widest in film. In film, the element of semblance has been entirely displaced by the element of play.”
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See Gardiner, The Dialogics of Critique, p. 172:
It is indeed strange that Bakhtin, although living in a period of accelerated technological and
industrial development (that was, of course, even more pronounced in the Russian context, which
helps explain why Russia was such a hot-bed of avant-garde modernist experimentation in the arts,
architecture, design and so on) never attempts to assess the nature or importance of other forms of
media (film, photography, radio) and their possible impact on the prevailing structures of human
communication and consciousness. This is congruent with his seeming lack of interest in
modernist literature an his habitual utilization of pre-bourgeois writers as exemplars of a literary
dialogism (Cervantes, Rabelais, classical Greek and Roman authors) or, in the case of Dostoevsky,
on the periphery of capitalism. Parenthetically, it could be remarked that the loss of ‘immediacy’
in speech and writing was inevitable with the consolidation of typographic culture after the mid19th century. This can certainly be ‘dehumanizing’ in a certain sense, but in another (pace
Benjamin’s account of the demise of ‘aura’ in the modern world as developed in his seminal essay
“The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproduction”), typographic culture is at least
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clearly derived from the same complex of ideas: “The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the
History of Realism (toward a Historical Typology of the novel),” apparently a surviving fragment
of a complete book on the novel of education, and portions of “Epic and Novel.”
676
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 13.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 28.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 25.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 26.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, pp. 26-7.
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Goethe makes this claim during his discussion of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, “Influence of the New
Philosophy”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 229:
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had long since appeared, but it lay completely beyond my orbit.
Nevertheless, I was present at many a discussion of it, and with some attentiveness I could notice
the old question continually reappearing, namely, how much we ourselves and how much the
outside world contributes to our intellectual existence. I had never separated the two and when I
did philosophize about subjects in my own way, I did so with unconscious naïvety, in the belief
that I actually saw my views before my very eyes.
682
Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings,
p. 235.
683
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 28. See also Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form
One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 235. There one Dr. Heinroth is quoted as
praising Goethe for his “objectively active” thought in which there is an absolute reciprocity between
seeing and Goethe’s thought ingressing into objects.
684
Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings,
p. 236: the concrete situatedness of the object is at root of Goethe’s poetic method and explains his
“inclination toward the occasional poems to which I was irresistibly inspired by special occurrences. And
thus it has been noticed that something particular is always at the basis of each of [his] poems, a definite
nucleus for a more or less significant product.”
685
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 28.
686
The recounting of this encounter is really a charming anecdote; Goethe’s ambivalent feeling for the
young poet was clearly present in this first meeting. See “Propitious Encounter”, Goethe’s Botanical
Writings, p. 217:
We had reached [Schiller’s] house, the conversation lured me in. I gave a spirited explanation of
my theory of the metamorphosis of plants with graphic pen sketches of a symbolic plant. He
listened and looked with great interest, with unerring comprehension, but when I had ended, he
shook his head, saying, “That is not an empiric experience, it is an idea.” I was taken aback and
somewhat irritated, for the disparity of our viewpoints was here sharply delineated. ... Controlling
myself, I replied, “How splendid that I have ideas without knowing it, and can see them before my
very eyes.”
687
Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 58.
688
Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 59.
689
Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 61. See also Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 31-2:
Goethe goes on to develop in detail the method he has chosen for translating organic Italian time
into German, that is, ordinary time, and he appends a sketch in which he uses concentric circles to
give a visually graphic image of the relationship between the two kinds of time.
This organic Italian time (the calculation of time proceeds from the actual setting of the
sun, which, of course, takes place at different hours during different times of the year) is
inseparably interwoven with all of Italian life, and Goethe repeatedly turns his attention to the
latter. All his descriptions of Italian everyday life are pervaded with a sense of everyday time,
measured by the pleasures and labour of the vital human life. This feeling for time profoundly
permeates his celebrated description of the Roman Carnival.
Cf. Reproduced from Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 61 where the diagram is reproduced.
690
Cf. Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 29.
691
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 33. Bakhtin points to the example in Italian Journey
in which Goethe rebukes a tourist guide for trying to infer an ancient battle scene which had left no visible
trace. See also Goethe, Italian Journey, pp. 227-9. There, on his visit to a “pleasant valley in the
mountains south of Palermo,” Goethe provides us the example of the “stupid” tourist guide who arbitrarily
mixed up “past and present” by trying to make visible an ancient battle fought by Hannibal during the Punic
Wars. Goethe had no interest in these invisible remnants of the past. He spent the day collecting sediment
that had been deposited on the banks of the river, instead, and tried to explain to the guide that these
“specimens” were visible traces of the “prehistoric earth.”
692
Goethe, “Propitious Encounter”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 217
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 33.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 33.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 34.
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 34.
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Goethe, “Preliminary Notes for a Philosophy of Plants”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings, p. 93.
698
See Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 36:
In the process of developing a sense of time, Goethe overcomes the ghostly (Gespenstermässiges),
the terrifying (Unerfreuliches), and the unaccountable (Unzuberechnendes), which were strong in
his initial feeling of a merged past and present. But the very sense of the merging of times
remained in complete and undiminished force and freshness until the end of his life, blossoming
into an authentic fullness of time. The ghostly, terrifying, and unaccountable in it were
surmounted by the structural aspects, already disclosed by us above, which are inherent in n this
way of visualizing time: the aspect of an essential link between the past and present, the aspect of
the necessity of the past and the necessity of its place in a line of continuous development, the
aspect of the creative effectiveness of the past, and, finally, the aspect of the past and present being
linked to a necessary future.
699
Goethe qtd. in Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 35.
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701
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Goethe qtd. in Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 35.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 36.
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Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 36.
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Goethe, “Considerable Assistance form One Ingeniously Chosen Word”, Goethe’s Botanical Writings,
p. 236.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 446, written on the occasion of Goethe’s second visit to Rome.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 446.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 447.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 447.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 450.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 451.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 451.
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See Goethe, Italian Journey, pp. 451, 454, 548-9, and 460, respectively.
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Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 459.
715
See Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 461.
716
See Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 467.
717
See Goethe, Italian Journey, p. 469.
718
For more on the Roman, or “New Year” Carnival’s relation to Rabelais and his World¸ see also
Gardiner, Dialogics of Critique, pp. 44-5.
719
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 37.
720
Cf. the phrase which we have already quoted from “Art and Answerability, Art and Answerability, p. 1:
“I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and understood in art....”
721
Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, pp. 353-4: “when discourse is torn from
reality, it is fatal for the word itself as well: words grow sickly, lose semantic depth and flexibility, the
capacity and to expand and renew their meanings in new living contexts—they essentially die as discourse,
for the signifying word lives beyond itself, that is, it lives by means of directing its purposiveness outward.”
Bakhtin draws a similar conclusion in terms of the fullness of the folkloric chronotope vs. the negativity
with which its eschatological aspect regards the present form of reality, “Forms of Time and of the
Chronotope in the Novel”, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 149:
Images of [the eschatological future] were inevitably located in the past, or transferred to some
Land of Cockaigne, beyond the seven seas; their dissimilarity to a cruel and evil present-day
reality was measured by temporal and spatial distancing. But such images were not taken out of
time as such, they were not torn out of the real and material world of the here-and-now. On the
contrary, one might even say that all the energy of this presumed future served only to deepen and
intensify images of material here-and-now reality, and above all the image of the living, corporeal
human being: a man grew up at the future’s expense.
The complexity of this passage cannot go without further commentary. The eschatological and mythic
chronotopes that seek a golden utopic age are not wholly without their own striving for reality, but the
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reality for which they strive remains a mere possibility. The eschatological vision takes itself for a univocal
and monological absolute, but it is nevertheless embedded in what it sees as a very real and oppressive
present.
722
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 40.
723
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 42.
724
Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 42.
725
There Kant distinguished once and for all between a true genetic history of nature and its mere
description on which the taxonomies of Linnaeus and Buffon had been constructed. See for example Sloan,
“Buffon, German Biology, Historical Interpretation of Biological Species”, p. 126:
But in his 1777 paper, Kant achieved a clarity far greater than that of Buffon, with his explicit
distinction between Naturgeschichte, meaning the genetic history of nature, and
Naturbeschreibung, the description of nature…. With this new basis, Kant was able to achieve a
significantly greater rigour of analysis than Buffon ever achieved, and with this made a rigorous
distinction between the taxonomic concepts as applied in the domain of Naturbeschreibung from
their function in Naturgeschichte.
See also Kant’s paper “Determination of the Concept of the Human Race”, Anthropology, History, and
Education, p. 153:
Initially, when looking only for characters of comparison (in terms of similarity or dissimilarity),
one obtains classes of creatures under a species. If one looks further to their phyletic origin, then it
must become apparent whether those classes are so many different kinds or only races. The wolf,
the fox, the jackal, the hyena and the house dog are so many classes of four-footed animals. If one
assumes that each of them require a special phyletic origin, then they are so many kinds.
However, if one concedes that they also could have originated from one phylum, then they are
only races of the latter. In natural history (which is concerned only with generation and phyletic
origination kind and species are not distinguished as such. This distinction occurs solely in the
description of nature, in which only the comparison of marks matters. What is here called kind, is
often only called race there.
See also Kant’s “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” where this distinction is most clearly
stated: “I would propose the word physiography (Physiographie) for the description of nature and the word
physiogony (Physiogonie) for natural history.”
726
See also Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman”, Speech Genres, p. 40: “In it, space and time are bound together
into one inseparable knot. Terrestrial space and human history are inseparable from one another in
Goethe’s integrated concrete vision. This is what makes historical time in his creative work so dense and
materialized, and space so humanly interpreted and intensive.” See also p. 42:
Everything—from an abstract idea to a piece of rock on the bank of a stream—bears the stamp of
time, is saturated with time, and assumes its form and meaning in time. Therefore, everything is
intensive in Goethe’s world; it contains no inanimate, immobile, petrified places, no immutable
background that does not participate in action and emergence (in events), no deteriorations or sets.
In Goethe’s world there are no events, plots, or temporal motifs that are not related in an essential
way to the particular spatial place of their occurrence, that could occur anywhere or nowhere
(‘eternal’ plots and motifs). Everything in this world is a time-space, a true chronotope.
...everything is intensive....
727
Heraclitus, Fragment 52, The Cosmic Fragments, xiii. Deleuze tells us that “Heraclitus had two
thoughts which are like ciphers: according to one there is no being, everything is becoming; according to
the other, being is the being of becoming as such”, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 23. These, it would seem,
are related to the two tables, the chance of the gods and the necessity of man: “these two tables are not two
worlds. They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and
midday, the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back.” Cf. also p. 24: “the child
plays, withdraws from the game and returns to it. In this game of becoming, the being of becoming also
plays the game with itself; the aeon (time), says Heraclitus, is a child who plays, plays at draughts.”
728
Shakespeare, “Sonnet 124”, The Complete Sonnets and Poems, p. 629.
729
Marx, Marx and Modernity: Key Readings and Commentary, ed. Robert J. Antonio, p. 227.
730
Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 435-6.
731
Dostoevsky, “Rebellion”, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 255.
732
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part III., “Of the Apostates”, § 3, p. 201.
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I have borrowed the phrase “By the testicles of Hercules” from “Book IV” of Gargantua and
Pantagruel, p. 535. “Bum-gut” comes from the same, Chapter IV, “Book I”, p. 13.
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